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Auditing and Regulations 
Abstract 
Effective financial reporting has become of critical importance in our economic markets 
and the international accounting scandals of the last decades have accentuated the role of 
auditing in protecting stakeholders' interests and contributing to an efficient functioning 
of financial markets. 
Auditing regulation has been at the centre of recent international debates (e.g. EU Green 
paper; 2010) and different regulatory interventions have been put in place in different 
countries and in different periods of time. 
From a theoretical point of view, there is a broad spectrum of regulatory choices that 
legislators could take, the extremes being self-regulation and government direct 
interventions. 
My empirical works focus on two extreme examples of how regulation may interact with 
auditing processes with the ultimate objective of improving financial information and 
therefore enhancing the effectiveness of financial markets. 
In one case, I analyze whether an example of enforced audit self-regulation is effective in 
improving audit quality and ultimately, reporting quality. In particular, I analyze the 
mandatory audit rotation rule, i.e. the rule imposing the change of the auditor after a 
specified period of time, as a potential means to increase auditor independence and 
therefore audit and reporting quality. 
I then study a case of direct monitoring activity on reporting quality carried out by a 
supervising body, namely the SEC in the U.S., and how this interacts and influences audit 
processes. 
The evidence collected may be useful to legislators in order to understand the potential 
effects of different audit regulatory choices and therefore to effectively address the need 
of high-quality auditing which strongly characterize our economic markets especially 
after the financial and accounting scandals. 
9 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The communication about effective information of organizations' levels of 
performance has become of crucial strategic importance in our economic markets. 
Investors base their investment decisions on companies reporting, and so in general do 
financial institutions and creditors when deciding lending strategies. Other users of 
financial information include tax authorities, costumers, competitors etc .. A conflict of 
interest arises in all these cases as the reporting organizations have incentives to distort 
information in their favour in order to enhance their position in the contractual exchanges 
between the parties (Mookherjee and Png, 1989). 
Moreover, the reporting entity typically holds a higher amount of information 
compared to external users, and could use this disparity to pursue its own interests, 
potentially creating harmful externalities to the market. The presence of information 
asymmetry in contractual exchanges has been defined as one source of market failure 
(Cooter and Ulen, 2008). Taking the example of Akerlof (1970) in his famous work "the 
market for lemons", the buyer of a car does not know beforehand all the latent defects. 
Therefore purchasers may end up paying too much for cars of low quality or refraining 
from purchases because of a fear of latent defects. Similarly, investors are often at a 
disadvantage in learning the true performance of a company and this could lead financial 
markets not to work in a socially optimal manner. In order to protect the recipients of 
financial information and to avoid these kinds of market failures, financial reporting in 
most economies is subject to audit by an independent external party, who should assess 
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the truth and fairness of the information communicated to the market. This reVIew 
process enhances the reliability of reporting information for the other contracting parties 
who do not take part in the information preparation (Arrunada, 2000). Given the critical 
role of this monitoring activity in assuring the correct functioning of financial markets, a 
crucial question becomes how to regulate the three parties involved: reporting companies, 
auditors of financial information and the external users. 
From a theoretical point of view, two extreme possibilities could be envisioned: 
effective self-regulation versus direct governmental regulation. 
Arrunada (2000) strongly favours the first solution. He argues that the market is by 
itself able to punish market failures and dynamically to realign contractual mechanisms in 
order to reach another stage of market equilibrium. The Enron scandal represents in his 
view a good example. After the company's bankruptcy in 2002, Arthur Andersen ceased 
to trade as an audit partnership and new policies were voluntarily adopted by all players. 
Companies voluntarily decided to change their auditors or to limit the purchase of non-
audit services and audit firms enhanced their internal control mechanisms, for example 
by imposing the rotation of the responsible partner after a specific number of years. 
Arrunada (2000) considers these as examples of low-cost strategies that increase 
auditors' incentives to perform a high quality monitoring activity thus preventing the risk 
of other market failures. Other examples of low-cost strategies would be the threat of 
loosing reputation capital and the use of client specific assets which would be lost in case 
of a break in the audit-client contractual relationship. Finally, the author argues that the 
audit market would naturally self-regulate having all the incentives to implement policies 
that would increase its perceived independence (thus its value) in the other contracting 
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parties' eyes (client, investors or the market). Under this perspective, the market would 
automatically implement self-regulated policies that would optimize contractual 
efficiency among the parties. Gunninghan and Rees (1997) define self-regulation as 
"regulatory processes whereby an industry-level organization sets rules and standards 
relating to the conduct of firms in the industry". The benefits of self-regulation are indeed 
apparent: speed, flexibility to market circumstances and lower costs. However, complete 
self regulation may not always be optimal. As some critics argue, it could also be used by 
interested parties to give the "appearance" of regulation, thereby warding off the more 
direct and effective government intervention (Braithwaite, 2010). In fact, corporations 
may not be necessarily willing to regulate themselves effectively. As argued by 
Braithwaite (2010), recommendations will stop many violations which are costly for the 
company, are cost-neutral or eventually benefit the company only in the short-term, but 
all others will be commonly ignored. This could be the case for auditors, who could 
potentially prefer to collude with the client's management in order to pursue economic 
interests. In such cases, the optimal regulatory choice would perhaps be "enforced self-
regulation", where the government compels each company to write a set of rules tailored 
to the unique set or contingencies facing that firm. 
Direct government regulation represents the opposite extreme within the spectrum 
of regulatory choices. There is however a general consensus in the literature which stands 
against this regulatory framework. Gunninghan and Rees (1997) state that direct 
government regulation has become less attractive in the last decades and Braithwaite 
(1982) argues that the state simply cannot afford to perform an effective job on its own as 
it lacks critical competences given its position as neither producer nor client (Arrunada, 
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1999). Arrunada (1999) also argues that regulators would lack the right incentives as the 
may tend to exaggerate eventual external effects and therefore require higher than 
optimum quality (that would involve no additional cost for them) and they may be 
influenced by private interests alien to the audit market. Notwithstanding this argument, 
governments in Europe have tightened their involvement in audit regulation after the 
Enron scandal, as full self-regulation turned out to be not an effective solution (1. Tiedje, 
in Quick et aI., 2008). The result of this was the issuance of the new Directive on 
Statutory Audit in 2006. 
My empirical works focus on two extreme examples of how regulation may interact 
with auditing processes with the ultimate objective of improving financial information 
and therefore enhance the effectiveness of financial markets. 
In one case, I analyze whether an example of enforced audit self-regulation is 
effective in improving audit quality and ultimately, reporting quality. In particular, I 
analyze the mandatory audit rotation rule, i.e. the rule imposing the change of the auditor 
after a specified period of time, as a potential means to increase auditor independence and 
therefore audit and reporting quality. 
I then study a case of direct monitoring activity on reporting quality carried out by a 
supervising body, namely the SEC in the U.S., and how this interacts and influences audit 
processes. 
I obviously do not pretend to find a definite answer on how to put an end to 
corporate scandals and management misbehaviours. My intention is to provide empirical 
evidence to better understand how different regulatory mechanisms may effectively and 
14 
efficiently work to Improve financial information and therefore enhance investors' 
confidence. 
1.2 Empirical Studies 
This dissertation includes three empirical studies. 
Specifically, the first two empirical papers analyze the mandatory rotation rule and 
its role in affecting auditing and reporting quality. As briefly mentioned above, this rule 
imposes a requirement for a specific company to change its auditor after a certain number 
of years, drawing from the underlying assumption that extended audit tenure may weaken 
auditor independence and impair the auditor's capacity for critical judgement. After the 
Enron scandal, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 introduced in the US a mandatory five-
year rotation for the leading and concurring audit partner as a way of increasing audit 
quality and to restore public confidence. The possibility of extending the requirement to 
audit firms was also taken into consideration, but the decision was postponed as the 
potential effects of the rule were not clear (GAO 2003). In fact, although academics and 
legislators around the world are still debating the potential benefits and costs associated 
with the mandatory rotation rule, there is still a call for supporting empirical evidence, 
mainly due to a lack of data availability. This is due to two main problems. At the partner 
level, research is made difficult given the lack of data availability, as the name of the 
responsible partner is not published in the audit opinions of most of the countries in 
which the rule is actually in force. At the firm level, the analysis of the empirical effects 
of the rule is hindered because a mandatory rotation rule is actually in force in very few 
countries, most of which are developing countries. 
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For this reason, I decided to take advantage of a unique research setting, Italy. Here 
the mandatory rotation rule is in force both at the firm level since 1975, and at the partner 
level since 2006 and the name of the partner is available on the audit opinion. By 
analyzing this audit environment I wanted to shed light on the actual benefits and costs 
and help to improve the general understanding of this rule. Such evidence will be useful 
for legislators around the world who are considering introducing or even extending this 
rule in their own countries. 
The specific topics covered in these two papers are summarized below. 
The first empirical paper is entitled "Partner mandatory rotations versus firm 
mandatory rotations: Evidence from Italy". In this study, I contrast the relation of partner 
versus firm mandatory rotations with higher audit quality. Partner mandatory rotations 
are likely to be associated with lower information asymmetry, lower loss of client 
specific knowledge and smaller set up costs as the audit firm (and in most cases the audit 
team) remains unchanged. Therefore I expect partner mandatory rotations to be 
associated with higher audit quality compared to firm mandatory rotations. I test this 
using a unique research setting where the mandatory rotation rule (MRR) is in force both 
at firm and at partner level. Consistent with expectations, I find that only partner 
mandatory rotations are positively associated with improved audit quality. I also predict 
that the relation between auditor rotations and audit quality is a function of the 
complexity of the audit task and demand for audit quality. I find that the positive 
association between partner mandatory rotations and audit quality is weaker in a highly 
complex audit environment. However, I do not find that this association varies with my 
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proxies for the demand for audit quality. Finally, I show that voluntary rotations are not 
associated with improved audit quality. 
The second paper is entitled "Mandatory auditor rotation, earnings conservatism 
and the mandatory adoption of IFRS". This paper examines the role of audit firm 
rotations and auditor tenure for the supply of reporting conservatism, measured as timely 
loss recognition (TLR) - under the regime of mandatory audit firm rotations in Italy. We 
argue that conservative reporting will be required by more independent auditors and 
auditors facing high information asymmetry. If auditor independence and information 
asymmetry increase (decrease) with auditor rotations (tenure), we expect to find positive 
(negative) association between mandatory rotations (tenure) and reporting conservatism. 
If, however, the ability to identify and report a loss event in a timely fashion improves 
over time, and is a dominant factor, we expect to find the reverse. We further investigate 
whether these relations are moderated by external demand for TLR. Finally, we explore 
whether the adoption of IFRS in 2005 has influenced the relations between tenure and 
auditor rotations and TLR. We provide some evidence supporting a positive association 
between mandatory firm rotations and TLR and that this association is stronger after 
2005 than before 2001. We document that TLR is positively related to tenure, but only 
before the adoption of IFRS. We also find evidence consistent with new auditors 
responding to external demand for conservatism, but not incumbent auditors. 
In the last empirical chapter I focus on a different monitoring mechanism, which is 
the direct review activity that the SEC carries out on the quality of the financial 
statements of listed companies in the U.S .. The title of the third empirical study is "An 
Analysis of External Auditor Fees Following Sec Comment Letters". 
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The SEC is mandated to review the filings of public companies in the U.S. to 
confirm that they comply with federal securities laws. Where the SEC staff believe that 
filings could be improved or enhanced, a formal Comment Letter is issued to the 
company setting out the commission's concerns. While the responsibility for reply and 
the need to make any additional disclosures if necessary, lies completely with the 
company, it is likely that the external auditor will become involved especially in the case 
where the application of specific accounting standards is questioned. This research 
considers first whether external auditor fees rise following the issue of a comment letter 
and secondly whether for those letters that question the application of specific accounting 
standards the fee change, if any, is more significant than for other reasons for letter 
issuance. Then an investigation of persistence effects is conducted to see whether the data 
is consistent with the hypothesis that SEC investigation and production of a comment 
letter result in the external auditor materially revising the overall reporting risk measure 
they assign to a client when setting risk adjusted audit prices in subsequent years, even 
when no further comment letter is received. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 includes an overview of the different possible regulatory frameworks in 
the auditing area, and Chapter 3 provides a more detailed description of the two 
regulatory mechanisms analyzed in this dissertation. Firstly, the regulation involving 
mandatory auditor rotations is presented. In particular, the analysis focuses on Italy first, 
which represents the research setting of my first two empirical works. A brief description 
of the way the rule is applied in Europe follows and finally the U.S, system regarding the 
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mandatory rotation rule is presented. The second part of chapter 3 describes the SEC 
Comment letter process in depth, starting from the provision included in the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 and then moving to the actual steps the SEC Staff and the filer usually 
undertake when a Comment letter is sent. 
The three empirical works which constitute the core of this thesis follow. 
Chapter 4 presents the first work "Partner Mandatory Rotations Versus Firm 
Mandatory Rotations: Evidence From Italy". Chapter 5 follows which includes the paper 
"Mandatory auditor rotation, earnings conservatism and the mandatory introduction of 
IFRS". Finally, the study "An Analysis of External Auditor Fees Following Sec 
Comment Letters" is presented in Chapter 6. These last three chapters present the typical 
structure of articles included in international Journals. They first introduce the topic, 
highlighting the motivation behind the study. Then the main relevant literature is 
presented, followed by the development of the main hypotheses tested in the research. 
The data and the methodology used in the study follow, together with the description of 
the main results and any eventual additional tests performed in order to assess their 
soundness. The final comments and conclusions are included in the last section of each 
chapter. 
All references included in the thesis are listed in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AUDIT REGULATORY CHOICES 
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2. Audit Regulatory Choices 
In this chapter different possible audit regulatory choices are presented, together 
with a description of different regulatory frameworks. The final part of this chapter 
positions this study within these frameworks and justifies the choice of the specific audit 
regulations analyzed in this dissertation. 
2.1 Self-Regulation & Market Mechanisms 
Arrunada (2010) strongly favours the development and use of safeguards provided 
by the free action of market forces. In his opinion, the role of regulation should be 
minimal and only limited to facilitating audit firms, audit clients and self-regulatory 
bodies to discover the most efficient mix of services and corresponding quality 
safeguards directly through market interactions. Supporters of direct-market regulation 
state that the threat of auditors bending to clients' pressure caused by lax regulation is 
limited by reputation mechanisms. Even in that extreme case in which the law does not 
provide any system of sanctions against auditors and it is therefore impossible for 
external parties to sue them, there would still be private enforcement and sanctioning 
instruments. In fact a certain level of demand for high quality would still be present as it 
is independent of regulatory mechanisms: in such cases, switching decisions and low 
rents would castigate underperformance. 
Another example of "market mechanism" which represents an incentive to carry 
out high quality audits regardless of the level of regulation consists of what is called in 
technical terms "quasi rents'". Auditors who benefit from a high-level reputation would be 
21 
able to charge a higher price compared to their competitors who contract without a 
reputation. Therefore quasi-rents are defined as the difference between the remuneration 
for any productive resource in its current use and the maximum remuneration which 
would be received for its best alternative use (Arrunada, 2010). Of course, the continued 
receipt of these higher fees is only ensured if the service provided is characterized by a 
level of quality which is consistent with expectations. 
Complete free-audit market monitoring, although strongly favoured by some 
academics (Arrunada, 2010), is only theoretical and not present in any developed 
economy, the reason being the importance of investors interests and of guaranteeing a 
minimum level of investors' protection in those cases in which the incentives to produce 
high-quality audits mentioned above are not sufficiently strong. 
This is the reason why self-regulation as an alternative regulatory framework has 
traditionally encountered strong support (Gunninghan and Rees, 1997; Braithwaite, 
1982). 
2. 1. 1 Self-regulation 
Self-regulation is defined as "regulatory processes whereby an industry-level 
organization sets rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the industry" 
(Gunninghan and Rees, 1997). The supporters of self-regulation state that it is usually 
characterized by speed, flexibility and relatively low costs. On the other hand, opponents 
of th is form of regulation state that it may not always be optimal, as private incentives 
could impair its effectiveness. Braithwaite (2010) concludes that recommendations will 
stop many violations which are costly for the company, are cost-neutral or eventually 
benefit the company only in the short-term, but all others will be commonly ignored. This 
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might be the case for auditors who may potentially prefer to collude with the client's 
management in order to pursue economic interests. In such cases, the optimal regulatory 
choice would perhaps be "enforced self-regulation", where the government compels each 
company to write a set of rules tailored to the unique setting or contingencies facing that 
firm. 
Enforced Self-regulation 
Enforced self-regulation in the audit-market is typically aimed at protecting auditor 
independence. Independence has two main dimensions: real independence (or 
independence in mind) and perceived independence. The first concerns the actual state of 
mind of the auditor and how the auditor acts in/deals with a specific situation. Perceived 
independence refers to the level of independence in appearance, or, in other words, how 
independent the auditor is perceived by the market. Auditors have all the incentives to 
increase at least the level of perceived independence, as this enhances reputation and 
consequently the level of quasi-rents. However, it is the real independence which in the 
end affects audit quality: for this reasons legislators in different countries have 
traditionally intervened to guarantee that certain specific requirements be put in place 
with the ultimate objective of increasing audit quality. These requirements typically 
concerned the length of audit-client relationship and the del ivery of non-audit services. 
The mandatory rotation rule 
Long audit tenure may lead to potentially dangerous "cosy relationships" between 
the auditor and the client. For this reason Big audit firms have often introduced internal 
policies of auditor partner rotations in order to impose breaks on tight auditor-client 
relationships and therefore increase auditor independence. As these decisions were in 
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most cases voluntarily adopted by the audit firms themselves, they may be considered as 
examples of self-regulation. Different legislators around the world then decided to 
mandate auditor rotation by law after a specific period of time, either at the partner or at 
the firm level!. This, in turn, represents an example of enforced self-regulation, where the 
imposition comes directly from the legislator. It is important to notice that currently the 
EU is considering a dual MRR by also requiring audit firm rotations (EC's Green Paper -
Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis, 2010). 
Provision of non-audit services 
Non-audit services refer to the provIsIon of activities such as advice and 
consultancy, assistance and support in implementing transactions, tax services, advising 
on information systems and other specific tasks. Even if this phenomenon is quite 
widespread (in the late nineties non-audit services would count approximately 50% of 
total audit fees, Arrunada, 2010), it has often been argued that the provision of this kind 
of services could reduce the level of audit independence by increasing the economic 
bonding between the auditor and the client. Even if empirical evidence does not provide 
consistent results related to the effects of non-audit services on auditor independence 
(Arrunada, 2010), legislators around the world are introducing different restrictions to the 
possibility of delivering services different from the audit ones. The initial debate started 
in the early seventies in the United States2, and the first reference in the European context 
is the Cadbury Report in the U.K, which strongly opposed the non-audit service 
restriction as it was considered an unnecessary and costly constraint on the freedom of 
companies to choose their sources of advice. The Cadbury Report only recommended 
1 The mandatory rotation rule is described in depth in Chapter 3, section 3.1. 
2 [n 1976, following a series of financial scanalds, a Senate sub-committee reported that one of the most 
critical causes of alleged lack of independence was the delivery of non-audit services 
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audit clients to publish the amount of fees related to non-audit work. The Spanish 
Oliviera Report on auditor independence in 1998 used a similar approach by only 
including a recommendation for audit committees and Boards of Directors to monitor the 
delivery of non-audit services. In 1996, the European Commission published the Green 
Paper on the role of the statutory auditor in the EU. The text of the report, however, has 
been subject to different criticisms as potentially subject to different kind of interpretation 
(Arrunada, 2010). In short, the Green Paper does not prohibit ex-ante the delivery of non-
audit service, but proposes a set of restrictions that should avoid the auditor finding 
him/herself in any situation which could compromise his/her independence. 
Looking at the choices adopted in different countries around the word, three different 
groups can be distinguished (Arrunada, 2010): 
- Countries which allow all types of non-audit services to be provided: these 
include Australia, Canada, Ireland, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Sweden and the U.K .. 
General rules safeguarding auditor independence are still present in these countries. 
- Countries which prohibit the provision of any type of non-audit services: Belgium 
and France prohibit audit firms from providing audit services by the same legal entity, 
while in Italy the prohibition is clear-cut. 
- Countries which prohibit only certain types of non-audit activities: almost all 
countries (with the exception of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the U.K.) prohibit the delivery of book-keeping 
and accountancy services. Japan prohibits tax and management advisory activities while 
Denmark, Greece, Japan, Portugal and the U.S. forbid the provision of legal services. 
Finally, Japan and Portugal prohibits the delivery of corporate recovery services. 
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2.1.2 Direct Intervention 
On the opposite side of the regulatory spectrum we find what is called "direct 
intervention". Direct involvement from the State has traditionally encountered strong 
opposition among academics (Gunninghan and Rees, 1997; Braithwaite, 1982; Arrunada, 
1999, 2010), the reason being that in most cases the State does not have sufficient 
competence to carry out an efficient and effective monitoring role. 
Strict legal intervention 
According to Arrunada (20 I 0) extremely restrictive legal sanctions should be 
avoided. The assumption behind this position is that when auditors are subject to 
disproportionate liability, their independence may be trivialized. In this case, the auditor 
could be tempted to "play safe", and base his/her opinion only on evidence that can be 
easily verified by third parties (so called "hard" infonnation), as this may be used as a 
defence in litigation. "Soft" infonnation, i.e. all kind of evidence which is not verifiable 
by external parties, will not generally be considered by external auditors, even if it 
contains valuable infonnation for the auditor. As mentioned before, the market is usually 
more competent than the legal system in verifying qualitative infonnation and therefore 
even soft infonnation would be used by auditors should the sanctions be decided by the 
market as opposed to the legal system. This would benefit the ultimate quality of the 
audit. 
SEC reviews 
One extreme example of strict legal intervention is represented by the situation in 
which direct review processes on financial infonnation are carried out directly by the 
State or other governmental bodies. A typical example is represented by the periodical 
reviews carried out by the SEC in the U.S. on the financial reporting of all listed 
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compames. In the worst scenano In which the financial information is seriously 
misreported, the review process leads to enforcement action. The latter typically has a 
significant financial impact on the company's stock prices, suggesting that the review 
process performed by the SEC is considered to be of high value by investors. In most 
cases the review process will lead to no action by the SEC, meaning that the Staff 
considers the company's financial reporting true and fair. If the SEC has doubts or 
concerns, the Staff sends a comment letter to the company and the latter has a limited 
period of time (typically 10 days) to answer the SEC concerns. Even if the severity of 
these comment letters is much lower compared to cases of enforcement, prior literature 
has demonstrated that comment letters do have an impact on financial markets3. These 
findings suggest that, at least with reference to this specific monitoring activity 
performed directly by the SEC, the Staff is considered capable and with the right 
competences to perform a valuable monitoring activity. 
- The role of peer reviews 
The accounting profession in the U.S. represents an interesting example of shifting from 
a self-regulated environment to a more strictly regulated industry, where governmental 
bodies playa significant role. 
Until the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, audit firms in the U.S. were 
subject to a specific form of self/regulated peer reviews. These were administered by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). However, this particular 
form of self-regulation was heavily criticized (Hilary and Lennox, 2005) for two main 
reasons. First of all, reviews were conducted by interviewing audit staff and inspecting 
3 Chen and Johnston (2010) find evidence of reduced return volatility and trading volume around earnings 
announcements that were preceded by a SEC comment letter 
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working papers but they did not directly test the validity or appropriateness of the audit 
work. Secondly, it was claimed that reviewers lacked incentives to perform independent 
reviews as they may have been subject to future reviews, potentially carried out by the 
same firms they had to report on. For this reason, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
replaced this form of self-regulation with independent inspections conducted directly by 
the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) which can be defined as a 
"non-profit corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of public 
companies in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in 
the preparation of informative, accurate and independent audit reports,,4. This with the 
aim of restoring investors' confidence in the role of independent auditors after the well 
known accounting scandals and audit failures. In short, the PCAOB may be defined as 
the "auditor of auditors". The PCAOB has broad powers, including the ability to levy 
fines and other penalties for non-compliance (from expanded civil liability to outright 
criminal prosecution). 
2.1.3 The focus of this thesis 
This thesis focuses on two different regulatory examples within the broad spectrum of 
legislative frameworks outlined in this chapter. In particular, the first two empirical 
chapters of this dissertation (ch. 4 and ch. 5) analyze the mandatory auditor rotation rule 
as an example of auditing enforced self-regulation. The aim of this part is to understand 
whether such regulatory choice is valid in enhancing audit quality and therefore reporting 
quality. The third empirical chapter focuses on SEC oversight activity as an example of 
direct governmental monitoring perfonned on the financial statements of listed 
4 www. Pcaobus.org 
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companies in the U.S .. In particular, we analyze how auditors react to SEC comment 
letters when adjusting their risk pricing: increases in auditor fees after the receipt of a 
SEC comment letter would suggest that auditors believe in the validity of the SEC 
monitoring process and therefore perceive an increase in risk. By examining the effects of 
SEC comment letters and auditors risk-adjusted fees, therefore, we can also better 
understand how the two monitoring parties (SEC and external auditors) interact with the 
ultimate objective of assuring transparent financial information. The choice of these two 
different regulatory frameworks is motivated by two main reasons. Firstly, given that the 
possible auditing legislative frameworks may be quite different and therefore the 
empirical analysis of the effectiveness of each regulatory solution is almost impossible, 
by looking at two extreme examples (self-regulation and direct oversight activity) I 
endeavour to catch their most important aspects. This in order to obtain a good 
understanding of where these two opposite regulatory tendencies might lead. Secondly, 
while most of the regulatory choices outlined above have already been empirically 
studied5, the call for empirical evidence on the two areas analyzed in this dissertation still 
exists, for reasons which will be outlined in more detail in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
5 For example, the effect of non-audit fees on auditor independence (De Fond et aI., 2002); the 
effectiveness of PCAOB review process (Hilary and Lennox, 2000): the effects of SEC enforcement 
actions (Feroz et al. 1991; Beneish, 1999) etc. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
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3. Institutional background 
In this chapter the two different types of regulation analyzed in the empirical part 
are presented. Firstly, the audit mandatory rotation rule is presented, with particular focus 
on Italy, Europe and the U.S. The SEC Comment Letter process is then presented, as an 
example of direct oversight activity carried out by a governmental supervisory body on 
the quality of reporting information. 
- Self-Regulation 
- Direct Intervention 
- The role of peer reviews 
3. 1 The mandatory rotation rule: application around the world 
3.1.1 Italy 
Auditing activity was only introduced in Italy in the early twenties, with a 
considerable delay compared with the Anglo-Saxon experience. The first Italian 
regulation dealing with audit activity dates back to 1936, when the Regio Decreto n. 1648 
was enforced. 
However, audit regulation remained unchanged for the following twenty-five years. 
3.1.1.1 Presidential Decree 13611975 
Presidential Decree n .13 6/1975 which enforced Law 21611974 aimed at filling in 
the regulatory gap concerning audit activity. This law regulated audit activity and 
mandated all listed companies to subject their financial statements to an audit which was 
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to be carried out by audit firms registered in a specific register ("Albo Speciale") ruled by 
Article 2. of the Decree introduced for the first time in Italy the mandatory rotation 
rule for listed companies, marking a difference between Italian audit regulation and the 
audit disciplines of most other countries. In particular, art.2, comma 4 stated. 
"L 'incarico ha la durata di tre esercizi, puo essere rinnovato per non piu 
di due volte e puo essere nuovamente conferito alia stessa societa solo 
dopo il decorso di cinque esercizi ". 
(Audit engagement lasts three years, may be renewed maximum twice and 
the same audit firm cannot be reappointed before five years have passed) 
This was defined as the "3+3+3" scheme according to which the length of the audit 
engagement was set at three years and this was renewable maximum twice, setting the 
limit for audit firm tenure at nine years. A "cooling-off' period of five years before the 
same audit firm could be reappointed was also introduced. 
The assumption behind this choice was that auditor independence might be 
threatened in long-lasting relationship between the auditor and the client's management. 
No rotation requirements were introduced at the partner level. 
3.1.1.2 Legislative Decree 58/1998 
The peculiarity of the Italian audit regulation was confirmed with the reform of the 
Italian commercial law which was enforced in 1998. 
6 Consob (Commissione Nazionale per Ie Societa e la Borsa) is the public authority responsible for 
regulating the Italian securities market. 
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Article 159 confirmed the previous regulation, stating that: 
L'incarico [di revisione] dura tre esercizi e puo essere rinnovato per non 
piit di due volte. 
(The audit engagement lasts three years and cannot be renewed more than twice). 
The "3+3+3" scheme was confirmed, but no specific mention of the cooling-off 
period was foreseen. This caused different interpretative problems (Tron and Sanzo, 
1998; Donativi, 1998), as it may have been suggesting a complete impossibility of future 
reappointments. CONSOB therefore intervened, stating that a cooling-off period of three 
years still had to be applied (CONSOB, 2001). Again, no rotation requirements were 
introduced for the audit partners. 
3.1.1.3 Law 26212005 
The period between the above mentioned enforcement of Legislative Decree 
58/1998 and the following legislative reform was characterized by two important events 
which significantly influenced the new audit regulation. On the one hand, as mentioned 
in the following paragraph 3.1.2, a set of European Community interventions were 
issued, drawing from the Green Paper of 1996 on the role of auditors in the European 
Union. On the other hand, a series of financial scandals shocked the financial markets 
around the world. In particular, the Parmalat scandal pushed the Italian Legislator to set 
up regulatory interventions aimed at strengthening the role of auditors in Italy, thus 
restoring investors' confidence. Drawing from this, law n.262/2005 was enforced. 
With reference to audit activity and in particular to the mandatory rotation regime, 
article 159 of Legislative Decree 58/1998 was substituted with the following (art. 159.4) 
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L'incarico [di revisione] ha durata di sei esercizi, e rinnovabile una sola 
volta e non puo essere rinnovato se non siano decorsi almeno tre anni 
dalla data di cessazione del precedente. In caso di rinnovo il responsabile 
della revisione deve essere sostituito con altro soggetto. (art. 159.4) 
(The audit engagement lasts six years, can be renewed only once and the 
same audit company cannot be reappointed if at least three years have not 
passed since the previous engagement. In case of renewal, the responsible 
partner has to rotate) 
Moreover, Article 160 introduces for the first time in Italy the mandatory rotation 
of the audit partner. 
L 'incarico di responsabile della revisione dei bilanci di una stessa societa 
non puo essere esercitato dalla medesima persona per un periodo 
eccedente sei esercizi sociali, ne questa persona puo assumere 
nuovamente tale incarico, relativamente alia revisione dei bilanci della 
medesima societa 0 di societa da essa con tro lIate, ad essa collegate, che 
la controllano 0 sono sottoposte a comune control/o, neppure per conto di 
una diversa societa di revisione, se non siano decorsi almeno tre anni 
dalla cessazione del precedente. (art. 160.1-quater) 
(The audit partner engagement cannot exceed six years. The same partner 
cannot be reappointed to audit the financial statements of the client, or of 
controlled or associate companies, or of companies controlling the same 
client or which are subject to common control, even for a different audit 
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company, if at least three years have not passed since the previous 
engagement}. (art. 160.1-quater) 
However, the interpretation of this new formulation of the rule was subject to 
different critiques (Sabbatini 2006). The original intention of the Italian legislator was in 
fact to reduce the maximum limit for audit firm engagement from nine to six years and to 
introduce partner mandatory rotation as mentioned in the Parliamentary Act of the 3rd of 
March 2005 (Documento Camera dei Deputati). However, during the legislative iter, the 
formulation of the rule was slightly modified with critical consequences. The greatest 
part of the professionals and academics interpreted the rule as introducing a "6+6" 
scheme, where the six years engagement could be renewed once, up to a maximum limit 
of twelve years and the mandatory rotation of the responsible partner was introduced 
after the end of the first engagement. The cooling off period was interpreted as being 
three years both for the audit firm and for the audit partner. 
3.1.1.4 Legislative Decree 30312006 
As the reform introduced by the previous legislation was subject to hard critiques, 
the Italian Legislator issued the Legislative Decree 303/2006. 
The previous disputed article 159.4 was modified. 
L'incarico ha durata di nove esercizi e non puo essere rinnovato 0 
nuovamente conferito se non siano decorsi almeno tre anni dalla data di 
cessazione del precedente. 
(The length of the audit engagement is nine years, and cannot be renewed 
before at least three years have passed since the previous engagement) 
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The maXImum limit for the audit engagement was brought back to mne years. 
According to this new formulation, however, the "three years scheme" was abolished. 
The dispositions concerning the partner rotation and the cooling-off period were not 
modified. 
To conclude, a brief summary of the development of the Italian audit regulation is 
presented in the Table below. 
Table 3.1 
D.P.R D.Lgs. Law D.Lgs. 
136/1975 58/1998 26212005 303/2006 
Audit Firm Rotation 3+3+3 3+3+3 6+6 9 
Audit Firm Cooling-off Period 5 3 3 3 
Partner Rotation No no 6 6 
Partner Cooling-off Period No no 3 3 
3.1.2 The European Union 
There are many differences concerning the rotation rules around the world, and 
these were even more pronounced before the European Union began its long 
hannonization process. Apart from Italy, other European countries which applied the 
rotation rule at the firm level were Spain and Austria, but in both cases the rule was 
abandoned7• Partner mandatory rotation, on the other hand, has encountered much greater 
7 Austria enforced the firm mandatory rotation rule every six years (with a cooling-off period of three 
years) in 2004, but the rule was then dropped in 2005 as a consequence of commercial law reform 
(Cameran et ai., 2007). Spain introduced mandatory firm rotation every nine years in 1988, but the 
requirement was then abolished in 1995 and therefore never enforced (Carrera et aI., 2007) 
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support. In particular, apart from Italy, the UK and The Netherlands introduced 
mandatory partner rotation every five years in 2003. Germany and France enforced the 
rule in 2002 and 2003 respectively, mandating partner rotations every six years. 
With the so called "Green Paper" of 1996, the European Union provided an 
overview of auditing legislations among the State members, at the same time highlighting 
intemational best practices which could be applied within the EU. In particular, at 
paragraph 4.15 on "auditor independence", the EU commissions mention the mandatory 
audit firm rotation as a means of reducing the "familiarity threat". However, this 
eventuality is not considered favourably as "the arguments in favour of such a system are 
not conclusive". Greater support is given to partner mandatory rotation: "A solution 
which could enhance the perception of the auditor's objectivity, without causing the 
efficiency and quality drawbacks of firm rotation, could consist in setting up a rotation of 
audit partners within the same firm". Even if in paragraph 4.16 it is acknowledged that 
auditor independence is dealt with differently in Member States, being based on different 
traditions and experiences, the Green Paper definitely expresses preference for the partner 
mandatory rotation rule. 
The Commission Recommendation of 16th of May 2002, "Auditing: Commission 
Issues Recommendations on independence of statutory auditors" represents another 
important step towards understanding the position of EU with reference to auditor 
rotation rules. It is stated that "to mitigate a familiarity or trust threat to the independence 
of a Statutory Auditor who is engaged to audit an Audit Client of public interest, the 
requirement to replace the Engagement Partner and the other Key Audit Partners of the 
Engagement Team within a reasonable period of time cannot be replaced by other 
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safeguards". Finally, in the Eighth Company Law Directive, 2006/43/EC, the partner 
mandatory rotation rule is again considered as an effective means to increase auditor 
independence. Article 26 of the Directive states: "In order to reinforce the independence 
of auditors of public-interest entities, the key audit partner(s) auditing such entities 
should rotate. To organise such rotation, Member States should require a change of key 
audit partner(s) dealing with an audited entity, while allowing the audit firm with which 
the key audit partner(s) is/are associated to continue being the statutory auditor of such 
entity. Where a Member State considers it appropriate in order to attain the objectives 
pursued, that Member State might, alternatively, require a change of audit firm, without 
prejudice to Article 42(2)". Article 42.(2) continues "Member States shall ensure that the 
key audit partner(s) responsible for carrying out a statutory audit rotate(s) from the audit 
engagement within a maximum period of seven years from the date of appointment and 
is/are allowed to participate in the audit of the audited entity again after a period of at 
least two years". 
To conclude, mandatory firm rotation seems to be considered as an additional 
requirement which should not however substitute partner rotations. The European Union 
therefore confirms its greater preference for partner rotations as an effective means of 
enhancing audit independence. 
3.1.3 The United States 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICP A) introduced the 
mandatory partner rotation in the eighties as a fundamental aspect of monitoring 
processes for those audit firms serving SEC registrants (SEC, 2003). In particular, partner 
rotations every seven years (with a cooling-off period of two years) were introduced as a 
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means to enhance auditor independence and to bring in "new fresh eyes". On the other 
hand, the "Securitises Exchange Act" did not discipline mandatory rotations until the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was introduced in 2002. 
In Section 203, SOX states: 
"AUDIT PARTNER ROTATION - It shall be unlawful for a registered 
public accounting firm to provide audit services to an issuer if the lead 
(or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility for the 
audit), or the audit partner responsible for reviewing the audit, has 
performed audit services for that issuer in each of the 5 previous fiscal 
years of that issuer ". 
Partner mandatory rotations every five years were therefore legally introduced, 
whereas no specific mention is made with reference to the cooling-off period. 
Concerning firm mandatory rotations, on the other hand, the US legislator opted for 
a more cautious approach. Sec. 207, titled "Study of Mandatory Rotation of Registered 
Public Accounting firms", delegates The Comptroller General of the United States to 
"conduct a study and review of the potential effects of requiring the mandatory rotation 
of registered public accounting firms". The results of this study, which were presented in 
a report in November 2003, did not support the introduction of the rule and therefore the 
decision was postponed until the debate around the costs and benefits of mandatory firm 
rotations provided consistent opinions. 
It is also important to mention Sec. 208, which delegates the SEC to issue a final 
regulation to carry out each subsection of the above mentioned rule. A fertile debate 
arose in which all interested parties were asked to provide comments on the proposed 
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rules. This lead the SEC to issue the "Final rule: Strengthening the Commissions' 
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence", which was enforced on 6th of May 
2003. The mandatory partner rotation was confirmed for both the leading and concurring 
partner every five years and a cooling-off period of five years was also introduced. 
Particularly interesting is the definition of audit partner given by the rule: 
"(. . .) a member of the audit engagement team who has responsibility for 
decision-making on significant auditing, accounting, and reporting 
matters that affect the financial statements or who maintains regular 
contact with management and the audit committee. The term (. . .) would 
include the lead and concurring partners, partners such as relationship 
partners who serve the client at the issuer or parent level, other than a 
partner who consults with other on the audit engagement team during the 
audit, review, attestation engagement regarding technical or industry-
specific issues, transactions, or events, and the lead partner on 
subsidiaries of the issuer whose assets or revenues constitute 20% or 
more of the consolidates assets or revenues of the issuer". 
The rule therefore does not take into consideration the formal appointment of the 
partner, but rather the substantial type of relationship between the partner and the audit 
client. 
F or partners different from the lead and the concurring ones, a different regime of 
rotation is introduced, i.e. every seven years and with a cooling-off period of two years. 
This, in order to facilitate the switch of the leading and ofthe concurring partners through 
appropriate processes. The incoming partner could in fact enter the engagement team in 
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the two years prior to the switch before becoming the new lead partner. This, in order to 
overcome the potential loss of client specific knowledge deriving from the rotation. 
Finally, the "Final Rule" gives the option to small audit firms (Le. with less than ten 
partners and five SEC Registrants) of not applying the rule but to be subject to periodical 
audits from the Public Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 
3.1.4 The rest of the world 
The other countries which have adopted the firm mandatory rotation rule are very 
few. The mandatory audit firm rotation is enforced, apart from Italy, in Brazil, South 
Korea, Singapore and India (Cameran et aI., 2007). Brazil introduced mandatory firm 
rotation for banks every five years in 1996 and then extended the rule for all listed 
companies in 1999. South Korea adopted the rule in 2006, mandating a change of the 
audit firm every six years. In Singapore the mandatory rotation rule is enforced only for 
banks (starting from 2002), while in India it was set for banks, privatised insurance 
companies and Governmental companies in 2004. 
Partner mandatory rotation is more commonly enforced. It is also recommended by 
the IFAC Codes of Ethics (Section 290). 
Apart from the European Union and United States mentioned above, the rule has 
been enforced in Japan (GAO 203), Australia (Ryen et aI, 2007), and Malaysia (Sori and 
Karbhari, 2005). In particular, Japan introduced partner mandatory rotation in 2004, 
requiring the rotation for both the lead and concurring partner every seven years. 
Australian regulation is similar to the US one: starting from December 2003 the rotation 
of the lead partner every seven years was imposed. In December 2004 the rule became 
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stricter, imposing mandatory rotation every five years for both the lead and concurring 
partner. Finally, Malaysia introduced the rotation every seven years. 
3.2 Arguments supporting and contrasting the mandatory 
rotation rule 
There are different views concerning the effects that mandatory audit rotation may 
have on audit quality. Some of these arguments support the assumption that audit quality 
decreases as audit tenure (the number of years the same auditor performs its services to 
the same client company) increases. The supporters of this view look favourably at the 
introduction of the mandatory rotation rule as an instrument aimed at enhancing audit 
quality. Equally logical arguments exist which support the opposite, i.e. audit quality 
should increase as audit tenure increases. Obviously, in this case, the mandatory rotation 
rule is not seen as an effective way of improving the quality of an audit and thus 
protecting the investors' interests. 
All of these arguments may be valid both at the audit firm and at the partner level, 
even if some differences exist which justify a separate discussion. 
3.2.1 Audit firm level 
At the audit firm level, mandatory audit rotation may enhance audit quality by 
increasing auditor independence. Long-term relationships between the auditor and audit 
client management may become "cosy" and thus may work to affect the monitoring role 
played by the auditor adversely. Under this perspective, rotation would lead to better 
audit quality when the new auditor comes in, as it would impose a break in the 
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development of tight personal relationships between the two parties (Mautz and 
Sharaf, 1961; Farmer et al,1987; Brody and Moscove, 1998). 
Moreover, it is argued that mandatory rotation may Increase auditor critical 
capacity, as "new fresh eyes" approach the financial statement, (AI CPA 1978; Hoyle 
1978; McLaren 1958). If the auditor performs its services towards the same client for a 
long number of years, it could incur in a type of professional routine (Shockley, 1981). 
The auditor could in fact assume to have a good knowledge of the clients' internal control 
procedures and accounting systems, thus decreasing the level of scepticism which should 
instead characterize every audit. Moreover, it is possible that the auditor will tend to rely 
on previous years' controls, especially with reference to the extensive internal control 
tests which are usually performed during the initial years of the audit engagement. In all 
these cases, the probability of not discovering an error or a mistake increases, and thus 
audit quality would decrease. 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that imposing the rotation of the audit 
firm may decrease audit quality. Supporters of this view state that in the first years of the 
engagement period the new auditor is usually less familiar or experienced with the affairs 
of the new audited firm, and, for this reason, it can monitor audit quality less effectively 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002; Petty and Cuganesan, 1996; Geiger and Raghumamdan, 
2002; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Myers et aI., 2003). This suggests that audit quality will 
be poorer following the auditor rotation. 
In addition, the incoming auditor will have strong incentives to retain the new client 
and therefore to use a low balling approach (DeAngelo, 1981). If ｾｾ＠ new auditor is 
f 
unable to recoup the "low balling costs" deriving from delivering its service to the new 
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client, he/she will exert less effort thus reducing audit quality (Beck, Frecka, and 
Solomon 1988). 
Finally, another argument against the effectiveness of the mandatory rotation rule 
looks at the last years of the engagement. In this period, should the rule be applied, the 
economic incentive to perform high quality audit decreases and hence earnings quality 
would suffer, as the incumbent auditor reaches the termination of the contract (Elitzur 
and Falk, 1996). However, one needs to take into account the possibility that reputation 
and litigation considerations on part of the incumbent auditor may attenuate this 
argument. 
3.2.2 Audit partner level 
At the partner level, arguments in favour and against the mandatory rotation rule 
are similar, but it is still necessary to highlight some differences. 
As before, the mandatory rotation of the audit partner should enhance audit 
independence by imposing a limit to the management-partner relationship and should 
increase partners' critical ability as a new "fresh look" comes in. 
On the other hand, the loss of client specific knowledge which could characterize 
the first years of a new engagement should be lower at the partner level compared to the 
audit firm level. In the former case, in fact, the audit team usually remains unchanged 
whereas the overall guidance and responsibility come from a new perspective (Hamilton 
et al. 2005). Moreover, the transfer of knowledge from the previous auditor to the new 
one is much more immediate if the change occurs at the partner level as compared to the 
firm level. 
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Also the economic incentives may be different at the partner level compared to the 
firm level. At the beginning of the new engagement the audit partner does not feel the 
same pressure to keep the audit fees low in order to "capture" the client (the so called 
"low balling approach") as the audit firm does when starting a new audit. This means that 
the partner will not have to eventually lower the level of quality of the audit in the initial 
years of tenure in order to recoup these "low balling" costs. On the other hand, the 
economic incentives of the partner to bond and retain the client are stronger compared to 
those of the audit firm, during the last years of tenure. The economic impact of losing one 
client will be much higher at the partner level than at the firm level: the audit firm, in 
fact, will be generally able to diversify such potential loss on a wider client portfolio 
(Fargher et aI., 2008). 
Perhaps for all these reasons, the introduction of the mandatory audit partner 
rotation has incurred much less resistance across the legislators in different countries, as 
illustrated in the previous section (3.1) of this chapter. 
Finally, it is important to highlight the audit profession's point of view. In order to 
assess auditors' opinion about the mandatory rotation rule, the partners responsible for 
professional practice and audit risk management of the Big Four in Italy were 
interviewed8. The opinions declared were substantially uniform and are consistent with 
what was stated by auditors and accountants in 2003 in the US, when the SEC asked the 
accounting profession for opinions about the mandatory rotation rule on the occasion of 
8 In particular, the interviews were made with partners of the Milan offices ofDeloitte, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Kpmg. For all the Big Four audit firms, the office in Milan is the largest in 
Italy. 
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the drawing up of the "final regulation" (SEC 208) 9. Audit firms seem to consider 
partner rotation as an effective way to enhance audit quality, while they perceive firm 
rotation as a highly inefficient means which could even harm the quality of the audit. 
Each time the audit firm is obliged to leave a client company, they state, it has to set up 
appropriate organizational procedures in order to allocate all the professionals and the 
personnel who were following the former client to other audit engagements; this, with 
unavoidable impact to other audits of the same firm. TIlis internal turnover, if not 
properly managed, could increase the audit risk and therefore reduce audit quality. On the 
other hand, auditors confirmed that the substitution of the responsible partner is usually 
highly supported by the entire organization, with the aim of optimizing the transfer of 
client knowledge from the previous partner to the new one: therefore the loss of client 
specific knowledge deriving form the partner rotation should be minimized. 
In conclusion, there exist arguments both in favour and against the mandatory audit 
rotation rule and both views seem perfectly logical. For this reason, there is a general 
need for empirical evidence, in order to assess what actually happens to audit quality 
when the audit firm or the engagement partner rotates. This academic evidence would 
help governments, legislators and professional boards in different countries to draw up 
effective and efficient rules aimed at enhancing audit independence, audit quality and, by 
this, restoring the confidence both of the public and of investors. 
3.3. SEC comment letters 
9 All the comments left by the accounting profession are still available on line at 
\\;WW .sec.goy /rules/proposed/s7 4902.shtml. 
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For many years the SEC periodically reviewed the financial reports of publicly 
listed companies in the US with the general aim of enhancing the quality and timeliness 
of disclosure in order to provide investors with all the information needed to efficiently 
undertake investments' decisions. This process became more and more critical after the 
financial scandals of the last decades and the recent financial crisis, as these events made 
it clear that corporate disclosure needed careful monitoring and improvements. 
The reviews are undertaken by the SEC Division of Corporation Finance and are 
intended to provide companies with comments on filings they believe could be enhanced 
or improved. These generally consist of requests for supplemental infonnation, filings 
amendments or improvements to future filings. 
The primary objective of the comment letter process is therefore to "improve 
disclosure for investors". The process generally involves many interactions between the 
Division and the issuer for clarifications or additional infonnation regarding the 
disclosure in the filing. 
3.3.1 Section 408 Sarbanes Oxley Act 
After the Enron's scandal the Sarbanes Oxley Act was signed in 2002, as a 
response to major concerns about abuses of management discretion and to the 
consequential loss of investors' confidence. A particular section of this Act dealt with the 
comment letters process which was therefore fonnalized by law. In particular, Section 
408 (a) states: 
SEC. 408. ENHANCED REVIEW OF PERIODIC DISCLOSURES BY 
ISSUERS. 
(aJ REGULAR AND SYSTEMATIC REVIEW.-The Commission shall 
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review disclosures made by issuers reporting under section 13(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (including reports filed on Form 
10-K), and which have a class of securities listed on a national securities 
exchange or traded on an automated quotation facility of a national 
securities association, on a regular and systematic basis for the protection 
of investors. Such review shall include a review of an issuer's financial 
statement. 
Under this requirement, the Commission assures that all issuers of securities or 
whose securities are publicly traded provide all available information, whether positive or 
negative, that might be relevant for any investment decision 10. 
Section 408 also defines the periodicity with which the Commission undertakes 
these reviews. 
c) MINIMUM REVIEW PERlOD.-In no event shall an issuer required to 
file reports under section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 be reviewed under this section less frequently than once every 3 
years. 
SEC staff have therefore to review every issuer's disclosure, including financial 
reports (lOQs, 10Ks, S1-4), at least once every three years. This assures consistency and 
continuity in the SEC reviews. Until 2005, the SEC released comment letters and the 
relative answers for complete reviews under specific requests, in compliance with the 
"Freedom Information Act". In 2004, however, SEC began to receive an increasing 
number of requests for comment letters and responses. In order to enhance transparency 
and to permit equal access to investors to public information, the SEC decided to publish, 
10 SEC website: http://www.sec.gov 
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free of charge, all comment letters and response letters related to all disclosure filings 
made after the 1 st of August 2004 11 . These are released on EDGARI2 no earlier than 45 
days. SEC however allowed filers to request confidential treatment for some portions of 
the response letters (Rule 83). Generally, the filer cannot use the comment process as a 
defence in any securities related litigation against them and the SEC staff may even 
require the filer to specify this in writing (the so called 'Tandy letter"). 
3.3.2 Comment letter process 
3.3.2.1 The review process 
The comment letter process involves different steps by from the SEC Division and 
by the filer. This process is undertaken by the Division of Corporation Process, which 
includes eleven offices each of which is specialized in a specific industry. In particular, 
the offices relate to the following industries: 
Health care and insurance 
Consumer products 
Computers and online services 
Natural resources and food 
Structured finance, transportation, and leisure 
Manufacturing and construction 
Financial Services 
Real estate and business services 
11 SEC website: http://www.sec.gov 
12 Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system. This database "performs automated 
collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies and others who 
are required by law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)". SEC \\ebsite: 
http://www.sec.gov 
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Beverages, apparel, and health care services 
Electronics and machinery 
Telecommunications 
In 2009, SEC issued an overview of the filing review process, in order to increase 
the transparency of the comment letter process13 . The Commission receives the filings 
and sends them to the relative office Division for a first screening review. As mentioned 
previously, according to Section 408 of SOX, the Division has to review every filer at 
least once every three years. In addition to this, the Division reviews transactional filings 
(IPO filings, business combination transactions and proxy solicitations). The preliminary 
review performed at this stage by the Division is aimed at selecting filings requiring 
additional reviews and it is performed taking the perspective of potential investors. The 
extent of this further review varies and depends on different factors. In particular, there 
are three levels of reviews which are usually undertaken by a Staff accountant, the 
"examiner", within the Division: 
Full cover-to-cover review: the entire filing is reviewed to assess compliance with 
federal securities laws and regulations 
Financial statement review: the financial statement and related disclosure is 
reviewed, in order to assess compliance with GAAP and other disclosure 
requirements of the federal securities laws and regulations 
Targeted issue review: only specific items of filer's disclosure are reviewed, in 
order to assess compliance with GAAP and/or federal securities laws and 
regulations. 
13 This is available on SEC website www.sec.gov 
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If the exammer believes that filings may be improved or extended to make 
disclosure clearer for investors, he will propose a comment letter. Then a second 
examiner, referred to as the "reviewer", will perform a second review and will confirm or 
amend the examiners' comments. The comment letter is then sent by the Division to the 
filer and a communication process begins between the issuer, the staff accountant and the 
examiner. Before answering the comments via a written letter, the filer has the right to 
speak directly with the examiner or reviewer and ask for clarifications. The issuer may 
even ask to involve more senior Division staff, Division's Office of Chief Accountant or 
the Division Director. Once the filer has answered via a written letter to the Staff, the 
latter can either accept the answer closing the process, or send a follow-up letter asking 
for additional disclosure or filings' amendments therefore starting an iteration process. 
Once the Division believes the process can be closed, it will issue a "no further 
comment" letter to confirm the filing is complete. 
3.3.2.2 The selection process 
The process by which the Division selects filings for review is not public and it is 
strictly confidential. Section 408(b) of SOX, however, indicates some factors the Staff 
should consider when selecting filings for review. These reflect a distinct perspective on 
the relative benefits of the regulatory review process (Alexander and Haneiy, 2007): 
b) REVIEW CRITERIA.-For purposes oJscheduling the reviews 
required by subsection (a), the Commission shall consider, among 
other Jactors-
(1) issuers that have issued material restatements oj financial 
results; 
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(2) issuers that experience significant volatility in their 
stock price as compared to other issuers; 
(3) issuers with the largest market capitalization; 
(4) emerging companies with disparities in price to earning 
ratios; 
(5) issuers whose operations significantly affect any material 
sector of the economy; and 
(6) any other factors that the Commission may consider 
relevant. 
Historically, the Staff has mainly focused on marked capitalization. A study from 
the SEC Office of Economic Analysis (Alexander and Hanely, 2007), however, showed 
that the third factor is not a good predictor of non-compliance risk l4 . Factors (2) and (4) 
indicate cases where investor uncertainty and incentives for management discretion are 
higher (Alexander and Hanely, 2007). Factors (3) and factors (5) are considered to be 
associated with a higher potential harm from non-compliance. 
3.3.2.3 Filers' answer process 
On the other hand, some best practice developed for filers regarding how to manage 
SEC comment letters. In general, the filer should answer within the time framework 
indicated in the letter (usually approximately ten days). 
14 The authors use disclosure of material weaknesses in internal controls under Section 404 as an indicator 
for non-compliance. They found that relatively few large size companies have disclosed material 
weaknesses in internal controls. Price volatility, on the other hand, is found to bee a good predictor for non-
compliance. 
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A report by Deloitte l5 summanzes the steps the filer should take In order to 
successfully deal with answering comment letters. These are listed below: 
Consider the impact the comment letter may have on filer's ability to Issue 
financial statements. 
Consult with its SEC legal counsel about the impact the comment letter may have 
on the certifications contained in its Form lO-K. 
Consult with its auditors to discuss the impact the comment letter may have on 
their ability to issue the current-year audit report. 
Review the comment letter immediately and respond to the SEC staff reviewer 
(named in the letter) within the time indicated in the comment letter (usually 10 
business days). If possible, the registrant should not request an extension, since 
this may delay resolution of the comment letter. However, in certain 
circumstances, the registrant should consider requesting an extension to provide a 
more thorough and complete response which addresses all of the staffs 
comments. 
If the registrant does not fully understand any specific comment, it should contact 
its SEC staff reviewer quickly for clarification so that it can provide an 
appropriate response. 
Include in the response a discussion of supporting authoritative accounting 
literature and references to the specific paragraph(s) from the standard(s). 
15 "Best practices for managing unresolved SEC Comment letters", in SEC Comment Letters on Domestic 
Registrants. Deloitte (2009) 
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Because some comments may request disclosure in future filings, the registrant 
should consider including such disclosure in the response letter to potentially 
eliminate additional requests from its SEC staff reviewer. 
If an immaterial disclosure is requested, the registrant should consider explaining 
why the disclosure is immaterial instead of including the immaterial disclosure in 
future filings. 
Maintain contact with its SEC staff reviewer and make the reviewer aware of the 
registrant's required timing (on the basis of its current-year filing deadlines). 
If the registrant has not received a follow-up letter or been contacted within two 
weeks of filing the initial response letter, the registrant should contact its SEC 
staff reviewer to determine the status of the comments. The registrant should 
promptly address any follow-up questions. 
If the registrant is uncertain about whether its review has been completed without 
further comments, it should ask the SEC staff reviewer about the status of the 
review. If the review is complete, the registrant should ask the reviewer for a 
completion letter. 
A specific section of the report deals with oral comments. SEC Division staff may 
in fact provide an oral comment instead of a written letter. In this case, it is suggested to 
specifically ask the SEC reviewer the format with which the answer should be given. If 
no preference is stated by the SEC staff, best practice still suggests to formally answering 
via a written letter. 
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3.3.3 Contents of comment letters 
As the purpose of the comment letter process is to enhance the quality of the filers' 
disclosure, it is not surprising that the recent financial tunnoil which affected global 
markets greatly influenced the areas on which SEC Staff is focusing its major attention. 
In particular, the topics which received greater scrutiny by the SEC are the following16: 
Management discussion and analysis 
The purpose of the Management discussion and analysis section (MD&A) is to 
provide investors with infonnation "necessary to an understanding of [a company's] 
financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of operations,,17. In 
particular, the Commission Statement About Management's Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations18, states that the three main objectives of 
the MD&A section are: 
to provide a narrative explanation of a company's financial statements that enables 
investors to see the company through the eyes of management; 
to enhance the overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which 
financial information should be analyzed; and 
to provide infonnation about the quality of, and potential variability of, a 
company's earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain the likelihood 
that past perfonnance is indicative of future performance. 
MD&A should include an analysis of the company's business from the perspective 
of management. As stated by the document released by SEC "Interpretation: Commission 
16 SEC Comment Letters on Domestic Registrants. Deloitte (2009) 
17 Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.303(a)] 
18 Release No. 33-8056 (Jan. 22, 2002) [67 FR 3746] ("January 2002 Release"). 
55 
Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations,,19, MD&A should not include a mere narrative description of the 
financial statements. The document should rather take advantage of the unique 
perspective and knowledge management has of its own business to provide useful key 
information to investors. 
Especially after the financial crisis, SEC Staff attention focused on this section of 
the financial statement with the aim of enhancing the quality and usefulness of MD&A. 
In particular, many comment letters highlighted the need for filers to include in the 
MD&A an appropriate explanation of how the financial crisis is affecting or had affected 
their results from operations, liquidity and capital resources. MD&A should also address 
any material opportunity, risks and uncertainties deriving from the current economic 
environment. Different comment letters also asked for a deeper explanation of the 
methods and assumptions behind any critical accounting estimation. In some cases the 
Division also asks for a sensitivity analysis of estimates to change on the bases of 
outcomes that are reasonably likely to occur and that would have a material effect. 
Goodwill impairment and testing 
SEC staff has frequently asked filers to extend disclosure regarding goodwill 
impairment and testing. The Division has stressed the fact that such disclosure should not 
only focus on the noncash nature of the impairment, but it should also include a 
discussion about the business and economic condition behind the charge. Additional 
information has also been requested concerning three main areas: 
Identification of impairment recoverability risks: additional quantitative 
information lS often required by SEC Staff about potential risks to revenue, 
19 17 CFR Prnts 211,231 and 241; Release Nos. 33-8350; 34-48960; FR-72. Available on www.sec.gov 
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operating results and asset recoverability. This should help investors to judge the 
probability of future impainnents 
Detailed sensitivity analysis: SEC Staff has asked for additional disclosure 
concerning the sensitivity analyses used in order to monitor both the validity of 
the impairment charges, and of the management's estimation process. 
Managerial judgement process: SEC is requiring companies to make their 
impairment "thought process" clearer, giving more details about the inputs they 
used in their calculations. 
Particular attention has also been given to the identification process of determining 
the unit level at which goodwill has been allocated and then tested for impainnent, the 
detennination of fair value of each reporting unit, the reasons behind the choice of a 
particular valuation model, and the detennination of goodwill in cases fair value is less 
than book value. 
Valuation allowances and repatriation offoreign earnings 
Another topic on which SEC has recently focused its attention in its comment 
letters has been the assessment of the realizability of deferred tax assets. In particular, 
additional disclosure has been required in the MD&A concerning the effects that the 
financial crisis had or is still having on the realization assessments of deferred tax 
balances and any triggering events or new evidence leading to an adjustment of the 
valuation allowance as well as the effect on current and future results. Moreover, SEC 
staff also required registrants to clearly disclose the current and anticipated effects of 
repatriation of foreign earnings and to disclose whether such repatriation is uncertain: in 
this case, the effects that this would have on future earnings should also be highlighted. 
Fair Value 
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SEC staff has frequently required registrants to provide additional transparent 
disclosure (within the MD&A section) about the use of unobservable inputs in fair value 
measurements, especially for financial securities not actively traded. In particular, when 
the determination of fair value is based on unobservable items, SEC requires filers to 
disclose: 
the valuation models used to determine fair value; 
the significant inputs into the models; 
the assumptions that could have the greatest impact on the valuations; 
whether, how, and why those assumptions have changed from prior years. 
In cases in which the filer holds inactive financial instruments, SEC reqUIres 
additional information regarding the criteria used to determine whether the market is 
inactive, the specific date on which the filer last considered the market active, and the 
period passed between that date and the fair value measurement date. 
Debt 
Again as a consequence of the financial crisis, SEC Staff has focused its attention 
on companies' solvability and solidity. In particular, additional disclosure and 
explanations concerning debt covenance compliance has been required in several 
comment letters. For example, filers have been asked to disclose the most material debt-
covenant ratios as of the latest balance sheet date compared with the minimum/maximum 
allowed in the contract. 
Other than-temporary impairments (OTT!) 
Registrants are asked to clarify the assumptions (both positive and negative) behind 
the choice of not recording an investment with a fair value below cost as an "other than 
temporary investment". The Staff has also frequently asked questions in order to check 
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whether the impairment was recorded in the appropriate period and to clarifY how the 
company considered any eventual change in factors since the last reporting period. 
Pensions 
SEC Staff has also focused its attentions also on the key assumptions behind the 
calculation of pension obligation and fair value of plan assets. In particular, comments 
have focused on: 
how registrants considered recent market performance in determining their key 
assumptions, 
the impact of recent market performance on net periodic benefit cost and an 
entity's financial position, and 
the impact of funding requirements on an entity's liquidity. 
Staff members have also frequently asked for sensitivity analyses in order to 
pinpoint to investors what are the assumptions the change of which might have a material 
effect on reporting (e.g. discount rate used to calculate the company's benefit obligation). 
Executive compensation 
Many comment letters recently focused on executive compensation and in 
particular on the analysis of factors affecting executives' compensation and policies. On 
many occasions SEC Staff have asked registrants to disclose any eventual performance 
targets on which executive compensation is based. For competition reasons, filers are 
allowed not to publish performance targets or factors involving confidential information. 
If required, however, they must disclose information about how feasible it would be for 
executives to meet such targets. 
Other topics 
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SEC Staff have recently focused on the above topic especially as a consequence of 
the financial crisis and the impact this had on financial reporting. Apart from this, SEC 
Division has continued to scrutiny with particular attention other disclosure areas such as 
revenue recognition, business combination, segment reporting, financial instruments and 
impairments. 
3.3.4 Examples of comment letters 
3.3.4.1 McCormick & Company 
UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, 
D.C. 20549-4628 
DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE 
February 26, 2010 
Mr. Gordon M. Stetz, Jr. 
Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer 
McCormick & Company, Incorporated 
18 Loveton Cirlce 
Sparks, MD 21152 
Re: McCormick & Company, Incorporated 
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended November 30, 2009 
Filed January 28, 2010 
File No. 1-14920 
Dear Mr. Stetz: 
We have reviewed your filing and have the following comments. Please provide a 
written response to our comments. Please be as detailed as necessary in your explanation. 
In some of our comments, we may ask you to provide us with information so we may 
better understand your disclosure. After rf"viewing this information, we may raise 
additional comments. 
Please understand that the purpose of our review process is to assist you in your 
compliance with the applicable disclosure requirements and to enhance the overall 
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disclosure in your filing. We look forward to working with you in these respects. We 
welcome any questions you may have about our comments or any other aspect of our 
review. Feel free to call us at the telephone numbers listed at the end ofthis letter. 
Form 1 O-K for Fiscal Year Ended November 30,2009 
Exhibit 13 
2009 Annual Report 
Liquidity and Financial Condition, page 27 
1. We note in both your 2009 Highlights section and the Chairman's message to 
shareholders, your disclosures indicate you have reduced your cash conversion cycle 
by five days in both 2009 and 2008. Please tell us and expand your liquidity 
disclosures to explain your cash conversion cycle including the following: 
a. Explain how your cash conversion cycle is calculated. 
b. Explain how the five day reductions in the cash conversion cycle were 
achieved in both 2009 and 2008, by quantifying the working capital changes 
that impacted these reductions. 
c. Provide disclosure of the number of days in your cash conversion cycle for 
each period end presented. 
d. Provide indicative disclosures regarding the extent to which you expect the 
downward trend in your cash conversion cycle to continue in the future. 
Financial Statements 
Note 2 - Acquisitions, page 47 
1. We note your disclosure that indicates you have reclassified $135.5 million of your 
preliminary Lawry's purchase price allocation from brands and other intangible assets 
to goodwill. Please tell us and disclose the reasons why you were unable to allocate 
the purchase price to the intangible assets as originally expected. 
Note 9 - Employee Benefit and Retirement Plans 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans, page 53 
1. We note you have either increased or held constant, your expected return on plan 
assets. Please tell us and disclose the critical assumptions and benchmarks you used 
in determining your expected return on plan assets. Further, please tell us why you 
believe your return on plan asset expectations are reasonable. 
Definitive Proxy Statement filed on February 16,2010 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis, page 18 
1. Starting on page 21, you state that the Compensation Committee determined actual 
2009 incentive bonuses for each NEO based on performance metrics. One of the 
performance metrics is EPS growth. The bonuses of Messrs. Timbie, Kurzius and 
Langmead were based on metrics other than EPS growth, such as operating income 
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from US consumer and Mexico consumer businesses. Please disclose the target levels 
for each performance metric. See Instructions 2 and 4 to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-
K. Alternatively, provide us with your analysis of how you meet the standard for 
confidential treatment for these targets. In addition, to the extent there is sufficient 
basis to keep the targets confidential, disclose how difficult or likely you believe it 
will be for such targets to be achieved. 
Closing Comments 
Please respond to these comments within 10 business days or tell us when you 
will provide us with a response. Please furnish a letter that keys your responses to our 
comments and provides any requested information. Detailed letters greatly facilitate our 
review. Please understand that we may have additional comments after reviewing your 
responses to our comments. 
We urge all persons who are responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the disclosure 
in the filing to be certain that the filing includes all information required under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that they have provided all information investors 
require for an informed investment decision. Since the company and its management are 
in possession of all facts relating to a company's disclosure, they are responsible for the 
accuracy and adequacy of the disclosures they have made. 
In connection with responding to our comments, please provide, in writing, a statement 
from the company acknowledging that: 
the company is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure in the 
filing; 
staff comments or changes to disclosure in response to staff comments do not 
foreclose the Commission from taking any action with respect to the filing; and 
the company may not assert staff comments as a defence in any proceeding 
initiated by the Commission or any person under the federal securities laws of the 
United States. 
In addition, please be advised that the Division of Enforcement has access to all 
information you provide to the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance in our review 
of your filing or in response to our comments on your filing. 
You may contact Kevin Stertzel at (202) 551-3723, or Kimberly Calder, Assistant Chief 
Accountant, at (202) 551-3701 if you have questions regarding comments on the 
financial statements and related matters. Please contact Parker Morrill at (202) 551-3696, 
or me at (202) 551-3611 with any other questions. 
Sincerely, 
Anne Nguyen Parker 
Branch Chief 
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3.3.4.2 Vulcano Materials Company 
UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-4628 
DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE 
MAIL STOP 4628 
April 15,2010 
Mr. Daniel F. Sansone 
Senior Vice President 
Vulcan Materials Company 
1200 Urban Center Drive 
Birmingham, Alabama 35242 
Re: Vulcan Materials Company 
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2009 
Filed February 26, 2010 
File No. 1-33841 
Dear Mr. Sansone: 
We have reviewed your filing and have the following comments. We have limited 
our review of your filing to those issues we have addressed in our comments. Please 
provide a written response to our comments. Please be as detailed as necessary in your 
explanation. In some of our comments, we may ask you to provide us with information so 
we may better understand your disclosure. After reviewing this information, we may raise 
additional comments. 
Please understand that the purpose of our review process is to assist you in your 
compliance with the applicable disclosure requirements and to enhance the overall 
disclosure in your filing. We look forward to working with you in these respects. We 
welcome any questions you may have about our comments or any other aspect of our 
review. Feel free to call us at the telephone numbers listed at the end ofthis letter. 
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2009 
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations, page 23 
Critical Accounting Policies, page 36 
Pension and other postretirement benefits, page 39 
I. We note your disclosure stating that you expect to make contributions totaling $72.5 
million to the funded pension plans during 2010, and that it is anticipated that these 
contributions, along with existing funding credits, are sufficient to fund projected 
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minimum required contributions until the 2013 plan year. Please tell us how you 
considered the target funding levels of the PP A of 2006 in your detennination that 
these contributions will be sufficient. 
Financial Statements, page 45 
Note 1- Summary of Significant Accounting Policies, page 50 
Stripping costs, page 54 
2. We note your disclosure stating that pre-production stripping costs are expensed as 
incurred unless certain criteria are met, and capitalized pre-construction stripping 
costs are typically amortized over the productive life of the mine. Please tell us, with 
a view towards disclosure, the following: 
Clarify what types of costs you consider to be pre-production stripping costs versus pre-
construction stripping costs, and describe to us in detail the criteria you use to determine 
if your stripping costs are expensed as incurred or capitalized; 
Explain to us the authoritative accounting literature on which you relied to conclude pre-
production stripping costs should be expensed as incurred and pre-construction stripping 
costs should be capitalized; 
Tell us how you determine when you have entered into the production stage; 
Clarify for us how you define the "productive life of the mine" with respect to the method 
you use to amortize capitalized costs; and 
Quantify the amount of stripping costs you have either capital ized or expensed in fiscal 
2009. 
Note 10- Benefit Plans, page 72 
1. We note your disclosure on page 56 stating that amounts representing differences 
between actual results and expected or estimated results recognized in other 
comprehensive income are reclassified to earnings in a systematic manner over the 
average remaining service period of active employees expected to receive benefits 
under the plan. Please tell us the average remaining service period of active 
employees expected to receive benefits under the plan, and provide us with your 
calculation of the amortization of actuarial loss recognized in fiscal year 2009. 
Closing Comments 
Please respond to these comments within 10 business days or tell us when you 
will provide us with a response. Please furnish a letter that keys your responses to our 
comments and provides any requested information. Detailed letters greatly facilitate our 
review. Please understand that we may have additional comments after reviewing your 
responses to our comments. 
We urge all persons who are responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the disclosure 
in the filing to be certain that the filing includes all information required under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that they have provided all information investors 
require for an informed investment decision. Since the company and its management are 
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in possession of all facts relating to a company's disclosure, they are responsible for the 
accuracy and adequacy ofthe disclosures they have made. 
In connection with responding to our comments, please provide, in writing, a statement 
from the company acknowledging that: 
the company is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure in the 
filing; 
staff comments or changes to disclosure in response to staff comments do not 
foreclose the Commission from taking any action with respect to the filing; and 
the company may not assert staff comments as a defence in any proceeding 
initiated by the Commission or any person under the federal securities laws of the 
United States. 
In addition, please be advised that the Division of Enforcement has access to all 
information you provide to the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance in our review 
of your filing or in response to our comments on your filing. 
You may contact Tracie Towner at (202) 551-3744 if you have questions regarding 
comments on the financial statements and related matters. Please contact me at (202) 
551-3299 with any other questions. 
Sincerely, 
Mark Shannon 
Branch Chief 
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3.3.4.3 Qualcomm Incorporated 
UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549 
Mr. William E. Keitel 
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer 
QUALCOMM Incorporated 
5775 Morehouse Drive 
San Diego, CA 92121-1714 
RE: QUALCOMM Incorporated 
February 23, 2010 
Form 10-K for the Year Ended September 27, 2009 
Filed November 5, 2009 
Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended December 27, 2009 
File No. 0-19528 
Dear Mr. Keitel: 
We have reviewed your filing and have the following comments. Please address 
the following comments in future filings. Confirm in writing that you will do so and 
explain to us how you intend to comply. If you disagree, we will consider your 
explanation as to why our comment is inapplicable or a future revision is unnecessary. 
Please be as detailed as necessary in your explanation. In some of our comments, we may. 
ask you to provide us with information so we may better understand your disclosure. 
After reviewing this information, we mayor may not raise additional comments. 
Please understand that the purpose of our review process is to assist you in your 
compliance with the applicable disclosure requirements and to enhance the overall 
disclosure in your filing. We look forward to working with you in these respects. We 
welcome any questions you may have about our comments or on any other aspect of our 
review. Feel free to call us at the telephone numbers listed at the end of this letter. 
Form 10-K for the Year Ended September 27,2009 
Item 2. Properties, page 35 
1. Please tell us and disclose in your filing how you evaluated the guidance in ASC 410 
in determining whether you have a legal retirement obligation associated with the 
operation of your tangible long-lived assets. We note that you lease space on base 
station towers and buildings. Do any of these lease agreements include obligations at 
the end of the lease tenn to restore facilities or remove equipment? 
Liquidity and Capital Resources, page 55 
66 
1. We note that your capital expenditures decreased 46% in the 2009 as compared 2008 
and your 2008 capital expenditures increased by 71 % as compared to 2007. Please 
tell the nature of the increase in capital expenditures in 2008 and why the 2009 capital 
expenditures are less than 2007. In addition, revise to disclose if you expect the 
capital expenditures to continue to decrease or increase in the future and the reasons 
why. 
Note 1. Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, page F-l 0 
1. Please tell us why the weighted-average amortization period for the wireless licenses 
decreased to 5 years in the current year from 15 years in 2008. 
Note 10. Segment Information, page F-28 
1. We note that $255 million of goodwill was allocated to reporting units within your 
Qualcomm Wireless & Internet segment. We further note your declines in revenue 
and your near break-even EBT over the last three years within this segment. Please 
explain in detail why you recorded no impairment charge in this segment. Identify 
your reporting units within this segment, the amount of goodwill allocated to each 
reporting unit and the methodology you used to test each reporting unit including the 
assumptions utilized. 
* * * * 
Please respond to these comments through correspondence over EDGAR within 10 
business days or tell us when you will provide us with a response. Please furnish a letter 
that keys your responses to our comments and provides any requested information. 
Detailed letters greatly facilitate our review. Please understand that we may have 
additional comments after reviewing your responses to our comments. 
We urge all persons who are responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the disclosure 
in the filings reviewed by the staff to be certain that they have provided all information 
investors require for an informed decision. Since the company and its management are in 
possession of all facts relating to a company's disclosure, they are responsible for the 
accuracy and adequacy of the disclosures they have made. In connection with responding 
to our comment, please provide, in writing, a statement from the company 
acknowledging that 
the company is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure in the 
filings; 
staff comments or changes to disclosure in response to staff comments do not 
foreclose the Commission from taking any action with respect to the filings; and 
the company may not assert staff comments as a defense in any proceeding 
initiated by the Commission or any person under the federal securities laws of the 
United States. 
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In addition, please be advised that the Division of Enforcement has access to all 
information you provide to the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance in our review 
of your filings or in response to our comments on your filings. 
You may contact Dean Suehiro, Senior Staff Accountant, at (202) 551-3384 or Kyle 
Moffatt, Accounting Branch Chief at (202) 551-3836 if you have questions regarding 
comments on the financial statements and related matters. Please contact me at (202) 
551-3810 with any other questions. 
Sincerely, 
Larry Spirgel 
Assistant Director 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PARTNER MANDATORY ROTATIONS VERSUS 
FIRM MANDATORY ROTATIONS: EVIDENCE 
FROM ITALY 
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4. PAPER I: Partner mandatory rotations versus firm 
mandatory rotations: Evidence from Italy 
4.1 Introduction 
Auditors play an important role in the prOVISIon of high quality financial 
information (Krishnan, 2003). This role, however, has been questioned following Enron's 
case and other high-profile accounting scandals (e.g., Worldcom, Parmalat). In most of 
these cases, the company's auditor was accused of colluding with the management and 
helping it to hide the company's true financial situation. This, in tum, prompted a number 
of countries to consider and/or adopt mandatory rotation rules (MRR) as a means of 
enhancing auditor independence. The reasoning is that long audit tenure may weaken 
auditor independence and impair the auditor's capacity for critical judgement. 
Specifically, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of2002 introduced in the US a mandatory five-year 
rotation for the leading and concurring audit partner. Moreover, the Congress has debated 
the possibility of introducing the mandatory rotation also at the audit firm level. The 
decision was postponed as the potential effects of the rule were not clear (GAO 2003io. 
Several years after the introduction of rotation rules, the debate on its effectiveness 
is still open. Currently, the EU is considering a dual MRR by also requiring audit firm 
rotations (EC's Green Paper, 2010). In this paper I attempt to shed light on the following 
questions. First, do mandatory rotation rules improve audit quality? And if so, is it better 
20 Even before the US initiative other countries had considered introducing the mandatory rotation rule into 
their own legislations (Petty and Cuganesan, 1996; Vanasco et aI., 1996; Arrunada, 1997). 
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to apply the rule at the audit firm level or is it sufficient to require it for audit partners? 
Do these rules work similarly for all companies? Finally, are mandatory rotations 
different from voluntary ones with respect to audit quality? 
Accounting professionals have traditionally strongly opposed rotation 
requirements, as they increase both the auditor's and auditee's costs and, for audit firm 
rotation, it requires great organizational effort. The latter could even harm audit quality if 
not properly managed (Gietzmann and Sen, 2002). But, empirical evidence concerning 
MRR is scarce. This is caused by two main problems. First, in most countries (U.S. and 
U.K. included) where a policy of mandatory partner rotation is already in force, the 
names of the audit partner are not disclosed. Second, most of the literature examining the 
impact of audit firm changes on financial reporting quality (Ghosh and Moon 2005; 
Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003), studies environments where audit firm rotations 
are voluntary. However, the results of these studies may not be generalizeable to a 
mandatory rotation regime. Endogeneity issues may complicate the interpretation of the 
results of such studies (e.g., Bamber et ai., 2009; Lennox and Francis, 2008i i . 
In this paper I analyze mandatory rotations in Italy. This choice is motivated by the 
observation that Italy is a country with the longest tradition of mandatory audit firm 
rotation, as the rule has been in force since 1975. It has also introduced mandatory audit 
partner rotations in 200622 . I therefore investigate the 2006-2008 period, as this allows 
me to contrast the two types of auditor rotations while keeping other institutional factors 
fixed. 
21 There are only a few exceptions to this literature (Barbadillo et aI., 2009; Cameran et al. 2010), which 
will be discussed later in this paper. 
22 For a more detailed description of audit legislation in Italy, see Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.1.1. 
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Against the presumed benefits of audit rotations it is important to consider a 
number of shortcomings. First, audit firm rotations may involve excessive setup costs. If 
the new audit firm cannot recoup these costs through higher fees, it may not exert 
sufficient effort to overcome the lack of client-specific knowledge. During the initial 
engagement period the new auditor is more prone to judgement errors (Johnson et al. 
2002; Myers et al. 2003). In contrast, audit partner rotations are not expected to result in 
loss of client-specific knowledge since the access to documents and working papers is 
maintained. The organizational side effects are also expected to be much weaker at the 
partner level23 . To the extent that audit partner rotations enhance the new auditor's ability 
to make better judgments without being affected by setup costs or loss of client-specific 
knowledge, I expect partner mandatory rotations to be associated with higher audit 
quality. In contrast, owing to the abovementioned shortcomings, I do not expect 
mandatory audit firm rotations to be strongly related to improved audit quality. 
The main result is consistent with this prediction. Using an accrual measure as a 
proxy for audit quality, I find that only partner mandatory rotations are positively 
associated with improved audit quality. This result is consistent with the claim that the 
costs associated with firm rotations may outbalance the relative benefits. These findings 
also provide support for the regulatory path undertaken by U.S. and U.K. legislators and 
by the other countries which decided to introduce the MRR only at the partner level. 
I also analyze whether the association between mandatory rotation and audit quality 
varies cross-sectionally in a predictable way. I argue that the association between 
mandatory rotations and audit quality is weaker when audit task complexity is higher. 
23 See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2 
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The information asymmetry induced by rotations is more severe in highly complex 
environments. It is therefore more difficult for the incoming auditor to perform a high-
quality audit, especially in the first years of the engagement. I also expect that the 
association between mandatory rotations and audit quality is higher when the demand for 
audit quality is more pronounced. If rotations lead to improved independence, it stands to 
reason the new auditor will respond better to the information demands of users than the 
incumbent auditor. I use company's leverage and ownership concentration as proxies for 
external demand for audit quality (Carey et aI., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2005). Using size to 
proxy for task complexity, I find that the association between mandatory partner rotations 
and audit quality is weaker in larger companies. However, I do not find that the 
association between mandatory rotations and audit quality varies with demand for audit 
quality. 
Finally, I contrast mandatory and voluntary rotations. The underlying reason 
causing the change of auditors may influence the association between rotations and audit 
quality, but is not observed by the researcher. I test and find that the association between 
rotations and audit quality seems to be different according to their nature (i.e. voluntary 
vs mandatory). In particular, I find that voluntary rotations are not associated with 
improved audit quality. Collectively, the evidence presented in this study seem to 
supports the introduction of mandatory audit partner rotations as a way to enhance the 
quality of audit services and therefore to reinforce markets' effectiveness and potentially 
mitigate the risk of frauds or other financial scandals. 
In assessing this paper's results it should be noted ｴｨ｡ｬｾｾｯｭ･＠ features of the Italian 
institutional setting could hinder the generalizability of the findings. These include a 
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weak investor protection regime, the weak level of enforcement and the high level of 
ownership concentration (LaPorta et aI., 1998). These notwithstanding, LaPorta, et al. 
(1998) state that Italy's creditor rights provide a level of protection higher than those of 
some Anglo-Saxon markets like US, Canada or Australia. Windgate (1997) assigns Italy a 
litigation risk score of 6.22 out of 10, which is the same for France, Germany, Ireland, 
The Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland. Gietzmann and Sen (2002) describe Italy as 
an audit thin market and they argue that MRR is beneficial especially in this kind of 
settings24 . Recent reforms, however, made audit activity compulsory for a much larger set 
of firms, significantly enlarging the market for audit services and aligning Italy with other 
deeper markets. These institutional features suggest that auditors in Italy in the period 
examined here may be exposed to similar forces as in these other countries. Nevertheless, 
it remains an open question as to what extent auditors' incentives in Italy are similar to 
those of auditors in other countries. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on audit rotations in a number of 
ways. First, to best of my knowledge, it is the first paper to directly contrast the effects of 
mandatory firm rotations and mandatory partner rotations within the same institutional 
setting. This helps to shed light on whether regimes that require rotations at the partner 
level are more effective than regimes imposing rotations at the firm level. Moreover, this 
study can help inferring what could be the effects of requiring both kinds of rotations. 
The evidence presented may therefore be helpful for legislators considering introducing 
or augmenting mandatory rotation rules. Second, prior literature provides scant evidence 
on the effects of mandatory rotations at the partner level (Chen et aI., 2008; Carey and 
24 In thin markets auditors may hardly tind new clients after the end of an audit engagement. Therefore they 
may have more incentives to succumb to managerial influence. 
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Simnett, 2006; Hamilton et aI., 2005). The analysis of partner rotations in Italy therefore 
can help developing a better understanding of the effects of the mandatory rotation rule at 
the partner level. Third, this study shows that audit task complexity likely influences the 
effectiveness of audit rotations. 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Audit firm level 
4.2.1.1 Audit firm tenure and audit quality 
Most of the literature written so far about audit rotation is mainly focused on the 
audit finn level. As the rule is enforced in very few countries (see chapter 3, paragraph 
3.1), the majority of papers studying MRR analyze the association between audit firm 
tenure and audit quality. This is generally proxied by the quality of the reporting 
earnings, (e.g., Jackson et al. 2008; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003), fraudulent 
reporting (Carcello and Nagy, 2004), and audit failures25 (Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2002). 
Among these papers, the one which is perhaps considered to be the "milestone" of 
this research area, is the one from Myers et al (2003). In this paper, the authors study the 
relation between audit firm tenure and the quality of earnings, proxied by the amount of 
discretionary accruals and current accruals in the company's earnings. Following the 
literature on earnings management and earnings quality (De Angelo 1986, Healy 1985, 
Jones 1991, Sloan 1996, Xie 2001, Dechow and Dichev 2002, Richardson et al. 2002), 
they assume that the higher the proportion of uncertain items in the earnings figure and 
2S Audit failures are defined as cases in which an auditor does not issue a modified going concern opinion 
for a company which went subsequently bankrupt (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). 
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thus the higher the proportion of accruals, the lower the quality of the financial statement. 
Using a sample of more than forty thousands U.S. firm-year observations, they found that 
longer auditor tenures are usually characterized by lower dispersion in the distributions of 
both discretionary and current accruals. Moreover, they also found that auditors seem to 
place a greater constraint to income increasing and income decreasing accruals as the 
engagement length increases. 10hnson et al (2002) used two proxies for measuring 
financial reporting quality: the absolute value of discretionary accruals as an indicator for 
earnings management activities, and earnings persistence, as a measure of accruals 
quality. Studying a sample of industry and size matched companies audited by Big audit 
firms 26, they also analyzed the association between auditor tenure and financial repOliing 
quality. In their paper they found that one-to-three years engagements (shorter tenures) 
are generally associated with lower audit quality compared to four-to-eight years 
engagements (medium tenures). The authors are not able to identify any statistically 
significant difference between the quality of financial reporting of longer tenures (more 
than eight years) and the quality of medium ones. 
Another stream of research uses financial reporting failures as a proxy for audit 
quality (Francis, 2004). Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), studied a sample of firms 
which went bankrupt in the period 1996-1998 and analyzed the type of audit opinion 
which was issued in the year preceding the bankruptcy. Defining audit failure as the case 
in which an auditor does not issue a modified going concern opinion for a company 
which went subsequently bankrupt, they analyzed the association between auditor tenure 
and audit report failure. The authors use a logistic regression in order to test the above 
26 In Johnson et al (2002) the number of the large international audit firms \vas si" (Big 6). As this number 
continuously changes due to the concentration process which invested the audit market \\ithin the last 
decades, I will hereafter refer to this group of accounting firms generally as "Big audit firm". 
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mentioned relation and they found that audit report failures were more likely to occur in 
the initial years of their engagement. 
Similarly to Johnson et al (2002), Carcello and Nagy (2004) compared the quality 
of the audit of short tenures (up to three years) and long tenures (over nine years) with 
the quality of medium tenures (between four and eight years). More specifically, they 
analyzed the association between auditor tenure and the fraudulent financial reporting, 
using the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases issued between 1990 and 
2001 27. Again similarly to Johnson et al (2002), the authors found that the quality of the 
audit seems to be lower within sh0l1er tenure, as evidence showed that fraudulent 
financial reporting was more likely to be detected in the first three years of the audit 
engagement. As in Johnson et al (2002), they don't find a significant difference between 
the quality of long and medium engagement, indicating that the quality of an audit does 
not necessarily decrease as auditor tenure increases. 
While all the papers mentioned above focused on US compal11es, Knechel and 
Vanstraelen (2007) analyzed the relation between audit tenure and audit quality basing on 
Belgium private companies. Less developed audit standards on going concern which 
differentiate Belgium from US companies, and the different threat for audit failures with 
reference to bankruptcy companies in private companies compared to the listed ones, 
make their sample more likely to be characterized by a negative audit tenure and audit 
quality relationship. The authors analyzed a sample of 618 Belgium private financial 
distressed companies, approximately half of which went successively bankruptcy and 
used the likelihood of properly issuing a going concern opinion (i.e. issuing a going 
27 Also available on website: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/fl'iactions.shtml 
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concern opinion for companies which successively went bankrupt and not issuing a going 
concern opinion when the company did not go bankrupt) as a proxy for audit quality. 
They found that, with reference to the bankrupt sample, auditor tenure seemed not to 
affect audit quality, whereas in the non bankrupt sample, they found some evidence of a 
negative association between auditor tenure and the issuance of a going concern opinion. 
Overall, this stream of research seems to suggest that audit quality tend to increase 
as audit tenure increases. Under this perspective, the mandatory rotation rule seems not to 
be the means to enhance audit quality. 
However, as argued by Elitzur and Falk (1996), audit and client incentives may be 
strongly altered by the presence of mandatory future auditor changes. Therefore, the 
findings of this literature are difficult to extend to settings involving mandatory rotations. 
Moreover, the fact that most of these studies focus on a voluntary setting, may actually 
hide a potential problem of endogeneity. It could be that auditors tend to stay longer in 
those companies showing a greater quality of earnings and more in general, a more 
transparent accounting system. This would justify the positive relationship between audit 
firm tenure and audit quality which has been found so far in the literature. 
4.2.1.2 Audit firm switches and audit quality 
There are a few studies which focus directly on auditor switches. 
De Fond and Subramanyam (1998) studied the behaviour of discretionary accruals 
for companies changing their auditor. What they tried to demonstrate in their paper was 
that auditor switches are usually driven by clients' refusal for auditors' conservatism 
choices. Using a sample of 503 firms which changed their auditors during tl,e period 
1990 to 1993 they found that discretionary accruals, measured according to DeFond and 
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Jiambalvo (1994) model (also known as the modified Jones Model) were significantly 
income decreasing during the last year of an audit engagement and not significant in the 
first year of the following auditor relationship. They also found a positive relation 
between litigation risk and amount of negative discretionary accruals: firms showing 
greater litigation risk usually reported a greater amount of negative discretionary 
accruals. Even if the authors are aware of the fact that financial distress may explain in 
part their results, they suggest that auditor switches may be driven by the incumbent 
auditors' choices of constraining discretionary accruals. 
There is one paper which specifically looks at mandatory audit firm rotations, 
which is Cameran et al. (2010). The authors analyze the impact of firm tenure and firm 
mandatory rotation in Italy during the period 1984-2004. They find that mandatory firm 
rotations are followed by more aggressive accounting28• 
Barbadillo et al. (2009) also study an audit firm mandatory rotation regIme, 
comparing the likelihood of issuing going concern opinions for financially distressed 
companies within a mandatory rotation period (1991-1994) and a voluntary rotation 
period (1995-2000) in Spain?9 However, the paper fails to find any significant 
association between the quality of the audit and the application of the rule. 
Finally, Bluin et al (2007) studied a sample made up of ex Arthur Andersen client 
companies and they were able to detect which of these decided to follow their previous 
audit team into the new auditor and which companies, on the contrary, preferred to break 
the relationship with the previous team. They found that companies characterized by 
28 They use the amount of abnormal working capital accruals and current accruals as proxy for audit 
quality. 
29 A rule imposing the mandatory rotation rule every nine years was present in Spain from 1988 till 1995 
but was never enforced (see chapter 3, paragraph 3.1). 
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extreme discretionary accruals before Arthur Andersen collapse which decided not to 
follow their previous audit team, failed to show a significant improvement in earnings 
quality, suggesting that being forced to rotate the audit firm did not have any effect on 
reporting quality. Even if this setting could be in a certain way compared to a mandatory 
rotation one, as companies were in fact forced to change their auditors after the demise of 
Arthur Andersen, these results cannot be generalized and therefore cannot be used as 
evidence supporting the mandatory rotation rule. 
To conclude, academic results do not suppOli mandatory firm rotations as an 
effective legislative way to increase and assure audit quality. 
4.2.2 Audit partner level 
The literature on partner tenure and partner rotation and their potential effects on 
audit quality is very recent and not very developed (Francis, 2004), even if it has been 
receiving an increasing attention in more recent years. As stated above, the name of the 
partner signing the audit opinion is not available in many countries (e.g. USA and UK), 
and therefore it becomes quite difficult to conduct empirical research in these settings. 
Carey and Simnett (2006) analyzed the impact of partner tenure in Australia with 
three different measures of earnings quality: the propensity of issuing a going concern 
opinion, the direction and amount of abnormal accruals and the tendency of just beating 
(missing) earnings benchmark. Focusing on a period in which the rotation of the partner 
was not mandatory by law3o, they found lower propensity of issuing a modified going 
concern opinion and a greater tendency in beating and missing earnings benchmark in 
longer tenures, thus supporting the assumption that audit quality decreases as patiner 
30 Mandatory rotation of the audit patiner was introduced in Australia in year 2003. 
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tenure increases. On the contrary, abnormal accruals did not show a significant relation 
with tenure. The contribution of this paper is significant, as it is one of the first researches 
which analyze audit rotation at the partner level. However, it focuses only on one year, 
which is 1995, thus using a cross-sectional technique. As in the meanwhile many 
financial and accounting scandals took place and a lot of pressure was put on auditors and 
on their part of responsibility in these issues by legislators, investors and the public in 
general, the results found by Carey and Simnett (2006) may not hold any more. 
Conflicting results were found by Chen et al (2008), who studied the behaviour of 
earnings quality linked to partner level and found that discretionary accruals tend to 
decrease when audit tenure increases. It should be highlighted, however, that this study 
focuses on Taiwan: as this is a developing country, results may not be necessarily 
generalized to other western countries. Moreover, as stated by the authors, results my be 
to a certain extent biased by the double signing system existing in this country, under 
which two concurrent partners sign the opinion, and these do not necessarily rotate at the 
same time: moreover in the audit opinion it is not specified who of the two is responsible 
for maintaining the engagement relationship. 
Fargher et al (2008) found that audit partner tenure is negatively related to earnings 
quality. More specifically, they found that when the partner of an engagement changes, a 
positive effect on earnings quality may be detected, as the amount of discretionary 
accruals decreases. On the contrary, when the entire audit firm rotates (and therefore also 
the audit partner changes), management discretion increases. 
Hamilton et al (2005) found greater earnings conservatism following an audit 
partner rotation. Studying once more the Australian setting, they found that the level of 
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positive abnormal accruals was lower and that the asymmetrical timely recognition of 
losses was greater in the year following a partner rotation. Moreover, they also found that 
this association seemed stronger when partner rotation was mandated by law, suggesting 
that greater earnings quality may be achieved by imposing the change of the responsible 
partner after a certain number of years, as in this case the client ability to resist partner 
rotation is weakened. Again in this case, however, the authors focus on only one year: the 
cross sectional analysis may leave out potentially critical information. 
To conclude, the literature focusing on the partner level does not always lead to 
consistent results. Parts of the findings, however, do suggest that audit quality tend to 
decrease with partner tenure and that it could be positively affected by mandatory 
rotations. 
4.3 Hypotheses development 
There are different views concerning the effectiveness of MRR in enhancing audit 
quality31. The proponents of the MRR rule state that rotation could lead to improved audit 
independence as it imposes a break in the development of tight relationships between the 
management and the auditor (Brody and Moscove, 1998; Farmer et aI., 1987; Mautz and 
Sharaf, 1961). Long-term engagements may also increase the risk of the auditor 
following a "professional routine", by relying excessively on previous years' control test 
and becoming overconfident about the client's accounting system and control procedures 
(Shockley, 1981). Auditor rotation reduces this risk as it brings in "new fresh eyes", thus 
increasing the auditor critical capacity (AICPA 1978; Hoyle 1978; McLaren 1958). In 
contrast, opponents of the MRR state that in the first years of the engagement period the 
31 See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2 
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new auditor is usually less familiar or experienced with the affairs of the newly audited 
firm. Consequently the information asymmetry between client management and the 
auditor is larger, potentially decreasing audit quality (Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Geiger 
and Raghumamdan, 2002; Myers, 2003; Petty and Cuganesan, 1996). In addition, an 
incoming auditor may have strong incentives to retain the new client by using a low 
balling approach (DeAngelo, 1981). If the new auditor is unable to recoup the "low 
balling fees", he wi11 exert less effort, thus reducing audit quality (Beck, Frecka, and 
Solomon 1988). 
These arguments are generally valid for any kind of rotation32• However, it is worth 
highlighting certain differences across rotation types which may affect the association 
between rotation and audit quality. Specifically, the strength of these arguments may 
differ according to whether this is a firm vs. partner rotation or a mandatory vs. voluntary 
rotation. In addition, client specific factors my influence the way rotations affect audit 
quality. 
Bamber et al. (2009) point out that in case of partner rotations, the auditor 
methodology, prior working papers, other members of the audit team and the firms' 
history largely remain intact. The main change usually concerns the responsible partner, 
who may be nominated from within the same audit team. For these reasons, the assumed 
benefits that come with a rotation (e.g., severance of tight relationship) induced by 
partner rotations may be lower compared to firm rotations. On the other hand, this also 
32 In particular, all of the arguments presented here are theoretically valid both for mandatory and voluntary 
rotations. However, this study is primarily interested in empirically analyzing mandatory rotations, as the 
effects induced by voluntary switches may be biased by the abovementioned endogeneity problem. This 
notwithstanding, some potential differences in the way mandatory and voluntary rotations affect audit 
quality are discussed in H5. Moreover, voluntary rotations are also added in most of the empirical models 
for control and comparison reasons. 
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means lower set up costs compared with audit firm rotations. The transfer of knowledge 
from the previous auditor to the new one is also more direct in partner rotations as 
opposed to firm rotations. This significantly limits the costs associated with 
"'inexperience". Moreover, the initial economic incentives are also different at the two 
levels. "'Low Balling" is not present at the partner level. To the extent that the initial fee 
discount represents a threat to audit quality (Palm rose, 1986), partner rotations will be 
associated with higher lower rotation costs. Empirical findings also suggest that firm and 
partner rotations may be differently associated with audit quality. Fargher et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that partner mandatory rotations are associated with higher audit quality, 
while Cameran et al. (2010) find that firm mandatory rotations in the period 1990-2004 
are followed by lower audit quality. Finally, different studies (Carey and Simnett, 2006; 
Fargher et aI., 2008) have found that the audit performed after a partner rotation event is 
higher than the quality of the engagement reaching the contract termination. On the other 
side, the opposite has been found for audit firm tenure, where a positive association 
between tenure and audit quality has been widely detected (Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et 
al. 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). Taken together, the 
arguments described above and the empirical evidence collected so far suggest that 
benefits induced by a partner rotation outbalance the potential limit on audit 
independence represented by maintaining the link with the same audit firm. At the firm 
level, on the other hand, rotation costs seem to be greater than the relative benefits, 
making MRR less effective at this level. I thus expect that partner mandatory rotations are 
associated with higher audit quality compared to firm mandatory rotations. The first 
hypothesis test, in its null form, is therefore the following33: 
33 All hypotheses are expressed in their null form. 
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Hi: Audit firm and audit partner rotations are similarly associated with audit quality, 
ceteris paribus. 
In analyzing the association between auditor rotations and audit quality, it is 
important to consider client-specific factors because these may influence the relation of 
interest. These include audit task complexity and firm-specific demand for audit quality. 
It is reasonable to assume that if rotations take place in highly complex infonnation 
environments, the incoming auditor will encounter more difficulties in performing his 
services in the first year of the engagemene4. The level of infonnation asymmetry caused 
by rotation will be higher in such cases, potentially adversely affecting the quality of the 
audit carried out. I argue that the association between mandatory rotations and audit 
quality is weaker when audit task complexity is higher. I use client size as a proxy for 
task complexity as larger finns likely have more segments, more international operations, 
M&A activities etc., all of which make the audit task harder (Amir et aI., 2010; Antle et 
aI., 2006). I therefore hypothesize: 
H2: Auditor rotations have similar association with audit quality regardless of client size, 
ceteris paribus. 
Auditor rotations may also lead to different effects on audit quality depending on 
the demand for audit quality in the client firm. If the demand for audit quality is higher, 
the new auditor will exert a higher level of effort in order to deliver an audit of high 
quality, especially in the first years of new engagement, where infonnation asymmetry is 
higher and bonding is weaker. Carey et aI. (2000) argue that the demand for high quality 
34 Lassila et al. (2010) demonstrate that the client's operating complexity increases the probability that the 
auditee retained its auditor as the potential benefits from knowledge accumulation increase. 
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auditing is positively correlated with leverage. As the proportion of debt in a firm's 
capital structure increases, shareholders have greater incentives to transfer wealth from 
creditors, suggesting that financial institutions demand a high level of quality to monitor 
the firm and its operation. Moreover, as stated by Khan and Watts (2009), financial 
distress is increasing with leverage and highly levered companies are more likely to be 
sued. This represents both a source of demand for audit quality and litigation risk for the 
new auditor. I therefore argue that auditor rotations have a greater positive association 
with audit quality in highly leveraged companies. The third hypothesis is then: 
H3: Auditor rotations are similarly associated with audit quality regardless of the client S 
level of leverage, ceteris paribus. 
Italy is characterized by a high concentration of family owned firms (Corbetta and 
Minichilli, 2006). Agency problems are present both in family and non-family firms. The 
nature of agency conflict is however different (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gilson and 
Gordon, 2003; Prencipe and Sasson, 2008). In diffused ownership firms, the separation 
between management and control creates conflicts of interests and the management has 
incentives to manipulate earnings to pursue its personal interests (e.g., Leuz, et at. 2003). 
In family firms, the agency conflict exists between the controlling share-holders and 
minorities. The former has incentives to exploit the private benefits of control (Coffee, 
2005). However, it has empirically demonstrated that agency problems tend to be more 
severe in non-family firms. Wang (2006) finds that family firms report higher quality 
earnings while Ali et at. (2007) find that bid-ask spreads are lower in family firms. The 
literature on audit quality suggests that firms with high agency costs are more likely to 
demand higher audit quality (Francis and Krishnan, 1999, and DeFond, 1992). For this 
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reason, I use ownership concentration as my second proxy for audit quality to argue that 
demand for audit quality is higher in non-family firms. The role of monitoring bodies is 
also different in family and non-family firms. Coffee (2005) argues that auditors tend to 
be less independent than in non-family firms, as they are inevitably subject to the control 
of the party they are expected to monitor. Thus I expect that the association between 
auditor rotation and audit quality is higher in non-family firms. My fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: Auditor rotations are similarly associated with audit quality in family and non-family 
firms, ceteris paribus. 
The association between MRR and audit quality may vary according to the nature 
of rotation, i.e. mandatory vs. voluntary. One particular argument is given by fee 
structure after the rotation event. For a voluntary rotation, the client company has the 
option of retaining the incumbent auditor client or switching to a new auditor, potentially 
a less expensive one. In a market mostly dominated by the BIG 435, this means an option 
between four potential suppliers. In the case of a mandatory rotation, the choice is limited 
only three alternative auditors. Competition is therefore higher in a voluntary rotation 
event compared to a mandatory one, increasing the threat of "low balling". To the extent 
that low balling leads to lower quality (Palmrose, 1986), voluntary rotations are expected 
to be less effective than mandatory rotation. Furthermore, voluntary rotations may be 
triggered by "opinion shopping" (Lennox, 2000). If this is the case, the subsequent 
engagement would be of lower audit quality. "Opinion shopping" is less likely when the 
switch is imposed as in mandatory rotations. Mandatory rotations can be scheduled well 
in advance and therefore be efficiently organized so as to maximise the transfer of 
35 Big 4 auditors provide service to 92% of listed companies (Cameran, 2007) 
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knowledge at the partner level and to minimize costs at the firm level. I therefore argue 
that mandatory rotations are more positively associated with audit quality compared to 
voluntary rotations. 
H5: Auditor rotations are similarly associated with audit quality, regardless of their 
nature (mandatory vs voluntary), ceteris paribus. 
4.4 Data and methodology 
The sample consists of Italian non financial companies listed on the Milan Stock 
Exchange during the period 2006 to 2008. This period was chosen in order to have both 
audit firm and audit partner mandatory rotations in force, keeping other institutional 
factors constant. Accounting data was taken from Compustat global 
(industrial/commercial issue). The names of the audit firm and audit partner were hand-
collected from financial statements, available online or on the cd-rom Borsa ltaliana36 . 
The final sample consists of 603 company-year observations (228 firms belonging to 17 
industries37). 
Audit firm rotations which followed an audit engagement of nine years are coded as 
mandatory firm rotations. Partner rotations which followed a partner engagement of six 
years are coded as mandatory partner rotations. All other rotations are coded as voluntary. 
Consistent with other papers (Cameran et aI., 2010; Fargher et aI., 2008; Johnson et 
aI., 2002; Myers et aI., 2003), this study uses earnings quality as a proxy for audit quality. 
Specifically, this is measured as the amount of absolute abnormal working capital 
accruals. The auditor is performing a high quality audit if it minimizes management's 
36 Audit finn data is also available on Compustat but many mistakes were found. For this reasons, even 
audit firms were double checked with the company's annual report. 
37 Using the NAICS industry classification. 
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self-serving accounting choices (Dechow, 1994; Subramanyam and Wild, 1996; Jones, 
1991; Dechow et al. 1995; De Fond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Wysocky, 2004; Meuwisswn et 
al. 2005). Consequently, the client will report earnings figures of high quality, 
traditionally measured by the amount of discretionary accruals present in its figure38. 
According to DeFond and Park (2001), abnormal working capital accruals are 
defined as: 
(i) 
Where A WCAt is the amount of abnormal working capital accruals in year t and 
wet is the actual level of working capital observed in year e9• In particular: 
WCt=(current assetst(#75) - short term investmentst (#69)) - (current liabilitiest (#104)-
short term debtt (#94)) (ii) 
The second term of the first equation [(W ct-lISt-l )*St] represents the predicted 
value of working capital, i.e. the level of working capital accruals expected according to 
the current level of sales (St). This measure of abnormal accruals is chosen as it has been 
found that abnormal working capital accruals better capture management accounting 
discretion in settings in which stock markets are relatively ''young'' and/or small and 
therefore the number of observations do no permit long time series analyses (Wysocky, 
2004; Meuwissen et al. 2005). 
38 Other studies (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007) have used the direct 
outcome of the audit process as a proxy for audit quality, i.e. the audit opinion. In Italy, however, as in 
most European countries, the variety of type of audit opinion issued is very low. In 2007, 96% of audit 
opinions issued towards listed companies were "clean opinion", whereas there were no cases of "Adverse 
opinion" (Report Osservatorio di Revisione, SDA Bocconi, 2007). 
39 The number in parenthesis indicates the relative Compustat Code 
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Following Johnson et al. (2002), I use the absolute value of abnormal working 
capital accruals (AbsAwca), as I am only interested in the magnitude of accruals, having 
no prediction about the direction of management discretion. AbsAwca measures the 
client's success in managing earnings either up or down, as needed, depending on year-
specific situations. 
In the first model, AbsAwca is regressed on firm and partner mandatory rotations40. 
AbsAwcai,l = ao +ajFmanroti,l +a2 Pmanroti,1 + /3jFagei,1 + f32NonBigi,l + /33 Fsizei,1 + /34L!OSSi,1 + /3sLeveragei,l + 
+/36Growthi,l + /37C,{Oi,1 + /3sd2006i,1 + /39d2007i,1 + ci,1 + Ie 
(1) 
The explanatory variables of interest in this model are Fmanrot and Pmanrot. 
These are dummy variables set equal to one if there has been a firm or a partner 
mandatory rotation respectively in year t, zero otherwise. As I argued earlier, I expect 
audit quality to be associated with partner rotation. I therefore expect the coefficient (12 to 
be negative. I also expect the association between partner rotation and audit quality to be 
stronger than the association between firm rotation and audit quality. I therefore expect 
Consistent with previous literature, a number of control variables are added to the 
model to control for other determinants affecting AbsAwca. Fage measures the number of 
years the client company has been listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (Anthony and 
Ramesh 1992); NonBig controls for auditor size and it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the audit firm is non-Big, 0 otherwise (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). Fsize is 
included as abnormal accruals are found to be negatively related to firm size (Johnson et 
40 I use OLS panel regressions with industry fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
41 A higher level of ABSA WCA suggests a lower level of audit quality. 
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al. 2002; Cameran et al. 2010). Lloss is a dummy variable equal to one if the client 
experienced a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise. Such firms are expected to carry out 
a higher level of earnings management in order to avoid showing losses in the current 
financial year (Cameran et al. 20 I 0; Carey and Simnett, 2006). Leverage is included in 
the model to control for the client company's leverage level (Frankel et al. 2002; Dechow 
et al. 1998). Growth controls for the impact of growth on earnings management (Carey 
and Simnett, 2006). Finally, year dummies are added to control for time differences. 
Voluntary rotations are then added to model (l) in order to understand whether 
these are differently associated with audit quality as compared to mandatory rotations. 
The following model is estimated. 
AbsAwca" = all + ajFmanrotiJ + a 2 Pmanroti., + a 3 Fvolroti., + a 4 Pvolroti., + /31 Fagei,l + /32 NonBig" + f3,FsizeiJ + 
+/34L!oSSi., + /35 Leverageil + /36Growthi., + /37 Cloif + /3sd2006i., + /39d2007i., + &1./ + Ie 
(2) 
Fvolrot is a dummy variable equal to one if the rotation in year t is not due to a 
legal requirement, zero otherwise. Pvolrot is a dummy variable equal to one if there has 
been a voluntary partner rotation in year t, zero otherwise). I argue that mandatory 
rotations are more positively associated with audit quality compared to voluntary 
rotations. I therefore expect al < a3 and a2 < a4. For comparative and control reasons, 
voluntary rotations are included in all the following models. 
In model (3) I analyze whether the association between rotations and audit quality 
varies with audit task complexity. 
91 
AbsAwcau = a o +alFmanrotu +a2Pmanroi;,r +a3Fvolrot
"
, +a4 Pvolrot" + fJ,Fage;" + fJ2NonBigu + fJ3Fsize" + 
+fJ4L!OSS;,I_1 + fJ5Leverage,,1 + fJ6Growth,., + fJ7CjOu + fJ8d2006u + fJ9d2007", + fJlOFmanrot * size", + fJlIPmanrot * size" + 
+fJ'2Fvolrot * si::eu + fJl3Pvolrot * size; ,+ 6 j ,+ je 
(3) 
In model (3), the interaction variables Fmanrot*size, Pmanrot*size, Fvolrot*size 
and Pvolrot*size are added. I have argued that the association between auditor rotations 
and audit quality is weaker when audit task complexity is higher. Therefore the 
coefficients from ｾｬｏ＠ to ｾＱＳ＠ are expected to be positive. 
The demand for audit quality is also taken into consideration in analysing the 
association between rotations and audit quality. Model (4) is estimated as follows. 
AbsAwca,., = au + alFmanrot" + a,Pmanrot" + a,Fvolrot,.1 + a.Pvolrotu + fJ1Fage" + fJ,NonBig" + fJ,Fsize" + 
+fJ.L!ossU_1 + fJsLeverageu + fJ6Growth" + fJ7Cjou + fJsd2006i' + fJ9d2007,.1 + fJl.Fmanrot * lev" + fJ,sPmanrot * lev" + 
+ fJI6Fvoirot * lev" + fJl7Pvolrot * lev,., + &" + je 
(4) 
In model (4), the interaction variables Fmanrot*lev, Pmanrot*lev, Fvolrot*lev and 
Pvolrot*lev are added. I have argued that auditor rotations have a greater positive 
association with audit quality in highly leveraged companies. The coefficients from ｾＱＴ＠ to 
ｾＱＷ＠ are therefore expected to be negative. 
Finally, model (5) is estimated distinguishing between family and non-family client 
firms. 
AbsAwca" = a
o 
+ a, Fmanrot,., + a, Pmanrot" + a, Fvo/rot" + a, Pvo/rot" + /3, Fage" + /3, NonBig" + /3, Fsi:::e" + 
+/3.L/oss, ,_I + /3
5 
Leverage,., + /3"Growth" + /37Cjo" + /3,d2006, , + /39d2007" + /3"/amily,, + /3",Fmanrot * family" + 
+jJ,oPmanrot * family" + /321 Fvolrot * family" + /3"Pvolrot * family" + 5" + je 
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(5) 
I assume that auditor rotations are more positively associated with audit quality in 
non-family firms. Therefore, the coefficients from ｾＱＹ＠ to ｾＲＲ＠ are expected to be positive. 
4.5 Main results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.8.2 reports the main descriptive statistics. 
The average absolute value of AbsAwca is 0.09 (median 0.04)42. 
Six percent (four percent) of firm-year observations involve a mandatory (non-
mandatory) firm rotation, whereas ten percent (seven percent) of observations involve a 
mandatory (voluntary) partner rotation43. 
Non-Big audit firms cover 13% of the sample. This percentage is a fare 
representation of the whole Italian market, where Big audit firms detain a market share of 
about 90% (Cameran, 2007). 62% of the companies in the sample are family owned. On 
average, client companies have been listed for 14 years, report operating cash flows (on 
total assets) of 0.04 and leverage of62%. 
Univariate correlation coefficients are presented in Table 4.8.3. AbsAwca is 
negatively correlated with firm size and cash flow from operations and positively 
correlated with growth and lagged losses, as one would expect. Firm and patiner rotations 
seem not to be significantly correlated with audit quality. Firm mandatory rotations 
42 The top and the bottom I % of abnormal working capital accruals. cash flo\\. leverage and gro\\th were 
winsorised in order to limit the impact of extreme observations 
43 The rate of firm mandatory rotations is slightly lower than the predicted one (11%) due to young 
companies which have recently been listed on the Stock Exchange and therefore have not reached the nine 
years tenure. 
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appear to be positively associated with lagged losses, leverage and negatively related to 
the amount of operating cash flow. Partner mandatory rotations show positive correlation 
with auditee's size and a negative correlation with the nonBig variable. This suggests that 
partner turnover tends to be generally higher in non-Big audit firms, as there is a lower 
probability that the same partner serves one client for more than six years. 
4.5.2 Empirical results 
Table 4.8.4 shows results of regressing Absawca on firm and partner mandatory 
rotations (Table 4.8.4, column 1). 
Partner mandatory rotations are negatively associated with AbsAwca (U2= -0.023 
p=0.016). This result is consistent with Fargher et. al (2008) who also found that the 
amount of discretionary accruals decreased in the year of partner rotation. No significant 
association is found for firm mandatory rotations. Taken together, these results meet 
previous expectations, suggesting partner mandatory rotations to be associated with 
higher audit quality compared to firm mandatory rotations. The coefficient ｾＲ＠ of NonBig 
is negative and highly significant ＨｾＲ］ＭＰＮＰＶＷ＠ p=0.007), implying that non-Big audit firms 
are associated with a lower level of Absawca. This result appears somewhat surprising as 
it has been well documented that audit quality is positively correlated with auditor size 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et aI., 1998; Francis et aI., 1999). Recently, however, literature 
has shown that institutional regimes highly affect earnings quality in general (La Porta et 
al. 1998; La Porta et al. 2000) and the way Big audit firms affect client earnings. Francis 
et Wang (2008) state that Big four behaviour is not uniform around the world but varies 
systematically with incentives. They argue that Big audit firms are expected to deliver 
higher audit quality in stricter investor protection regimes. The level of investor 
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protection in Italy is relatively low (LaPorta et aI., 1998). Big audit firms in Italy 
therefore may not be as incentived as in other countries to pursue a high level of audit 
quality. Finally, Cameran et al. (2010) study the opinion that Italian Chief Financial 
Officers have about their auditors. They find that Big audit firms in Italy are not always 
perceived as superior compared to non-Big counterparts, confirming the above 
arguments. As expected, Fsize appears to be significantly negatively related to AbsAwca, 
suggesting that smaller firms tend to have a more "aggressive" approach to accounting 
ＨｾＳ］ＭＰＮＰＸＹ＠ p=0.002). Consistently with previous studies, the coefficient of Growth 
variable is positive and significant, implying that firms showing a higher level of growth 
tend to report a greater amount of absolute abnormal accruals ＨｾＶ］ＰＮＰＵＷ＠ p=0.057). 
Finally, the year dummy variable d_2007 is negatively associated with AbsAwca ＨｾＹ］Ｍ
0.027 p=0.058). All other control variables are not significant. 
Column 2 (voluntary rotations) of Table 4.8.4 reports results of the regression of 
AbsAwca on firm and partner voluntary rotations. Coefficients a3 and a4 are both 
insignificant, implying that when rotations are a consequence of a voluntary choice, the 
effects on audit quality are minimized. Finally, mandatory and voluntary rotations are 
included in the same model (Table 4.8.4, column 3). The coefficient a2 is again negative 
and significant (a2=-0.021 p=0.024); coefficients aI, a3 and <14 remain insignificant. These 
findings suggest that mandatory rotations are more positively associated with audit 
quality compared to voluntary rotations, as I expected. Control variables show the same 
behaviour described for mandatory rotations, with the one exception of the year dummy 
d_2006, which in this case is also negative and signi fi8ant ＨｾＸ］ＭＰＮＰＲＱ＠ p=0.073). 
Table 4.8.5 reports results for model (3), where interaction variables between 
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rotations and client's size, used as a proxy for task complexity, are added to model (2)44. 
In Table 4.8.5, column 2 (Size Interactions), the coefficient U2 for partner 
mandatory rotations is negative and significant, but in this case the economic effect 
increases (from -0.02 to -0.46) and the significance level decreases (from 5 to 10%). 
Looking at the interaction variables ＨｾｉｏＭｾｉＳＩＬ＠ it seems that the effects of partner 
mandatory rotation in highly complex companies are weaker ＨｾＱＱ］ＰＮＰＵＰ＠ p=0.084). As 
expected, the beneficial effects of mandatory partner rotations are counterbalanced by the 
higher effort that has to be carried out in guaranteeing an effective and smooth transfer of 
knowledge. Control variables show the same behaviour as column (1). 
In Table 4.8.5, under column 3 (Leverage Interactions), leverage is interacted with 
rotation variables. The coefficient U2 for partner mandatory rotations is not significant 
(even if the p-value 0.11 is slightly above the significance level) and none of the 
interaction variables show a significant coefficient. The coefficients of NonBig and Fsize, 
ｾＲ＠ and ｾＳ＠ respectively continue to show a negative and significant sign ＨｾＲ］ＭＰＮＰＶＶＬ＠
p=O.Oll; ｾＳ］ＭＰＮＰＹＱＬ＠ p=0.002); also the coefficient ｾＶ＠ of Growth is still positive and 
significant ＨｾＶ］ＰＮＰＴＹＬ＠ p=0.094). Year dummy variables are not significant. 
The last analysis tests whether auditor rotations have different impact in family and 
non-family firms. Column 4 of Table 4.8.5 reports the results of adding interaction 
variables between family and rotation variables. Overall, it seems that auditor rotations 
are not differently associated with audit quality in family and non-family firms. As 
before, non-Big audit finns and larger companies are associated with a higher level of 
44 For comparability reasons table 4.8.5, column 2 reports results of the regression of AbsAwca on both firm 
and partner mandatory and voluntary rotations (model 2). 
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audit quality and Growth is positively related with the dependent variable. Given the 
results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.8.5, it appears that the association between 
auditor rotations and audit quality does not vary with the demand for audit quality. 
4.6 Additional analyses and robustness tests 
I perform additional analyses and a set of robustness tests in order to check the 
soundness of the results. 
Firstly, analyses are performed controlling for finn and partner tenure, which are 
added to all models presented as control variables. Results are presented in table 4.8.6. 
Results remain consistent in all specifications. Findings also confirm previous 
evidence from Cameran et al. (2010) and from most of the literature (Carcello and Nagy, 
2004; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; Nagy et a1. 2005). Audit finn tenure is 
highly negatively associated with Absawca (1 % level) suggesting that the ability of audit 
finns to constrain discretionary accounting choices improves over time. This reinforces 
results found in Table 4.4 and described above. If audit quality seems to increase with 
finn tenure and mandatory finn rotations bring in no incremental beneficial effect, 
legislators should be very cautious in introducing or augmenting the mandatory rotation 
rule at firm level, especially considering that such a rule might be very costly both for the 
auditor and for the client. The same positive association between audit quality and tenure 
is not revealed at the partner level. This is consistent with Carey and Simnet (2006) who 
also fail to detect any significant association between partner tenure and abnonnal 
accruals. 
Secondly, as Big and non-Big audit firms are considered to be not homogeneous, 
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analyses are repeated only for Big audit finns, i.e. deleting all firm year observations 
audited by non-Big audit finns in order to test whether general results are confrrmed for 
Big audit firms. Results are presented in Table 4.8.7. 
Again, partner mandatory rotations are negatively related to Absawca and seem to 
have a lower effect in larger client companies. In this case partner mandatory rotations 
are negatively associated with AbsAwca also when leverage interactions variables are 
added to the model, thus reinforcing results obtained with the whole sample. Results for 
demand for audit quality and ownership concentration remain unchanged. 
I then use different a different proxy for audit task complexity: the sum of auditee's 
inventories and receivables divided by the company's total assets, which is another proxy 
traditionally used in the literature to measure audit task complexity (Amir et a., 2010). 
Again, (results not tabulated) partner mandatory rotations are associated with a lower 
level of absolute abnormal working capital accruals and again this effect appears to be 
weaker for more complex companies. A similar result, even if weaker, is observed for 
finn mandatory rotations. Finally, firm voluntary rotations seems to be associated with a 
lower level of audit quality, but the opposite (higher audit quality) happens for clients 
which are characterized by a higher level of complexity. 
I also repeat the analysis redefining size and leverage interaction variables as the 
product of rotation variables and dummy variables taking the value of I if above the 
median and 0 otherwise. Also in this case results (not tabulated) remain unchanged. In 
particular, the significance level in audit task complexity is even higher (coefficient U2 of 
partner mandatory rotations is equal to -0.076, p=0.003; coefficient ｾｬｉｯｦ＠ the interaction 
variable Pmanrot*Dsize is equal to 0.096, p=O.OlO, where Dsize is a dummy variable 
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equal to I if the company's size is above the sample median, 0 otherwise). 
As a final robustness test, I use a different measure of earnings quality to check 
whether results are driven by the proxy chosen for the dependent variable. In particular, I 
use the absolute amount of abnormal accruals as defined by Francis and Wang, (2008): 
Abnormal accruals= Total accruals - Predicted accruals 
Where: 
Total A l (Earnings before extraordinay items, - CFO ) 
1 I ccrua s, = ' 
Total assets'_1 
And: 
[ I 
* current accrualst_1 PPE * depreciation,_1 ] 
sa eSt + gross / 
sales gross PPE 
Pr edicted Accruals, = ,-\ /-1 
Total assets,_l 
Results are presented in Table 4.8.8 
In this case, the coefficient U2 of the variable Pmanrot in model 2 is not significant, even 
if the negative sign holds. However, when controlling for audit task complexity, partner 
mandatory rotations are again associated with a lower level of absolute abnormal accruals 
(u2=-0.286; p-value=0.047). Also the offsetting result for more complex companies is 
confirmed, as the coefficient ｾＱＱ＠ is positive and significant ＨｾＱＱ］ＰＮＰＳＱＬ＠ p=0.07). As 
99 
before, the demand for audit quality and ownership concentrations seems not to affect the 
association between auditor rotations and audit quality. 
4.7 Conclusions and limitations 
This study contrasts the relation of partner mandatory rotations versus firm 
mandatory rotations with higher audit quality. Given that the loss of client specific 
knowledge and information asymmetry induced by rotations are much less evident at the 
partner level, I test whether mandatory partner rotations are more beneficial compared to 
firm mandatory rotations. Then, I perform analyses to test whether the effects of auditor 
rotations on audit quality are homogenous across firms or are different according to the 
economics behind rotations. For this purpose, audit task complexity and the demand for 
audit quality are taken into consideration in the analyses of auditor rotations on audit 
quality. I finally test whether mandatory auditor rotations are more strongly associated 
with audit quality compared to voluntary rotations. 
Using the amount of absolute abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and 
Park, 2001) as a proxy for audit quality, results suggest that only partner mandatory 
rotations might have a beneficial effect on reporting quality, while no significant effects 
can be detected when the entire firm is forced to rotate. Partner mandatory rotations are 
also found to be less effective in highly complex environments. Results also suggest that 
the demand for audit quality does not affect the association between auditor rotation and 
audit quality. Finally, voluntary rotations are not associated with audit quality. 
Two are the most important messages in this study. Firstly, given ,that only partner 
mandatory rotations seem to have a beneficial effect on audit quality and audit firm 
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rotations are considered to be highly costly, the choice undertaken by those countries (e.g. 
US and UK) which introduced the mandatory rotation rule at the partner level only finds 
empirical support. Secondly, audit firms should place greater effort to support partner 
mandatory rotations in highly complex clients, so as to make the MRR lead to its best 
results. 
I acknowledge that Italy is characterized by specific institutional features (small 
and young financial markets, low enforcement levels etc.). Even if this means that 
extending the results of this study to other settings is not straightforward, this research 
exploits a unique audit environment where both partner and mandatory rotations are 
enforced for all listed companies and it supports partner mandatory rotations as a means 
of enhancing audit quality. 
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4.8 Tables 
Table 4.8.1 
Sample composition 
Table -1.8 1 
Firm/year observations Sample period 2006-2008 
Initial sample 654 
Missing audit & accounting data, M& A obs -51 
Final sample 603 
Table 4.8.2 
Descriptives 
Table 4.82 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
AbsAwca 603 0.090 0.039 0.164 0 1.16 
Fmanrot 603 0.055 0 0.228 0 1 
Pmanrot 603 0.098 0 0.297 0 1 
Fvolrot 596 0.042 0 0.201 0 1 
Pvolrot 590 0.073 0 0.260 0 1 
Fage 603 14.353 8 24.104 0 185 
NonBig 603 0.128 0 0.334 0 1 
FSize 603 8.514 8.458 0.792 5.89 11.03 
Lloss 603 0.234 0 0.424 0 1 
Leverage 603 0.622 0.636 0.185 0.10 1.04 
Growth 603 0.154 0.079 0.421 -0.67 3.03 
C/o 603 0.044 0.052 0.118 -0.44 0.50 
Family 603 0.620 1 0.485 0 1 
d 2006 603 0.343 0 0.475 0 1 
d 2007 603 0.351 0 0.478 0 1 
d 2008 603 0.305 0 0.461 0 1 
Variable definitions 
AbsAwca = absolute abnormal working capital accruals, scaled by sales; Fmanrot= 1 if there has been a 
firm mandatOlY rotation in year t, 0 otherwise; Pmanrot= 1 ifthere has been a partner mandatory rotation in 
year t. 0 otherwise; Fvolrot= 1 if there has been a firm voluntalY rotation in year t. 0 otherwise; Pvolrot = if 
there has been a partner voluntary rotation in year t, 0 otherwise; Fage= number of years passed since the 
auditee's IPO; NonBig = 1 if the audit firm is a non-Big audit firm, 0 otherwise; Fshe = natural logarithm 
of total sales; Lloss= 1 if the company reported a loss in year t-1, 0 otherwise; Leverage= total liabilities 
divided by total assets; Growth = change in sales divided by sales in year t-1; Cio = operating cash flows in 
year t scaled by beginning total assets; Family = 1 if the company is family owned, 0 otherwise. Firms are 
classified as family owned if the majority of the stock (over 50%) is owned by a family; dj006=1 if the 
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observations belongs to 2006; d_2007=1 if the observations belongs to 2007; dj008=1 if the observations 
belongs to 2008. 
In some cases, it was not possible to correctly identifY the presence of a voluntary rotation, therefore the 
observation was left blank (this is the reason why the number of observations for foa/rat and pvolrot is 
lower than 603) 
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Table 4.8 3 
LNAF 
LET 
LET_ACC 
LET_NNACC 
LET_DISC 
LET_RISK 
LET1 
LET2 
LET3 
GC 
REST 
FOR 
BIG 
MA 
ROA 
DEC 
ARINV 
DEBT 
LNASS 
LOSS 
ABSDA 
SEG 
LNAF LET 
0.0823* 
0.0844* 1 
0.1388* 0.7552* 
-0.0611 * 0.4723* 
0.1215* 0.7595* 
0.0378* 0.2946* 
0.0159* -0.3780* 
-0.0209* -0.2622* 
-0.0226* -0.1787' 
-0.2670* 0.0217* 
0.0003 0.0213* 
0.4813' 0.0195' 
0.6207* -0.0148 
0.1437* 0.0246* 
o .3007 * -0.0567* 
0.0833" 0.0569" 
-0.0262* -0.0474* 
0.1575* 0.0258* 
0.8560* 0.0544* 
-0.2866* 0.0310 * 
-0.1 365* 0.0365 * 
0.3851* 0.0189* 
Variable definitions 
See Table 4.8.2. 
LET_ACC 
0.1382* 
0.7552* 
1 
-0.2211* 
0.7917* 
0.2884* 
-0.2855* 
-0.1980* 
-0.1349* 
-0.0401* 
0.0261' 
0.0594* 
0.0505* 
0.0131 
0.0340* 
0.0388* 
-0.0092 
0.0264* 
0.1304* 
-0.0424* 
-0.0071 
0.0445* 
Table 4.8.3 
Correlations 
LET_NNACC LET_DISC LET_RISK LET1 LET2 
-0.0252* -0.0634* 
0.4 723* 
-0.2211* 
1 
0.0654* 
0.0505* 
-0.1786* 
-0.1238* 
-0.0844* 
0.0862* 
-0.0034 
-0.0509* 
-0.0899* 
0.0190* 
-0.1301* 
0.0324* 
-0.0582* 
0.0029 
-0.0943* 
0.1031* 
0.0638* 
-0.0317* 
0.1200* 
0.7595* 
0.7917* 
0.0654* 
1 
0.2997* 
-0.2871* 
-0.1991* 
-0.1357* 
-0.0367* 
0.0140 
0.0639* 
0.0370* 
0.0177* 
0.0280* 
0.0325* 
0.0009 
0.0125 
0.1096* 
-0.0339* 
0.0030 
0.0437* 
0.0374* 
0.2946* 
0.2884* 
0.0505* 
0.2997* 
-0.1114' 
-0.0773* 
-0.0526* 
-0.0008 
-0.0049 
0.0034 
0.0064 
0.0140 
-0.0386* 
0.0261* 
-0.0232* 
0.0119 
0.0238* 
0.0127 
0.0392* 
-0.0072 
0.0148 
-0.3780* 
-0.2855* 
-0.1786* 
-0.2871* 
-0.1114* 
1 
0.1405* 
0.1570* 
0.0106 
-0.0154* 
-0.0092 
-0.0296* 
0.0023 
-0.0048 
0.0084 
-0.0007 
-0.0009 
-0.0008 
0.0386* 
-0.0533* 
-0.0089 
-0.2622* 
-0.1980* 
-0.1238* 
-0.1991* 
-0.0773* 
0.1405* 
1 
0.1692* 
0.0347* 
-0.0201 * 
-0.0137 
-0.0610* 
-0.0157* 
-0.0262* 
-0.0005 
0.0022 
-0.0007 
-0.0416* 
0.0755* 
-0.0330* 
-0.0142 
LET3 
-0.0268* 
-0.1787* 
-0.1349* 
-0.0844* 
-0.1357* 
-0.0526* 
0.1570* 
0.1692* 
1 
0.0546* 
-0.0206* 
-0.0214 * 
-0.0477* 
-0.0141 
-0.0281* 
0.0032 
-0.0038 
0.0080 
-0.0438* 
0.0518* 
-0.0187* 
-0.0224* 
GC REST 
-0.2674* 0.0001 
0.0217* 0.0213* 
-0.0401* 0.0261* 
0.0862* -0.0034 
-0.0367* 0.0140 
-0.0008 -0.0049 
0.0106 -0.0154* 
0.0347* -0.0201* 
0.0546* -0.0206* 
1 -0.0247* 
-0.0247* 1 
-0.1798* 0.0119 
-0.2659* -0.0137 
-0.0640* -0.0071 
-0.4505* 0.0026 
0.0353* 0.0038 
-0.0423* 0.0023 
0.0347* -0.0099 
-0.3581 * -0.0050 
0.2922* -0.0018 
0.1163* -0.0138 
-0.1063* 0.0226* 
FOR 
0.4911' 
0.0195* 
0.0594* 
-0.0509* 
0.0639* 
0.0034 
-0.0092 
-0.0137 
-0.0214* 
-0.1798* 
0.0119 
0.2868* 
0.1258* 
0.2270* 
-0.0557* 
0.1471* 
-0.0423* 
0.3761 * 
-0.1779* 
-0.0467* 
0.2133* 
Pair-wise Pearson correlations are reported below the diagonal; Spearman correlations are reported above the diagonal. 
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BIG MA ROA DEC 
0.6298* 0.1486* 0.2737* 0.0784* 
-0.0148 0.0246* -0.0458* 0.0569* 
0.0505* 0.0131 0.0333* 0.0388' 
-0.0899* 0.0190* -0.1129* 0.0324* 
0.0370* 0.0177* 0.0254* 0.0325* 
0.0064 0.0140 -0.0306* 0.0261 * 
-0.0296* 0.0023 -0.0228* 0.0084 
-0.0610* -0.0157* -0.0525* -0.0005 
-0.0477* -0.0141 -0.0626* 0.0032 
-0.2659* -0.0640* -0.3605* 0.0353* 
-0.0137 -0.0071 -0.0079 0.0038 
0.2868* 0.1258* 0.2282* -0.0557* 
1 0.0714* 0.2226* 0.0687* 
0.0714* 0.0743* 0.0175* 
0.2487* 0.0358* -0.0553* 
0.0687* 0.0175* -0.0514* 1 
-0.1061* -0.0062 0.1652* -0.2039 
0.1111* 0.0344* -0.0444* 0.0862* 
0.6193* 0.1337* 0.4083* 0.0715* 
-0.2527* -0.1025* -0.4171* 0.0351* 
-0.1102* 0.0169* -0.2327* 0.0310* 
0.1803* 0.0847* 0.1684* 0.0039 
Table 4.8.4 
Regression of absolute abnormal working capital accruals on auditor rotations 
Table 4.8-1 
(1) (2) (3) 
Expected Mandory rotations Non-mandatory All rotations 
sign rotations 
Intercept (aO) ? 0.844*** 0.846*** 0.842*** 
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001) 
Fmanrot (aJ) + 0.040 0.042 
(0.281) (0.248) 
Pmanrot (a2) -0.023** -0.021 ** 
(0.016) (0.024) 
Fvolrot (a3) ? 0.021 0.021 
(0.552) (0.566) 
Pvo/rot (a.f) ') 0.020 0.020 
(0.574) (0.566) 
Fage (PI) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.120) (0.149) (0.136) 
NonBig (fJ2) + -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.068*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Fsize (fJ3) -0.089** -0.090*** -0.089*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Lloss (P4) + 0.008 0.007 0.006 
(0.605) (0.645) (0.680) 
Leverage (P5) + 0.033 0.035 0.0312 
(0.614) (0.619) (0.655) 
Growth (fJ6) + 0.057* 0.053* 0.054* 
(0.057) (0.068) (0.0658) 
Cjo (P7) -0.165 -0.168* -0.164 
(0.102) (0.095) (0.103) 
dj006 (P8) ? -0.018 -0.028** -0.021 * 
(0.106) (0.019) (0.073) 
dj007 (P9) ? -0.027* -0.031 ** -0.028** 
(0.058) (0.027) (0.048) 
Observations 603 590 590 
R-squared 0.225 0.219 0.224 
IndustrY./ixed effects YES YES YES 
Regression Models: 
(1) Mandatory rotations 
AbsAwca;f = a
o 
+aIFmanrot;f +a
2
Pmanrotu + /31Fage;f + /32 NonB;g", + /3,Fsi::e" + /3,Lloss,,f + /3,Leverageu + 
+/3(,Growthf,f + /37Cjo" + /38d2006u + /39d2007,,f + C'f + je 
(2) Voluntary rotations 
AbsAwca;.f = a" + a) Fvo/rot" + a
4 
Pvo/rot" + /3\ Fage", + P2 NonBig'.f + /3,Fsize;f + /34L1oSS,., + /3jLeverage,.f + 
+/3(,Growth" + /37CjO,,f + /3gd2006,.f + /39d2007,.1 + G", + je 
(3) All rotations 
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AbsAwca" = an + a1Fmanrot", + a 2 PmanrOf", + a) Fvolrot", + a 4 Pvolrof" + /31 Fage,,/ + /32 NonBig,,1 + /3) Fsize" + 
+P.jLloss" + psLeverage" + pr-Growth,,1 + P7Cjo" + Psd2006" + /39d2007,,1 + c,,/ + je 
Variable definitions: 
See Table 4.8.2. 
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Table 4.8.5 
Regression of absolute abnormal working capital accruals on auditor rotations considering 
task complexity and demand for audit quality 
Table 4.85 
Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sign Basic Model Size Leverage Family 
Interactions Interactions Interactions 
Intercept (0.0) ? 0.842*** 0.844*** 0.876*** 0.850*** 
(0.001 ) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.001) 
Frnanr ot (0.1) + 0.042 0.316 -0.148 0.030 
(0.248) (0.639) (0.605) (0.659) 
Prnanrot (0.2) -0.021** -0.463* -0.085 -0.023 
(0.024) (0.072) (0.112) (0.153) 
Fvolrot (0.3) ? 0.021 0.786 -0.045 0.022 
(0.566) (0.246) (0.449) (0.583) 
Pvob·ot (0.';) ? 0.020 -0.161 -0.063 -0.009 
(0.566) (0.627) (0.655) (0.784) 
Fage (fJI) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
(0.136) (0.194) (0.128) (0.139) 
Non Big (fJ2) + -0.068*** -0.070** -0.066** -0.067*** 
(0.009) (0.011 ) (0.011) (0.010) 
Fsize (fJ3) -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.089*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lloss (fJ4) + 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.006 
(0.680) (0.491) (0.783) (0.644) 
Leverage (fJ5) + 0.031 0.024 -0.007 0.030 
(0.655) (0.719) (0.893) (0.674) 
Growth (fJ6) + 0.054* 0.053* 0.049* 0.053* 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.094) (0.085) 
Cfo (fJ7) -0.164 -0.154 -0.150 -0.165 
(0.103) (0.149) (0.136) (0.101) 
d 2006 (fJ8) ? -0.021 * -0.019** -0.018 -0.021 * 
(0.073) (0.018) (0.130) (0.069) 
d 2007 (fJ9) ? -0.028** -0.025* -0.026 -0.028* 
(0.048) (0.077) (0.110) (0.059) 
Fmanrot*Size (fJIO) + -0.032 
(0.685) 
Pmanrot*Size (fJII) + 0.050* 
(0.084 ) 
Fvolrot*Size (fJ12) + -0.094 
(0.241 ) 
Pvolrot*Size (fJ 13) + 0.021 
(0.565) 
Fmanrot*lev (fJN) 0.281 (0.517) 
Prnanrot *lev (fJ 15) 0.106 (0.190) 
Fvolrot*lev (/3 16) 0.099 (0.293) 
Pvolrot*/ev (fJ17) 0.138 
Family (fJI8) ? -0.013 (0.482) 
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Fmanrot*jamily (P19) + 
Pmanrof* ｦ｡ｭｩｾｶ＠ + 
(P20) 
Fvolrot* family (P2i) + 
Pvolrot* family (P22) + 
Observations 
R-squared 
industry fixed effects 
Regression Models: 
(1) Basic Model 
590 590 
0.224 0.242 
YES YES 
0.019 
(0.823) 
0.007 
(0.750) 
-0.005 
(0.932) 
0.041 
(0.372) 
590 590 
0.231 0.226 
YES YES 
AbsAwcai" = a o + a l Fmanrot" + a 2 Pmanro!" + a) Fvolroti" + a 4 Pvolroti" + f31 Fagei, + f32NonBig", + f3,Fsize", + 
+f3.,L!ossi,l + f3sLeverage" + f36Growth;" + f37Cf oi,l + f38d2006" + f39d2007;,l + s;" + fe 
(2)Size interactions 
AbsAwca;,l = a o + a l Fmanrof;" + a 2 Pmanrot" + a 3 Fvolrofi , + a I Pvolrot", + f31 Fageu + f32 NonBig;" + f3) Fsize, , + 
+P4L!ossi" + f35Leverage" + f36Growthi,' + f37Cf o;,l + f3Rd2006i,l + f39d2007i,l + f3loFmanrot * size;" + f31I Pmanrot * sizei,l + 
+f312Fvolrot * sizei" + f313Pvol * rotsize;,l + s;, + fe 
(3)Leverage interactions 
AbsAwca", = a
o 
+ a,Fmanrot;" + a 2 Pmanrot;, + a)Fvolrot" + a 4 Pvolrot", + f3I Fage" + f32 NonBig" + f3)Fsize" + 
+f3
4
L!oss" + f3sLeverage" + f36Growthi' + f37Cf o;" + f3Rd2006" + f39d2007;, + f31.,Fmanrot * lev;" + f31;Pmanrot * lev" + 
+f316Fvolrot * lev", + f317Pvolrot * leVi, + s;, + fe 
(4)F amily interactions 
AbsAwca" = au + a,Fmanroti" + a,Pmanrot" + a) Fvolrot", + a4Pvolrot" + f3,Fage", + f3,NonBigl.l + f3)Fsize", + 
+f34Llossu + f3,Leverage" + f36Growthu + f37Cfo" + f3sd2006" + f39d2007", + p,sfamily" + p'9Fmanrot * family" + 
+ p,uPmanrot * family, + P
21 
Fvolrot * familyu + P22 Pvolrot * family, + Su + fe 
Variable definitions: 
Fmanrot*Fsize= Interaction between Fmanrot (defined as above) and Fsize (defined as above); Pmanrot*Fsize= 
Interaction between Pmanrot (defined as above) and Fsize (defined as above); Fvolrot*Fi::.e= Interaction between 
Fvolrot (defined as above) and Fsize (defined as above); Pvolrot*Fsize= Interaction between Pvolrof (defined as 
above) and Fsi::.e (defined as above); Fmanrot*lev= Interaction between Fmanrot (defined as above) and Leverage 
(defined as above); Pmanrot*lev= Interaction between Pmanrot (defined as above) and leverage (defined as above): 
Fvolrot*lev= Interaction between Fvolrot (defined as above) and leverage (defined as above): Pvolrot*lev= 
Interaction between Pvolrot (defined as above) and leverage (defined as above): Fami(v = 1 if the company is family 
owned. 0 otherwise. Firms are classified as family owned if the majority of the stock (over 50%) is owned by a 
family; Fmanrot*family= Interaction between Fmanrof (defined as above) andfamdy (defined as above): Pmanrot* 
familv = Interaction between Pmanrot (defined as above) and ｦ｡ｭｩｾｶ＠ (defined as above): Fvolrot* family = 
ｉｮｴ･ｲｾ｣ｴｩｯｮ＠ between Fvolrot (defined as above) andfamily (defined as above); Pvolrot* family = Interaction between 
Pvolrot (defined as above) and family (defined as above). 
For all other variables see Table 4.8.2. 
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Table 4.8.6 
Regression of absolute abnormal working capital accruals on auditor rotations and auditor 
tenure 
Table ..f. 8 6 
Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sign Basic Model Size Leverage Family 
Interactions Interactions Interactions 
Intercept (aO) ? 0.875*** 0.879*** 0.908*** 0.877*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.001) 
Fmanrot (aI) + 0.026 0.289 -0.164 0.019 
(0.463) (0.674) (0.568) (0.776) 
Pmanrot (a2) -0.016* -0.465* -0.086 -0.015 
(0.091 ) (0.074) (0.128) (0.342) 
Fvolrot (a3) ? 0.007 0.773 -0.061 0.011 
(0.828) (0.250) (0.315) (0.775) 
Pvolrot (a4) ? 0.012 -0.179 -0.065 -0.036 
(0.751) (0.582) (0.645) (0.384) 
Ften (a5) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) 
Pten (a6) ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.771) (0.781) (0.724) (0.865) 
Fage (fJI) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.161) (0.226) (0.151) (0.160) 
NonBig (fJ2) + -0.076*** -0.079*** -0.074*** -0.076*** 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Fsize (fJ3) -0.091 *** -0.091 *** -0.092*** -0.090*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lloss (fJ4) + 0.013 0.018 0.010 0.014 
(0.459) (0.328) (0.542) (0.370) 
Leverage (fJ5) + 0.030 0.023 -0.008 0.027 
(0.667) (0.735) (0.860) (0.696) 
Growth (fJ6) + 0.058* 0.057* 0.054* 0.058* 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.094 ) (0.080) 
Cfo (fJ7) -0.150 -0.139 -0.137 -0.151 
(0.149) (0.207) (0.187) (0.148) 
dj006 (fJ8) ? -0.024** -0.022*** -0.021 * -0.024** 
(0.033) (0.004) (0.067) (0.030) 
dj007 (fJ9) ? -0.029** -0.026* -0.027* -0.029** 
(0.031) (0.054) (0.084 ) (0.041 ) 
ｆｭ｡ｮｲｯｴＪｓｩｾ･＠ (fJIO) + -0.031 
(0.702) 
ｐｭ｡ｮｲｯｴＪｓｩｾ･＠ (fJII) + 0.051 * 
(0.082) 
Fvolrot*Size (fJ 12) + -0.094 
(0.240) 
Pvolrot*Size (fJ 13) + 0.023 (0.536) 
Fmanrot*lev (fJI.J) 0.279 (0.517) 
Pmanrot*lev (fJI5) 0.114 (0.189) 
Fvolrot*lev (fJI6) 0.103 (0.281) 
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Pvolrot*lev (/317) 
Famizv ? 
Fmanrot*family (/3i8) + 
Pmanrot* family + 
(/319) 
Fvolrot* family (/320) + 
Pvolrot* family (/32l) + 
Observations 
R-squared 
Industryjixed effects 
Regression Models: 
(l) Basic Model 
581 581 
0.231 0.249 
YES YES 
0.126 
(0.606) 
-0.007 
(0.725) 
0.013 
(0.878) 
0.002 
(0.944) 
-0.008 
(0.892) 
0.062 
(0.210) 
581 581 
0.237 0.232 
YES YES 
AbsAwca", = a o +a1Fmanrot,,1 +a2 Pmanrot", +a1Fvolrot", +a4 Pvolrot" + as Ftenu +a6 Pten", + /31 Fage", + 
(2)Size interactions 
AbsAwca" = a o + alFmanrot" + a 2 Pmanrot" + a 3Fvolroti.t + a 4 Pvolrot,,1 + as Ften", + a 6 Pten,,1 + /31 Fage", + 
+/32 NonBig,,1 + P3Fsize", + +P4 L!oss", + /35 Leverage"t + /36Growth,,1 + /37Cf o't + /3gd2006" + /3"d2007"t + 
+/3
IO
Fmanrot * size" + /3IIPmanrot * size", + +/312 Fvolrot * size" + /3IlPvol * rotsize" + G,,1 + je 
(3)Leverage interactions 
AbsAwca'J = a
o 
+alFmanrot", +a
2
Pmanrot',t + a 3Fvolrot,J + a 4 Pvolrot,,I + as Ften", + a 6 Pten,,I + /31 Fage,,1 + 
+/32NonBig", + /3, Fsize" + P4 Lloss", + /3sLeverage", + /36Growth", + /37 Cjo" + /3gd2006", + /39d2007,,1 + 
+/314Fmanrot * lev" + /3lsPmanrot * lev" + /316 Fvolrot * lev", + /3I7Pvolrot * lev" + G" + fe 
(4)F amily interactions 
AbsAwca" = a
o 
+ a1Fmanrot',1 + a 2Pmanrotu + a 3 Fvo/rotu + a, Pvolrot", + asFten" + a"Ptenu + /31 Fage", + 
+/32NonBig" + fJ,Fsize"t + /3,L!ossi' + /35 Leverage, I + /3"Growthu + /37Cjou + /3gd2006i, + /3"d2007" + 
+/31sfamily" + /31" Fmanrot * family" + /32oPmanrot * family" + /321 Fvolrot * family, + /322Pvolrot * familyu + G" + ft 
Variable definitions: 
See Tables 4.8.2. and 4.8.5. 
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Table 4.8.7 
Regression of absolute abnormal working capital accruals on auditor rotations excluding 
non-Big audit firms 
Table 4.8 7 
Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sign Basic Model Size Leverage ｆ｡ｭｩｾｶ＠
Interactions Interactions Interactions 
Intercept (aO) '> 0.868*** 0.843*** 0.905*** 0.880*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fmanrot (al) + 0.055 0.479 -0.181 0.060 
(0.189) (0.460) (0.580) (0.413) 
Pmanrot (a2) -0.020** -0.442* -0.103* -0.022 
(0.024) (0.086) (0.067) (0.245) 
Fvolrot (a3) ? 0.044 1.125* -0.007 0.043 
(0.300) (0.100) (0.920) (0.348) 
Pvolrot (a-f.) ? 0.015 -0.124 -0.076 -0.019 
(0.696) (0.719) (0.615) (0.672) 
Fage (PI) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.451) (0.436) (0.444) (0.459) 
Fsi::e (P3) -0.091 *** -0.087*** -0.092*** -0.091 *** 
(0.004 ) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Lloss (P4) + 0.012 0.019 0.011 0.012 
(0.555) (0.423) (0.600) (0.524) 
Leverage (P5) + 0.015 0.003 -0.031 0.013 
(0.850) (0.974) (0.582) (0.872) 
Growth (P6) + 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.046 
(0.245) (0.236) (0.320) (0.280) 
Cfo (P7) -0.146 -0.132 -0.136 -0.143 
(0.177) (0.250) (0.214) (0.175) 
dj006 (PS) ? -0.020 -0.019** -0.019 -0.021 
(0.130) (0.043) (0.182) (0.117) 
dj007 (P9) ? -0.031 ** -0.027* -0.029* -0.031 ** 
(0.039) (0.079) (0.073) (0.040) 
Fmanrot*Size (P1O) + -0.049 
(0.517) 
Pmanrot*Size (PI1) + 0.048* 
(0.100) 
Fvolrot*Size (P12) + -0.132 
(0.101) 
Pvolrot * Size (P 13) + 0.016 
(0.670) 
Fmanrot*lev (PI-f.) 0.339 (0.482) 
Pmanrot*lev (PI5) 0.137 (0.122) 
Fvolrot*/ev (P16) 0.078 (0.468) 
Pvolrot*lev (p 17) 0.150 (0.561) 
Family (P1S) ? 
Fmanrot*family (PI9) + -0.012 
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Pmanrot* family 
(P20) 
Fvolrot* family (P21) 
Pvolrot* family (P22) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Industry fixed effects 
Regression Models: 
(l) Basic Model 
+ 
+ 
+ 
517 
0.223 
YES 
517 
0.250 
YES 
517 
0.231 
YES 
AbsAwca", = a o + a 1Fmanrot;,I + a 2 Pmanrot", + a) Fvolrot;" + ｡ｾｐｶｯｬｲｯｴｊＬＯ＠ + /31Fage" + /32 Fsize,,1 + 
+/3)L1oss;" + /34 Leverage,,I + /35Growth" + /36Cf o;" + /37d2006;" + /38d2007i,J + &;,1 + fe 
(2)Size interactions 
AbsAwca;" = a o + a 1Fmanrot;" + a 2 Pmanrot;, + a) Fvolrot" + a 4 Pvolroti,J + /31fage" + /32Fsize" + 
(0.565) 
-0.007 
(0.936) 
0.005 
(0.810) 
-0.001 
(0.988) 
517 
0.225 
YES 
+/3)L1oss" + /3
4 
Leverage" + /3,Growth;, + /3r,Cfo;, + /37d2006" + /38d2007", + /39 Fmanrot * size, 1 + /3loPmanrot * size" + 
+/311 Fvolrot * sizei,J + /312Pvol * rotsize;,I + &;" + fe 
(3 )Leverage interactions 
AbsAwca" = a
o 
+aIFmanrot" +a,Pmanrot;, +aJFvolrot", +a4 Pvo!rot;" + /31 Fage; , + /32 Fsize", + 
+/3) Lloss; , + /3
4 
Leverage", + /3,Growth", + /36Cfo;, + /37d2006;" + /38d2007", + /314Fmanrot * lev, I + /3lsPmanrot * lev,,I + 
+/316Fvolrot * lev, I + /3I7Pvolrot * levu + &;,1 + fe 
(4)F amity interactions 
AbsAwca
u 
= a
o 
+ a 1Fmanrot" + a2Pmanrotu + aJFvolrot" + a 4 Pvolrot;, + f3IFage,,I + f32Fsize" + 
+/3
3 
Lloss; , + /3
4 
Leveragei,J + f3prowth", + /3"Cfou + /37d2006" + f38d2007;, + f318Familyu + f31oFmanrot * family" + 
+f3,,)Pmanrot * family, + f321Fvolrot * family;, + f322Pvoirot * family,,I + &;1 + fe 
Variable definitions: 
See Tables 4.8.2. and 4.8.5. 
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Table 4.8.8 
Regression of absolute abnormal accruals on auditor rotations 
Table 4.8 8 
Expected (1) (2) (3) (4 ) 
sign Basic Model Size Leverage Family 
Interactions Interactions Interactions 
Intercept (0.0) ? 0.173*** 0.223*** 0.171*** 0.187*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) 
Fmanrot (0.J) + 0.001 -0.193 0.014 0.016 
(0.944) (0.306) (0.816) (0.711) 
Pmanrot (0.2) -0.014 -0.286** 0.010 -0.018 
(0.289) (0.047) (0.891 ) (0.471) 
Fvolrot (0.3) ') 0.004 -0.001 0.104** 0.012 
(0.830) (0.997) (0.043) (0.735) 
Pvolrot (0.-1) ? 0.005 -0.147 -0.003 0.047 
(0.578) (0.212) (0.940) (0.149) 
Fage (fJi) 0.001 *** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001 *** 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
NonBig (fJ2) + -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.932) (0.782) (0.814) (0.780) 
Fsi::.e (fJ3) -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004 ) (0.002) 
Lloss (fJ4) + 0.022* 0.023* 0.023** 0.020 
(0.076) (0.052) (0.050) (0.136) 
Leverage (fJ5) + 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.104*** 0.095*** 
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Growth (fJ6) + 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Cfo (fJ7) 0.016 0.020 0.013 0.024 
(0.684) (0.634) (0.737) (0.502) 
d_2006 (fJ8) ? 0.029** 0.030** 0.029** 0.030** 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.030) (0.023) 
dj007 (fJ9) ? 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
(0.373) (0.392) (0.346) (0.361 ) 
Fmanrot*Size (fJIO) + 0.022 
(0.284 ) 
Pmanrot*Size (fJI I) + 0.031 * 
(0.070) 
Fvolrot*Size (fJ 12) + 0.000 
(0.993) 
Pvolrot*Si:::e (fJi3) + 0.018 (0.205) 
Fmanrot*lev (fJl-I) -0.019 (0.824) 
Pmanrot*lev (fJi5) -0.040 (0.723) 
Fvolrot*lev (fJI6) -0.153** (0.035) 
Pvolrot*lev (fJ 17) 0.016 (0.818) 
FamiZv (fJI8) ') -0.008 (0.591 ) 
-0.020 
Fmanrot*family (fJi8) + 
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Pmanrot* family + 
(fiI9) 
Fvo!rot* family (fi20) + 
Pvolrot* family (fJ21) + 
Observations 
R-squared 
Industry fixed effects 
Regression Models: 
(1) Basic Model 
472 472 
0.185 0.196 
YES YES 
(0.627) 
0.006 
(0.793) 
-0.015 
(0.738) 
-0.054 
(0.160) 
472 472 
0.191 0.195 
YES YES 
AbsAAi, = an + alFmanroli., +a2 Pmanrot" + a 3 Fvo!roti., + a 4 Pvoiroti , + fJlfagei.l + /32 Non Big.., + /3,Fsize" + 
+/34Lloss,., + /35 Leveragei, + /36Growthi., + /37 Cjo,., + /3sd2006,., + /3"d2007" + &i' + je 
(2)Size interactions 
AbsAAi., = a o + alFmanrot" + a 2 Pmanrot" + a 3 Fvolroti .. + a 4 Pvo!rot" + /31 Fagei., + /32 NonBig, .. + /3,Fsize" + 
+/34Lloss" + psLeverage, .. + /36Growthil + /37 Cj oi., + /38d2006.., + /39d200\, + /3lOFmanrot * sizei., + /31 I Pmanrot * size, .. + 
+/312 Fvolrot * sizeil + plJPvol * rotsizei., + &i' + je 
(3)Leverage interactions 
AbsAA" = ao + a l Fmanrotu + a 2 Pmanroti., + a, Fvolrot" + a4 Pvolroti, + /31 Fage" + /32 NonBig" + /3, Fsi::.e" + 
+/34Lloss" + /3sLeverageu + /3"Growthi., + /37 Cjo" + /38d2006i' + /39d2007i., + /314 Fmanrot * lev.., + /31sPmanrot * lev,., + 
+/316 Fvolrot * lev" + /317Pvolrot * levi, + &" + je 
(4)F amity interactions 
AbsAA" = an + a
l 
Fmanrot
u 
+ a2 Pmanrotu + a J Fvolrot" + a4 Pvolroti., + /3/age" + /32 NonBig'f + /3J Fsize" + 
+fJ4Llossi' + /35Leverageif + /36Growth'f + /37Cjou + fJ,d2006 i.f + /39d2007u + /3lgfamity, .. + /319Fmanrot * familyu + 
+/32oPmanrot * familY,.f + /321 Fvolrot * family" + /322Pvolrot * familyu + &" + je 
Variable definitions: 
AbsAA = absolute abnormal accruals, scaled by beginning total assets. 
For all other variables, see Tables 4.8.2. and 4.8.5. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MANDATORY AUDITOR ROTATION, ACCOUNTING 
CONSERVATISM AND THE MANDATORY ADOPTION 
OFIFRS 
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5. PAPER II: Mandatory Auditor Rotation, Accounting 
Conservatism and the Mandatory Adoption of IFRS 
5.1 Introduction 
As argued in previous chapters, mandatory rotations, in particular finn rotations, impose 
considerable setup costs and likely increase the infonnation asymmetry between auditors and 
clients owing to the new auditor lacking firm-specific knowledge. This exposes him to a greater 
risk, because of the threat of expected losses and litigation (Solomon et aI., 1999; Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002; Ball et aI., 2003). One potential response to these threats by the new auditor 
could be carrying out an expensive initial audit. But this may not be a viable strategy, if the new 
auditor cannot demand additional fees. A potentially more cost effective approach would be to 
require more conservative reporting (Krishnan, 2007). 
Conservative reporting may be in auditors' best interest as it maintains reputation and 
mitigates litigation at all times (Benston, 1975; Watts, 2003). Auditors can also help satisfy 
demand by various stakeholders for conservative reporting (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
LaFond and Watts, 2008). However, as argued before, a long relationship between an auditor and 
his client can compromise independence (e.g., Bazerman et aI., 1997) and hence the auditor's 
inclination for conservative reporting. On the other hand, an incumbent auditor may be better 
placed to identify a loss event when it occurs. However, long-tenn relationships between 
auditors and clients may result in both auditors serving managers' reporting needs at the expense 
of shareholders and other stakeholders (Myers et aI, 2003) and a general reduction in infonnation 
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asymmetry. If the latter is the dominant factor, we expect incumbent auditors to progressively 
underreport loss events (even if indentified in a timely fashion) and respond less well to external 
demand for conservative repOliing. A new auditor, in contrast, free from adverse effects of long 
relationships, will favor conservative repOliing and be more responsive to the external demand, 
but may do a poorer job at detecting loss events as they occur owing to lack of client-specific 
knowledge. 
Prior studies provide limited guidance on these relations, in part because they do not use 
reporting conservatism as a measure of audit quality. For example, 10hnson et al. (2002) and 
Myers et al. (2003) find evidence consistent with a positive relation between auditor tenure and 
reporting quality, the latter proxied by a variety of accrual-based measures. However, accrual-
based measures are not designed to capture certain important dimensions of reporting 
conservatism, such as timely loss recognition (TLR) - our measure of reporting conservatism. In 
addition, the nature of the relationship between auditors and clients examined here differs 
markedly from prior literature. Specifically, this literature typically examines settings where 
auditor tenure is unrestricted by a mandatory rotation rule. A likely breaking point for the client-
auditor relationship arises when the auditor wishes to be more conservative than what is 
acceptable by the client (Lennox, 2000; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). Finding positive 
association between tenure and audit quality is then expected, if the client selects an auditor who 
is more willing to accommodate the client's (more aggressive) reporting choices to secure the 
new engagement. Under mandatory rotations, a new auditor is less exposed to such pressure, as 
the client is forced to replace the incumbent auditor at the end of the mandatory engagement 
period. This, in turn, reduces the new auditor's incentive to compromise on fee or effort, 
especially if the market for high quality audit is not sufficiently competitive (e.g., dominated by 
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the Big-4 finns). In addition, having a cap on tenure reduces client-specific rents and hence 
increases independence (Teoh, 1992). 
We investigate the relation between mandatory firm rotations and auditor tenure and TLR 
using data from Italy during 1990-2008. This is a unique and useful setting because of the 
relatively long history of mandatory audit finn rotation in Italy since 1975 (see Chapter 3, par. 
3.11). We analyze this dataset using the Basu (1997) model for asymmetric timeliness of changes 
in earnings and the asymmetric operating accrual-cash flow specification (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). Following LaFond and Watts (2008) and Khan and Watts (2009), we also examine if the 
relations between tenure and rotations and TLR are influenced by external demand for reporting 
conservatism. Consistent with this literature, we proxy for this demand using finn size, leverage 
and the market-to-book ratio. Specifically, it has been argued the demand for TLR decreases 
with size because infonnation asymmetry is larger in smaller companies. The demand for TLR is 
expected to increase with leverage and market-to-book because creditors prefer conservative 
reporting and managers know about growth opportunities more than outsiders. 
Italy has adopted in 2005 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). We exploit 
this fact to explore if the relations of interest operate differently under Italian GAAP than IFRS. 
Ball et a1. (2003) provide evidence suggesting that market and political incentives are potentially 
more important than accounting standards. Moreover, Ball et a1. (2000) express doubt that a 
change in reporting requirements alone will have any effect on the demand for high quality 
reporting. These arguments thus predict little effect for the adoption of IFRS. Nevertheless, the 
adoption of IFRS introduced a new set of rules that may, or may not, support more TLR than 
Italian GAAP. But, it is difficult to assess whether IFRS collectively require more TLR than 
Italian GAAP. More important, the potential for an auditor to influence reporting outcomes is a 
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function of the discretion a set of standards avails to the reporting entity. IFRS may furnish more 
room for professional judgment on part of auditors than Italian GAAP because it is more 
principles-based (Benston et ai., 2006). If standards matter, rotations under IFRS are then 
expected to be more strongly associated with TLR, because of new, more independent, auditors' 
preference for conservative reporting. If incumbent auditors are less independent and have a 
better client-specific knowledge, they may be less incentivized to employ the discretion under 
IFRS to increase TLR. Ultimately, whether IFRS allow more discretion and whether it is used by 
auditors is an empirical issue and therefore we make no prediction as to the effect of IFRS. 
Rather, we seek here evidence that can shed light on whether the adoption of IFRS has affected 
the ability of incumbent and new auditors to require TLR. 
Results of the Basu's changes-in-earnings model in the pooled sample indicate a greater 
degree of TLR for audit firm rotations, but we find no association between tenure and TLR. In 
addition, the accruals-cash flow specification reveals no significant association for either tenure 
or rotations with TLR. That the two model specifications do not yield similar results suggests 
they potentially capture different dimensions of conservatisms (Givoly et aI., 2007). In 
examining the role of external demand for conservative reporting, our findings are as follows. 
Audit firm rotations are positively related to TLR in highly leveraged firms, small firms and high 
market-to-book firms for the changes-in-earnings model, consistent with expectations, but not 
for the accruals-cash flow model. The association between auditor tenure and TLR is 
insignificant in all model specifications and for all three proxies for the demand for TLR, with 
one exception. Surprisingly, in the changes-in-earnings model we find a positive association for 
large firms. Distinguishing between Italian GAAP and IFRS we document a stronger association 
of rotations with TLR under IFRS than Italian GAAP before 2001 for the changes-in-earnings 
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model specification. We also find that tenure and TLR are positively related under Italian GAAP 
using the same model, but not under IFRS. 
Collectively, these analyses provide some evidence consistent with rotations increasing 
TLR, especially in the presence of extemal demand for conservative reporting. In contrast, 
incumbent auditors do not seem to respond well to this demand. A positive association between 
tenure and TLR is found only under Italian GAAP. This suggests that (1) tenure and TLR need 
not be positively related under all GAAP regimes and (2) the adoption of IFRS may have 
allowed incumbent auditors to be less conservative. Taken together, these suggest standards do 
matter for incumbent auditors. That rotations and TLR are similarly related under IFRS and 
Italian during 2001-2004, may be related to new auditors' incentives being shaped by similar and 
recent forces (e.g., adoption of SOX by global audit practices). 
The study contributes to the auditing literature in several ways. First, taken together, the 
findings of prior literature suggest that audit quality increases with audit firm tenure. As 
acknowledged by this literature (e.g., Myers et aI, 2003), this evidence is nonetheless silent on 
whether mandatory rotations may have a positive effect on audit quality. This paper helps fill this 
gap in our knowledge by providing evidence that suggests that rotations are capable of 
improving a reporting outcome, such as TLR. A contemporary paper by Cameran et al. (2010), 
using a similar dataset, concludes that mandatory firm rotations tend to hamper audit quality. The 
"contradiction" may be attributable to differences in measures used to assess audit quality. 
Cameran et al. use abnormal working capital accruals, consistent with prior literature.45 We offer 
a supplementary approach, relying on a well developed theory supporting conservatism as a 
means to resolve agency problems, and hence, as a measure of reporting quality (e.g., Watts 
45 Notwithstanding the popular use of abnormal accruals as a measure of audit quality, some have questioned its 
ability to accurately capture the abnormal or discretionary component in earnings (Bamber et aI.. 2009). 
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2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Our second contribution rests therefore with the use of TLR 
as a measure of audit quality that is likely not captured in abnormal accruals. In doing so, we add 
to the small body of research that investigates the role of auditors, and auditor rotations in 
particular, in the production of conservative reporting.46 Third, we extend the literature exploring 
whether external demand for audit quality is a likely factor influencing the relations of interest. 
This, we believe, can help to better understand the economics of rotations and tenure. Fourth, to 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to explore how rotations and tenure may 
influence TLR under different GAAP systems. The evidence provided here can be of use to 
researchers, accountants and practitioners interested in how the adoption of IFRS interacts with 
other accounting and legal institutions. This may be relevant in the event that IFRS are adopted 
in the US. 
In assessing these findings, it is important to add a cautionary note. The results are 
obtained for Italy - a country characterized by large family ownership, audit market controlled 
by Big-4 audit firms and a relatively small capital market - and therefore it is not clear that they 
can be extrapolated to other settings that may differ with respect to the institutional environment, 
such as legal, economic and auditing infrastructure. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Paragraph 4.2 develops the various 
hypotheses, whereas paragraph 5.3 presents the data and methodology used un this study. 
Paragraph 5.4 describes main results and 5.5 concludes47. 
46 Exceptions include, Ruddock et a!., (2006), Krishnan (2007) and Jenkins and Ve1ury (2008). 
47 For the literature review on mandatory rotation, see Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2. 
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5.2 Hypotheses development 
In this section, we (1) discuss the forces that may affect the relation between audit firm rotations 
and TLR: (2) posit that the association between audit firm tenure and TLR is expected to be 
negative unless incumbent auditors are more likely to identify and report loss events in a timely 
fashion; (3) argue that the association between TLR and auditor rotations is moderated by 
leverage, firm size and market-to-book; and (4) discuss whether the adoption of IFRS is expected 
to affect the relation between rotations and TLR. 
5.2.1 Auditor rotations and reporting conservatism 
Owing to threat of litigation and loss of reputation auditors prefer conservative reporting. This is 
because litigation and loss of reputation are more likely when companies are found to have 
inflated reported numbers or withhold bad news (Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1997). 
However, close relationship between the auditor and client may alter this basic "instinct." This 
may be a result of psychological biases as well as economic forces. Over time, as the auditor 
becomes more familiar with client's personnel, the auditor may lessen the extent to which he 
applies differential verifiability to the recognition of profits versus losses (Watts, 2003). 
Bazerman et aI., (1997) posit that auditors have an unconscious bias that prevents impartial 
audits because of close relationships with client personnel with whom auditors identify at a 
personal level. Dependence on client's fees may be another reason for the auditor to accept 
delayed loss recognition, especially when no mandatory rotation rule is in place. The threat of 
losing a constant stream of income, inclusive of lucrative non-audit fee income, may persuade 
auditors to cooperate with clients. If mandatory auditor rotations constrain the development of 
close personal relationships and weaken the financial incentive to co-operate with clients, we 
would expect the new auditor to require more conservative reporting than the incumbent auditor. 
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Furthermore, following a rotation, the new auditor has less client-specific knowledge. Facing 
higher level of information asymmetry, the auditor is exposed to greater litigation and 
reputational risks, especially in the first year. Though increasing effort level may reduce such 
risks, requiring conservative rep011ing is likely a cost effective strategy, especially when clients 
are reluctant to pay for additional effort. 
Reporting conservatism can be manifest in a variety of ways. Consequently, the literature 
has distinguished between conditional and unconditional conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005; Beaver and Ryan, 2005). However, in line with Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and LaFond 
and Watts (2008) and a number of other papers, we focus on the measure of conditional 
conservatism as originally developed by Basu (1997) - timely loss recognition (TLR). This leads 
us to the first hypothesis (presented in the null form).48 
Hi: TLR in audit firm rotation years is similar to TLR in non-rotation years, ceteris paribus. 
5.2.2 Auditor tenure and reporting conservatism 
An incumbent auditor learns more about his client over time as he acquires firm-specific 
knowledge. Because information asymmetry declines over time, the need to use conservatism as 
defensive mechanism against litigation and potential loss of reputation also lessens over time. In 
addition, social bonding can increase with tenure, and to the extent this results in re-alignment of 
the auditor's interest with that of managers, as opposed to that of shareholders, the incumbent 
auditor's independence will progressively weaken. This, in turn, suggests that he will find 
constraining aggressive accounting choices more difficult. However, firm-specific knowledge 
may enhance the ability of the incumbent auditor to identify a loss event when it occurs. The 
model developed by Elitzur and Falk (1996) suggests that over time the economic bond declines 
48 All hypotheses are presented in the null form. 
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under a mandatory rotation rule. This, in turn, suggests that the auditor has an increasingly 
smaller incentive to underreport such a loss. 
H2: TLR is unrelated to audit firm tenure, ceteris paribus. 
5.2.3 External demand for TLR: leverage, firm size and market-to-
book 
The extant literature on accounting conservatism has posited that there is market demand for 
conservative reporting, owing to contracting, litigation, taxation and accounting regulation (e.g., 
Watts 2003). In a recent paper, Khan and Watts (2009) argue that these four factors are 
correlated with a firm's investment opportunity set (IOS) and propose three firm-specific 
measures that can serve as proxies for the firm's lOS. These measures are, leverage, size and 
market-to-book. They predict and find that leverage and market-to-book are positively related to 
TLR whereas size is negatively related to TLR. Because auditors have to provide an opinion on 
reported numbers and are capable of influencing managers' reporting decisions, they playa 
pivotal role in the production of reporting conservatism. If new auditors bond less with managers 
than incumbent auditors, they will be more responsive to the demand for conservative reporting. 
However, the preceding discussion suggests that independence may not decrease with tenure. We 
therefore expect highly leveraged firms, high market-to-book firms and small firms that 
mandatorily rotate their audit firm to exhibit stronger association with TLR than other firms. We 
do not form expectations as to the moderating effect of these variables on the relation between 
tenure and TLR because the countervailing effects of firm-specific knowledge combined with 
external demand versus lack of independence. 
, 
H3: The association between fLR and leverage, firm size and market-to-book in rotation years is 
the same as in non-rotation years and is unaffected by tenure, ceteris paribus. 
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5.2.4 IFRS vs. domestic Italian GAAP 
lntemational Financial Repoliing Standards (lFRS) are set by the lASB. The IASB is a global 
standard-setting body which promulgates rules that are not geared to suit any individual 
country's legal, economic and political institutions. In contrast, the development of domestic 
GAAP is influenced by local institutions and so the properties of reported numbers under local 
GAAP vary across countries. The international accounting literature has linked these variations 
to factors such as bank vs. market oriented systems, origin of legal systems, investor protection 
rights, and ownership structure, to name a few (e.g., Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball et al. 2000; Ba11 
et a1. 2003; Leuz et a1. 2003). 
This prior literature suggests a strong demand for conservative reporting by banks and 
other creditors. Creditors particularly prefer rules that restrict distributions to other parties to 
ensure solvency. Italian firms rely of funding from banks with firms having multiple number of 
banking relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2000). The dominance of debt financing over equity 
financing is also explained by family controlled firms (Setia-Atmaja et aI., 2009), which is a 
common control structure in Italy. Consistent with this, Italian GAAP adopted the Conservatism 
Principle: only earned revenues may be recorded, but all estimated provisions and expenses 
should be included, even if they have not occurred yet. Melis et ai. (2006) call this a strong form 
of conservatism. IFRS, in contrast, pays no regard to conservatism as a qualitative property of 
accounting numbers (IASB, 2001). 
Yet, it is difficult to assess under which system TLR will be more pronounced because a 
particular GAAP system is ultimately a collection of a number of individual rules. Some rules 
are unconditionally more (less) conservative, and at the same time, less (more) conditionally 
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conservative because of the pre-emption property (Beaver and Ryan, 2005).49 For example, 
unlike Italian GAAP, IFRS allow recording of unrealized gains to a greater degree in some cases 
(e.g., fair value accounting for financial instruments). At the same time, these rules are 
accompanied by the requirement for impairment reviews (e.g., of available for sale securities) 
that should result in more TLR. On the other hand, some IFRS rules are more unconditionally 
conservative. These include recognition of pension liability and a stricter standard on 
capitalization of R&D. Such rules reduce the expected incidence ofTLR. 
Perhaps more important, IFRS may allow in certain standards a greater scope for auditor 
professional (more conservative) judgments because it is more principles-based (Benston et al., 
2006).50 New auditors may use this discretion, whenever available, to enhance TLR, while 
incumbent auditors may use this discretion to reduce TLR, if the independence problem is 
severe. 
Notwithstanding the differences between Italian GAAP and IFRS, Ball et al. (2003) 
provide evidence suggesting that market and political incentives are potentially more important 
than accounting standards. If a country's institutions are unchanged, auditors' incentives may not 
change with the adoption ofIFRS (Burgstahler et aI., 2006). Ball et ai. (2000) even express doubt 
that a change in reporting requirements alone will have any effect on the demand for high quality 
reporting. These arguments thus predict little effect for the adoption of IFRS. In Italy, we note 
three changes that are potentially important for auditor incentives. First, incentives for TLR are 
lower since 2002 because penalties for false accounting were reduced. On the other hand, in the 
same year the Sarbanes Oxley act was enacted in the US. This possibly affected global auditing 
49 Conditional (unconditional) conservatism is also known as news-dependent (independent) conservatism. 
50 Ball et al. (2003) show that TLR is less pronounced in code law countries, such as Italy. In some contrast, 
Aharony et al. (2009) find that Italian GAAP deviate the least from IFRS compared to 14 other European countries. 
Cordazzo (2008) provides evidence suggesting Italian GAAP is more conservative than IFRS. 
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practices - who also dominate the Italian audit market - to become more conservative. Third, in 
2006 the mandatory paliner rotation rule came into effect. However, more fundamentally, Italian 
political and economic institutions, such as the role of banks and families, probably did not 
change much. 
In sum, whether following the adoption of IFRS in 2005 auditors can and are incentivized 
to playa bigger role in the production of TLR is an empirical issue. We therefore make no 
specific prediction with respect to the adoption of IFRS. 
H4: TLR in rotation years relative to non-rotation years is the same under Italian GAAP as 
under IFRS. Similarly, the relation between auditor tenure and TLR is the same under Italian 
GAAP as under IFRS, ceteris paribus. 
5.3 Data and methodology 
The sample analyzed here consists of Italian listed companies during the period 1990-
2008. Accounting data were downloaded from Compustat Global (industrial/commercial issue). 
The name of the audit firm and audit partner were hand-collected from the financial statement of 
each company, available on the cd-rom Borsa Italiana physically stored in Universita Bocconi 
Library (Milan) or on the website of the Italian Stock exchange (Borsa Italiana) for recent years. 
We exclude partner rotations (since 2006) and voluntary rotations to capture more accurately the 
difference between mandatory rotations firm-year observations and non-rotations years. Data on 
market-to-book value were downloaded from Datastream. 
The initial sample consists of 3,532 firm-year observations. Observations with no 
accounting data are excluded from the sample, giving a final sample of 2,029 firm-year 
observations. We excluded 304 firm-year observations involving rotations other than firm 
mandatory rotation. This results in 1,725 observations are used in the analyses of firm mandatory 
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rotations. The top and the bottom 101 of . . bI 10 mam vana es were winsorized in order to limit the 
impact of extreme observations. 
We employ regression specifications in the spirit of Basu (1997) changes-in-earnings 
model and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) accrual-cash flow model. We do not use the Basu (1997) 
earnings-returns model because of the concern that the small Italian stock market and the 
dominance of family-controlled firms combine to generate uninformative share prices. 
In the first specification, changes in income are regressed on lagged changes in income. 
For rotations and tenure we employ models (Ia) and (1 b), respectively. 
(la) 
t..Nlt = U o + u1Dt..Nlt_1 + u 2t..Nlt_1 + u 3Dt..NI/-lxt..Nlt_1 
+ ｦＳＱｒｏｾ｟Ｑ＠ + ｦＳＲｒｏｾ｟ｬｸｄｴＮＮｎｉＯＭｬ＠ + ｦＳＳｒｏｾ｟ｬｸｴＮＮｎｉＯＭｬ＠
+ ｦＳＴｒｏｾ｟ｬｸｄｴＮＮｎｬｴ｟ｬｸｴＮＮｎｬｴ｟ｬ＠ + E 
t..Nlt = U o +u1DMlt_1 +u2t..NI/-l +u3Dt..Nlt_lxt..Nlt_l 
+ f31TENt_l + f32TEN'_lxDt..NI/-l + f33TEN/-lxt..Nlt_l 
+ f34TEN/-lxDt..NI/-lxt..Nlt_l + E (1 b) 
In these models MI is the change in earnings before extraordinary items from year t-l to year t, 
scaled by beginning total assets and Dt..NI is set equal to one if the change in earnings is 
negative, and zero otherwise. ROT stands for auditor mandatory rotation, whereas TEN is the 
measure of finn tenure in years. The coefficient U3 measures the incremental speed with which 
negative earnings reverse. If the recognition of gains is either delayed or transitory, but 
recognition of losses is timely, we would expect U2 to be non-positive and U3 < O. The coefficient 
P4 measures the additional speed of the reversal of negative earnings in a rotation year. If auditor 
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rotation enhances timely loss recognition, we would then expect ｾＴ＠ < 0, but we do not have 
formed expectation as to the sign of ｾＴ＠ in (l b), as tenure may have countervailing effects.51 
The second specification relates accruals (ACC) to cash from operations (CFO). Here 
ACC is earnings before extraordinary items minus CFO, scaled by beginning total assets and 
CFO is earnings before extraordinary items + depreciations and amortization - ｾＨｷｯｲｫｩｮｧ＠
capital),52 also scaled by beginning total assets. DCFO is set equal to one if the change in CFO is 
negative, and zero otherwise. As before, we use two models, one for rotations and the other for 
tenure. 
ACC, = U o + uIDCFO, + u 2CFO, + u 3DCFO,xCFq 
+ ｾｉｒｏｲ［＠ + ｾＲｒｏｲ［ｸｄｃｆｏＬ＠ + ｾＳｒｏｲ［ｸｃｆｏＬ＠
ＫｾＴｒｏｲ［ｸｄｃｆｏＬｸｃｆｱ＠ +E 
ACC, =uo +uIDCFq +u2CFq +uJDCFO,xCFq 
+ ｾｉｔｅｎＬ＠ + ｾＲｔｅｎＬｸｄｃｆｱ＠ + ｾＳｔｅｎＬｸｃｆｱ＠
ＫｾＴｔｅｎＬｸｄｃｆｏＬｸｃｆｱ＠ +E 
(2a) 
(2b) 
It follows from the definition of accruals and cash from operations that they tend to be inversely 
related. For example, collecting cash from selling inventory results in higher CFO but lower 
ACC because the balance of inventory decreases when a sale is made. This suggests that (12 < O. 
However, timely loss recognition may be based on expected, not realized, cash flows and 
therefore attenuates this relationship. For example, if the reporting entity is experiencing a 
decline in demand for its products, it likely needs to recognize a loss for the possibility that 
inventory can only be liquidated below cost. In such a case ACC will decrease at the same time 
as the entity is experiencing lower or negative cash from operations. That is, timely recognition 
51 A similar approach is taken by Jenkins and Velury (2008) who study the relation between audit tenure and TLR. 
52 Working capital is defined as in DeFond and Park (2001): (current assets - short term investment) - (current 
liabilities - short term debt). 
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of losses may create a positive relationship between ACC and CFO. It follows that timely 
recognition of unrealized losses should attenuate the negative relationship between accruals and 
cash from operations (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). It is therefore expected that <13 > O. If auditor 
rotations enhance the process of timely recognition of unrealized losses, we expect B4 > O. We do 
not have priors for B4 in (2b). 
Since GAAP changed in 2005 following the adoption of IFRS, the relation between 
changes in earnings and between accruals and operating cash flows may be affected by the 
difference in accounting rules. Consequently, in all the regressions we include a dummy variable, 
IFRS, which assumes the value of "1" if the time index in the right hand side of these models 
falls in the period 2005-2008, and "0" otherwise. 
5.4 Main results 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.6.2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Around 40% of sample firms 
report a negative change in net income, with average change very close to zero. The average of 
our accrual measure (ACC) is -4% of beginning total assets, suggesting that Italian firms are on 
average conservative in that earnings are below cash from operations (CFO). CFO has an 
average of 0.05 of beginning total assets, and 23% of the firm-year observations involve a 
negative cash flow from operations. About eight percent of firm-year observations involve a 
mandatory firm rotation. Average tenure is five and a half years, below the nine years mandatory 
term. As the average client age is 16 years (not tabulated) this is explained by voluntary rotations 
that are included in the larger sample. The maximum value for tenure is 20 years. This is 
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obtained because the rotation rule applies only to listed firms and tenure was tracked back before 
the company's IPO. 
Univariate correlation coefficients are presented in Table 5.6.3. CFO and ACC are highly 
and negatively related, as would be expected. CFO is positively related to firm size, market-to-
book value, and negatively related to LJNL DCFO and LEV. Change in net income is positively 
related to CFO. Mandatory firm rotations are negatively related to firm tenure, reflecting the cap 
on tenure required by mandatory rotations. Audit firm tenure is largely uncorrelated with other 
variables. This alleviates a concern that tenure is correlated with performance. 
5.4.2 Pooled regressions 
Table 5.6.4 reports the results for the analysis of the pooled samples. Panel A provides results for 
estimating the changes-in-earnings model and Panel B reports the findings for the accruals-CFO 
model. For brevity, in all tables we report only the coefficients U3 and ｾＴＬ＠ as they are the 
coefficients of main interest (representing incremental timeliness of loss recognition and the 
incremental effect on this timeliness owing to rotations or tenure, respectively). Examining audit 
firm rotations in 1990-2008 we find these rotations are associated with TLR in the changes-in-
earnings model ＨｾＴ＠ = -1.158, P = 0.004), but not in the accruals-CFO model. Audit firm tenure is 
not associated with TLR in both models. The coefficients on DLJNlt_1 X LJNlt-1 (Panel A) and on 
DCFOt x CF01 (Panel B) provide evidence on the presence of TLR independently of rotations or tenure. 
As can be seen, U3 is insignificant with the predicted sign in the changes-in-earnings model, for 
both rotations and tenure. It is significant in the accruals-CFO model for rotations and marginally 
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significant for tenure. Overall, Table 5.6.4 provides some support to the claim that rotations 
increase reporting conservatism. However, tenure is unrelated to TLR.53 
5.4.3 Rotations and the role of client firm leverage, size and market-
to-book 
Table 5.6.5 investigates if the association between auditor firm rotations and TLR varies with 
leverage (Panel A: low LEV vs. high LEV), client-firm size (Panel B: small SIZE vs. large SIZE) 
and market-to-book (Panel C: low ME vs. high ME) using the changes-in-earnings model. Note 
first that, consistent with the arguments advanced by Khan and Watts (2009), TLR is present in 
high leverage client firms (a.3 = -0.553, P = 0.000) independent of rotations. The difference from 
low LEV firms is also significant. TLR is also present for high ME firms (a.3 = -0.305, P = 0.05), 
though the difference from low MB is insignificant. In contrast to Khan and Watts (2009), 
however, there is no evidence for TLR in small firms, absent rotations. 
Turning attention to rotations, audit firm rotations are positively associated with TLR in 
high leverage client firms ＨｾＴ＠ = -1.134, P = 0.009), but not in low leverage firms. This is 
consistent with expectations, though the difference in ｾＴ＠ between low and high leverage client 
firms is insignificant. Firm rotations are positively associated with TLR in small size clients ＨｾＴ＠
= -1.445, P = 0.001), but not in large client firms. The difference in ｾＴ＠ between small and large 
firms is insignificant. As expected, TLR is more pronounced for audit firm rotations in high MB 
clients ＨｾＴ＠ = -1.415, P = 0.001), but not in low MB clients. The difference in ｾＴ＠ between low and 
high MB clients is insignificant though. Table 5.6.6 reports the results of the analysis of tenure, 
again using the changes-in-earning specification. It is structured in a similar way to Table 5.6.5. 
53 This stands in contrast to the findings of Jenkins and Velury (2008) who use a large US sample where rotations 
are voluntary. 
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First, inspecting the (13 coefficients, we note that (13 is negative and significant, as expected, in 
high leverage firms. Tenure is largely unrelated to TLR. The only case where ｾＴ＠ is negative and 
significant is for large client firms (Panel 8: ｾＴ＠ = -0.t12, P = 0.025). In other words, tenure is 
positively related to TLR in large firms, contrary to expectations, as Khan and Watts (2009) 
factors predict weak demand for conservatism in large firms. 
Table 5.6.7 investigates if the association between auditor firm rotations and TLR varies 
with leverage (Panel A: low LEV vs. high LEV), client-finn size (Panel B: small SIZE vs. large 
SIZE) and market-to-book (Panel C: low MB vs. high MB) using the accruals-CFO model. The 
coefficient (13 measures the degree of conservatism absent rotations. This coefficient is positive 
and significant in Panel A and Panel C, regardless the level of leverage and MB, respectively. In 
Panel B it is positive and significant, as expected, for small client finns. While these results 
indicate conservative reporting in Italy, they are somewhat inconsistent with the prediction that 
the demand for conservative reporting influences its supply. 
Turning to the association of rotations with TLR, the coefficients ｾＴ＠ are insignificant in 
all panels, regardless of the level of leverage, size and market-to-book. This suggests that the 
supply of TLR by new auditors is insensitive to external demand for TLR. 
Table 5.6.8 reports the results of the analysis of tenure and external demand for 
conservatism, again using the accruals-CFO model. Inspecting the (13 coefficients, we note that (13 
is positive and significant, as expected, in high leverage firms and small firms. Tenure is 
unrelated to TLR in all panels. Collectively, the evidence in Tables 5.6.5-5.6.8 provides some 
support to the notion that audit finn rotations boost TLR in rotation years in clients where this is 
expected to be the case (i.e., high leverage firms, small size firms and high market-to-book 
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firms). In contrast, the relation between tenure and TLR is unrelated to external demand for 
conservative reporting. 
5.4.4 Audit firm rotations, tenure and the adoption of IFRS 
We now tum to examine whether the relations of interest behave differently under Italian GAAP 
than under IFRS. We compare the period under IFRS (2005-2008) first to the entire sample 
period under Italian GAAP (1990-2004). Because such a comparison may be affected by variety 
of changes in legal, economic and other institutions, which in tum, may have affected auditors' 
incentives, we also provide a comparison for 2001-2004. We believe that the four years just 
preceding the adoption of IFRS can serve as an alternative comparison period to the four years 
under IFRS. This is because the decision to require IFRS in EU member states was announced in 
2002 (and probably was anticipated beforehand). Consequently, changes to certain new 
institutional arrangements might have implemented during that period and remained stable since. 
Another reason is that sample sizes are more similar. 
Table 5.6.9 reports the results of these analyses. Starting with firm rotations under the 
changes-in-earnings specification (Panel A), the coefficient U3 is insignificantly different from 
zero under both Italian GAAP and IFRS. That is, the changes-in-earnings indicate that neither 
GAAP system is conditionally conservative. Audit firm rotations are positively related to TLR 
both under IFRS and under Italian GAAP during 2001-2004, but not under Italian GAAP during 
the entire period. 
Panel B provides the results for audit firm rotations using the accruals-CFO specification. 
The coefficient U3 is positive and significantly except for 2005-2008 (IFRS). The difference 
between U3 under Italian GAAP and IFRS is also significant. Thus, this model indicates that 
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Italian GAAP have resulted in more TLR than IFRS. Examining the coefficient ｾＴ＠ it is seen that 
rotations do not have an incremental effect on TLR in all periods examined. 
In Panels C and 0 we report the results for the analysis of tenure. As in Panel A, the 
coefficients on negative change in lagged earnings, U3, are insignificantly different from zero 
under both Italian GAAP and IFRS. In contrast to the pooled regressions reported in Table 5.6.4, 
we find that tenure is positively related to TLR under Italian GAAP, but not under IFRS. 
Specifically, ｾＴ＠ is negative and significant for the 1990-2004 and 2001-2004 periods. Panel D 
reports the accruals-CFO specification. Similar to Panel B, TLR is more pronounced under 
Italian GAAP than IFRS. Moreover, IFRS does not seem to espouse TLR. Nonetheless, audit 
firm tenure is not associated with TLR under both GAAP regimes. 
Overall, the results across the two models are not consistent, presumably because the 
changes-in-earnings model captures a different dimension of TLR than that captured in the 
accruals-CFO model. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that IFRS is not more conservative than 
Italian GAAP. It also indicates that audit firm rotations may have resulted in more TLR in recent 
years, and that the change in standards may have a relatively modest effect on the economics of 
rotations. Rather, potentially, this result relates to the way that global audit practices such as the 
Big-4 have reacted to the early accounting scandals of the 2000s and the Sarbanes-Oxley act that 
followed. While this is true for incumbent auditors, changes in auditors' incentives are likely 
more pronounced for new auditors having a fresh start. That tenure is positively related to TLR 
under Italian GAAP but not under IFRS is consistent with incumbent auditors employing 
discretion in IFRS to reduce TLR. It is also suggestive that for incumbent auditors the events of 
early 2000s had relatively little effect on their incentives. 
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5.4.5 Additional analyses 
In the previous analyses we have used a sample spanning 19 years. It is possible that in such a 
long period changes were made that may have affected the incentives of auditors to advocate 
TLR. In Italy, we already noted three changes that are potentially impo11ant for auditor 
incentives. In 2002 penalties for false accounting were reduced by the Italian government. In the 
same year the Sarbanes Oxley act was enacted in the US. In 2006 the mandatory partner rotation 
rule came into effect. In all the analyses so far we included an indicator variable for observations 
during 2005-2008 (the IFRS period). We reexamine the findings by including indicators for 2002 
and 2006. The results remain unchanged. 
We also extend the analysis to employ other measures for information asymmetry 
between a client firm and external parties. In the spirit of LaFond and Watts (2008) and Khan 
and Watts (2009), we argue that information asymmetry is correlated with a demand for 
conservative reporting. We identify two additional proxies: family ownership, bearing in mind 
family ownership is pervasive in Italy as well as in our sample, and intangible asset intensity. 
While prior literature agrees the information environment in family firms is likely 
different than in non-family firms, it is unclear where the problem of information asymmetry is 
more sever. Agency problems may arise in both firm types (e.g., separation of ownership in non-
family finns; reduced flow of information in family firms). As for auditors, auditors of family-
controlled firms may not be as independent as in firms with dispersed ownership (Coffee, 2005). 
Empirically, Wang (2006) finds that family firms report higher quality earnings while Ali et al 
(2007) find that bid-ask spreads are lower in family firms. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that information asymmetry is higher in non-family firms. 
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Balih et al. (2001) find that more analysts follow intangibles-intensive firms than other 
firms. They posit that this is the result of investor demand for more information in such finns. 
Outsiders do not have a good understanding of intangibles as insiders do, implying more 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Analysts respond to this demand 
by increasing following of intangibles-intensive firms. Aboody and Lev (2000) find greater gains 
to insider trading in R&D intensive firms. They attribute this to managers taking advantage of 
the higher information asymmetry in R&D intensive finns to enrich themselves. 
We therefore expect to find more TLR in non-family firms and in intangibles-intensive 
finns. In addition, to the extent that auditor rotations and tenure positively respond to this 
demand, we expect to find greater association between rotations or tenure and TLR in client 
finns characterized by high intangibles intensity and non-family ownership.54 
Untabulated results indicate that, for the changes-in-earnings specification, rotations are 
positively related to TLR regardless of ownership structure and intangibles intensity. However, 
TLR is increasing with tenure in family firms. We do not find the relation between TLR and 
tenure varies with intangibles intensity. The accrual-CFO model shows no variations in the 
relations of interest with either ownership structure or intangibles intensity. In all cases we are 
unable to find significant association between TLR and rotations or tenure. 
5.5 Conclusions and limitations 
In this paper we investigate whether mandatory audit firm and tenure are associated with 
conditional conservatism, measured as timely loss recognition (TLR). We argue there are strong 
incentives for a new auditor to promote TLR and that there are weaker incentives for incumbent 
54 We use the classification from Corbetta and Minichilli (2006) to distinguish between family and non-family firms. 
About 61 % of firm-year observations come from family-owned firms. Intangibles intensity is measured as intangible 
assets (including goodwill) scaled by beginning total assets. The mean (median) of this variable is 0.139 (0.064). 
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auditor. These incentives relate to lack of client-specific knowledge in the initial years of the 
engagement, and absence of personal relationships with client management and personnel. 
Requiring TLR helps the new auditor to mitigate threats of litigation and loss of reputation and is 
likely more cost effective. On the other hand, an incumbent auditor may be better able to identify 
and help report loss events when they take place. We therefore make no prediction as to the 
relation between tenure and TLR as the effect of weaker incentives may be cancelled out by this 
better ability. 
Building on Khan and Watts (2009) we expect stronger external demand for TLR in high 
leverage, small size and high market-to-book client firm. To the extent that new auditors respond 
better to this demand, we expect to find stronger association between rotations and TLR in firms 
characterized by high leverage, small size and high market-to-book. In contrast, it is not a-priory 
clear that the relation between tenure and TLR will vary with these external factors. 
The potential for auditor rotation and tenure to enhance conservatism is also a function of 
the specific set of reporting standards used as well as institutional factors. In 2005 Italy adopted 
IFRS. Because IFRS were developed by the International Accounting Standard Board reflecting 
an international consensus, they likely are sub-optimal with respect to the demand for accounting 
conservatism in Italy. But IFRS are more principle-based and probably leave more room for 
auditor professional judgments. If new auditors can and want to make more conservative 
judgments under IFRS, we would expect to see a stronger association between rotations and TLR 
under IFRS. Incumbent auditors, on the other hand, may use this discretion to reduce TLR if the 
independence problem is severe. These arguments notwithstanding, if incentives for conservative 
reporting by auditors have been stable over time, the adoption of IFRS may change very little. 
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Employing a unique data set involving Italian auditors during 1990-2008, we provide 
some evidence supporting a positive association between mandatory firm rotations and TLR and 
that this association is stronger after 2005 than before 2001. We document that TLR is positively 
related to tenure, but only before the adoption of IFRS. We also find evidence consistent with 
new auditors responding to external demand for conservatism, but not incumbent auditors. 
We conclude with a caveat, which is similar to the one highlighted for the paper in 
Chapter 4 (4.7). The results are obtained for Italy - a country characterized by large family 
ownership, audit market controlled by Big-4 audit firms and a relatively small capital market -
and therefore it is not clear that they can be extrapolated to other settings that may differ with 
respect to the institutional environment, such as legal, economic and auditing infrastructure. 
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5.6 Tables 
Table 5.6 1 
Firm/year observations 
Initial sample 
Table 5.6.1 
Sample Composition 
Missing accounting or auditing data 
Final tenure sample 
Less: 
Firm.-year observations which involved either a firm voluntary 
rotation, a partner mandatory rotation or a partner voluntary 
rotation 
Number of observations used to analyze audit rotations 
Table 5.6.2 
Descriptive Statistics 1990-2008 
Table 5.62 
Std. 
Variable Obs Mean Median Dev. 
fJNI 2029 0.003 0.003 0.062 
DfJNI 2029 0.399 0 0.490 
ACC 2029 -0.038 -0.04 0.084 
CFO 2029 0.051 0.06 0.105 
DCFO 2029 0.231 0 0.422 
SIZE 2029 19.700 19.58 2.134 
LEV 2029 0.612 0.63 0.193 
ME 2029 1.906 1.44 1.970 
TEN 2029 5.548 5 3.061 
ROT 1725 0.076 0 0.265 
Notes: 
Entire sample 
period 
Min 
-0.758 
0.000 
-0.364 
-0.384 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
-1.530 
1.000 
0.000 
3532 
1503 
2029 
304 
1725 
Max 
0.362 
1.000 
0.315 
0.349 
1.000 
25.407 
1.044 
12.310 
20.000 
1.000 
MJ = change in earnings from year t-l to year t, scaled by beginning total assets. Earnings 
are measured before extraordinary items; DMJ = 1 if MJ < 0, zero otherwise; ACC = 
earnings before extraordinary items - CFO, scaled by beginning total assets; CFO = earnings 
before extraordinary Items + depreciations and amortization - ｾＨｗｯｲｫｩｮｧ＠ Capital), scaled by 
beginning total assets; Working capital is (following DeFond and Park, 2001): (current assets 
item #75 in Compustat Global- short term investment #65 ) - (current liabilities #104 - short 
term debt #94); DCFO = I if CFO < 0, zero otherwise; SJZE= natural logarithm of sales in 
year t; LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets; MB = market-to-book value of equity, 
140 
available on Datastream; TEN= number of years the same audit company is performing its 
services to the same client; ROT=l ifmandatory firm rotation in year t zero otherwise. 
Pre Euro data is translated using the official conversion factor existing at the date of 
conversion on 31 st December 1998 (€1 = Italian Lira 1936.27). 
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Table 5.6.3 - Correlations 
Table 5.63 
ANI DANI ACC CFO DCFO LEV SIZE MB TEN ROT 
ANI 1.000 0.041 0.011 0.262* -0.174* -0.039 0.047* 0.117* 0.014 -0.027 
DAN] 0.048* 1.000 -0.037 -0.176* 0.124* 0.076* -0.100* -0.142* -0.033 0.040 
ACC 0.044* -0.026 1.000 -0.659* 0.457* -0.056* -0.056* -0.003 0.006 0.004 
CFO 0.212* -0.173* -0.658* 1.000 -0.730* -0.222* 0.160* 0.128* 0.050* -0.016 
DCFO -0.164* 0.124* 0.466* -0.709* 1.000 0.172* -0.191 * -0.017 -0.062* 0.003 
LEV -0.022 0.059* -0.059* -0.166* 0.154* 1.000 0.343* 0.005 -0.028 0.034 
SIZE 0.0] 1 -0.0694* -0.006 0.135* -0.158* 0.399* 1.000 0.012 -0.0] 2 0.064* 
MB 0.05* -0.111* -0.024 0.079* 0.021 0.040 -0.018 1.000 0.015 -0.028 
TEN 0.035 -0.039 0.001 0.058* -0.064* -0.018 -0.009 -0.006 1.000 -0.461 * 
ROT -0.043 0.040 0.004 -0.015 0.003 0.039 0.053* -0.029 -0.438* 1.000 
Notes: 
See Table5.6.2 for variable definitions. 
Pair-wise Pearson correlations are reported below the diagonal; Spearman correlations are reported above the diagonal. 
142 
Table 5.6.4 
Firm Rotations, Firm tenure and Timely Loss Recognition 
Table 5.6 4 
Panel A: Pooled regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings 
Expected 1990-2008 1990-2008 
Sign Firm rotations Firm tenure 
DiJNklXiJNI'-l (U3) -0.189 -0.033 
(0.114) (0.875) 
-1.158*** 
(0.004) 
Observations 1725 
R-sguared 0.036 
Panel B: Pooled regression of accruals on cash from operations 
DCFO,xCFO, (U3) 0.271** 
+ (0.016) 
ROT, x DCFO f x CFO ＧＨｾＴＩ＠ 0.049 
+ (0.850) 
TEM x DCFO , x CFO , ＨｾＴＩ＠ + 
Observations 1725 
R-squared 0.463 
-0.054 
(0.149) 
2029 
0.039 
0.238 
(0.101) 
0.009 
(0.761) 
2029 
0.451 
This table presents the results for investigating the association between firm mandatory rotations and tenure and 
timely loss recognition (TLR), using regressions of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings (Panel A) and 
of accruals on cash from operations (Panel B). For space reasons, only the coefficients of interests are reported. 
Regression models: 
Panel A: regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings 
Firm rotations 
ｾｬｴ＠ =Uo +u1DMlt_1 +uzM1t-l +u3DMlt-lxMlt_l Ｋｾｬｒｏｾ｟ｬ＠ ＫｾＲｒｏｾ｟ｬｸｄｍｬｴ｟ｬ＠ + 
ＫｾＳｒｏｾ｟ｬｸｍｬｴ｟ｬ＠ + ｾＴｒｏｾ｟ｬｸｄｍｬｴ｟Ｑｘｍｬｴ｟ｬ＠ + 8JFRSt_1 + E 
Firm tenure 
ｾｬｴ＠ =uo+ulDMlt-l +u2M1t-l +u3DMlt_lxMlt-l ＫｾｬｔｅｎｴＭｬ＠ ＫｾＲｔｅｎｉ｟ｬｸｄｍｬｴ｟ｬ＠ + 
ＫｾＳｔｅｎｉ｟ｬ＠ xMI'_l + ｾＴｔｅｎｴ｟ｬ＠ xDMlt_1 xMI'_l + 811FRSt_1 + E 
Panel B: regression of accruals on cash from operations 
Firm rotations 
ACCt = Uo + u1DCFOt + u 2CFOt + u 3DCFOtxCFO, + ｾｬｒｏｾ＠ + ｾＲｒｏｾｸｄｃｆｏｴ＠ + ｾＳｒｏｲ［ｸｃｆｏＬ＠
ＫｾＴｒｏｾｸｄｃｆｏｴｸｃｆｏｴ＠ + 8JFRS, + E Fi 
Firm tenure 
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ACC, = (Xo + (Xl DCFO, + (X2CFq + (X3 DCFO,xCFq + f>lTEN, + f>2 TEN,xDCFO, + f>3TEN,xCFO, 
ＫｾＴｔｅｎＬｸｄｃｆｏＬｸｃｆｏＬ＠ + 8JFRS, + E 
Notes: 
See Table 5.6.2 for variable definitions 
For all the analyses, the coefficients are estimated using robust OLS and errors clustered by company. p-
values in parentheses. *, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.6.5 
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotations ｾｮ＠ 1990-2008: Leverage, Firm Size, Market-to-Book and 
TImely Loss Recognition 
Regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings 
Table 5.6 5 
Panel A: Leverage 
Expected 
sign Low LEV High LEV 
DANIt-1 x AN/t-1 (a3) 0.312 -0.553*** 
(0.114) (0.000) 
ROTt-1 X DL1N/t-1 x L1NIt_1 ＨｾＴＩ＠ -0.263 -1.134*** 
(0.592) (0.009) 
Observations 863 862 
R-squared 0.041 0.089 
Panel B: Firm Size 
Small SIZE Large SIZE 
DAN/t_1 x L1N 1/-1 (a3) -0.234 -0.143 
(0.118) (0.482) 
ROTI_1 x DL1NIt_1 x L1N/t_1 ＨｾＴＩ＠ -1.445*** -0.378 
(0.001) (0.517) 
Observations 863 862 
R-squared 0.051 0.03 
Panel C: Market-to-Book 
LowMB HighMB 
DAN/t_1 x L1N It-1 (a3) -0.073 -0.305* 
(0.717) (0.050) 
ROTt_1 X DL1N/t_1 x L1NIt_1 ＨｾＴＩ＠ -0.738 -1.415*** 
(0.245) (0.001) 
Observations 862 863 
R-squared 0.022 0.058 
Difference 
-0.865*** 
(0.002) 
-0.871 
(0.195) 
1725 
0.067 
0.091 
(0.722) 
1.067 
(0.151) 
1725 
0.045 
-0.232 
(0.388) 
-0.677 
(0.384) 
1725 
0.041 
This table presents the results for investigating the moderating role of leverage, firm size and market-to-book for 
timely loss recognition in years of mandatory audit firm rotation relative to other firm-year observations. It presents 
the results of the regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings. For space reasons, only the 
coefficients of interests are reported. 
Regression model: 
I1.Nlt =uo +u1DM1t-I +u2MI,_1 +u3DMI,_lxAN1t_l +!31R07;-1 +!32R07;_lxDMII_1 + 
+!33R07;_l xAN1,_1 + !34R07;_lxDMI,_lxMlt-I + 8JFRS/-l + E 
Notes: 
DLEV = 1 if LEI- is above the regression sample median, 0 otherwise. DSIZE = 1 if SIZE is above the regression 
sample median, 0 otherwise. DMB = 1 if MB is above the regression sample median, 0 otherwise. See Table 5.6.2 
for variable definitions 
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Table 5.6.6 
Firm tenure in 1990-2008: Leverage, Firm Size, Market-to-Book and Timely Loss 
Recognition 
Regression of changes in eamings on lagged changes in eamings 
Table 5.6 6 
Panel A: Leverage 
Expected 
sign Low LEV High LEV Difference 
DL1Nlt-1 X LJNlt-1 (U3) 0.457 
(0.168) 
TENt-1 X DLJNlt_1 X LJNlt-1 (P4) ? -0.08 (0.241) 
Observations 1014 
R-squared 0.033 
Panel B: Firm Size 
Small SIZE 
DL1Nlt-1 X LJNlt-1 (U3) -0.19 
(0.487) 
TENt_] X DLJNlt_1 X LJN It-] (P4) -0.029 ? (0.580) 
Observations 1014 
R-squared 0.036 
Panel C: Market-to-Book 
LowMB 
DLJNlt_1 X LJNlt_1 (U3) -0.082 
(0.839) 
TENt_1 X DLJNlt_] X ANlt_1 (P4) -0.02 ? (0.717) 
Observations 1014 
R-squared 0.051 
-0.452** 
(0.035) 
-0.028 
(0.470) 
1015 
0.08 
Large SIZE 
0.329 
(0.310) 
-0.112** 
(0.025) 
1015 
0.06 
HighMB 
0.01 
(0.963) 
-0.083 
(0.113) 
1015 
0.041 
-0.909** 
(0.013) 
0.052 
(0.508) 
2029 
0.057 
0.519 
(0.236) 
-0.083 
(0.257) 
2029 
0.043 
0.093 
(0.848) 
-0.063 
(0.423 ) 
2029 
0.046 
This table presents the results for investigating the moderating role of leverage, firm size and market-to-book for 
timely loss and audit firm tenure. It presents the results ofthe regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in 
earnings. For space reasons, only the coefficients of interests are reported. 
Regression model: 
MIt =u
o 
+u1DMIt_1 +u2MIt_1 +u3DMIt_lxMIt_l + [31 TENt_l + [32TENI_lxDMIt_l + 
+[33TENt_lxMI,_1 + [34TENHxDMIt_lXMIH + 8/FRS'_1 + E 
Notes: 
DLEV = 1 if LEf' is above the regression sample median, 0 otherwise. DSIZE = 1 if SIZE is above the regression 
sample median, 0 otherwise. DMB = 1 if MB is above the regression sample median, 0 otherwise. See Table 5.6.2 
for variable definitions 
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Table 5.6.7 
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotations ｾｮ＠ 1990-2008: Leverage, Firm Size, Market-to-Book and 
Timely Loss Recognition 
Regression of accruals on cash from operations 
Table 5.67 
Panel A: Leverage 
Expected 
sign Low LEV High LEV Difference 
DCFO IX CFO 1(<13) 0.297* 0.327** 0.031 
+ (0.066) (0.029) (0.888) 
ROTlx DCFOtx CFO t(P4) -0.08 0.148 0.228 
+ (0.838) (0.611) (0.637) 
Observations 863 862 1725 
R-squared 0.530 0.458 0.489 
Panel B: Firm Size 
Small SIZE Large SIZE 
DCFOtxCFOt (U3) 0.398*** -0.059 -0.458** 
+ (0.003) (0.704) (0.026) 
ROTlx DCFOlx ｃｆｏｉＨｾＴＩ＠ -0.036 0.042 0.078 
+ (0.904) (0.938) (0.900) 
Observations 863 862 1725 
R-squared 0.446 0.518 0.475 
Panel C: Market-to-Book 
LowMB HighMB 
DCFO IX CFO t (<13) 0.281 ** 0.296* 0.015 
+ (0.047) (0.082) (0.946) 
ROTtx DCFOlx ｃｆｏｴＨｾＴＩ＠ -0.12 0.228 0.348 
+ (0.767) (0.398) (0.459) 
Observations 862 863 1725 
R-squared 0.478 0.463 0.47 
This table presents the results for investigating the moderating role of leverage, firm size and market-to-book for 
timely loss recognition in years of mandatory audit firm rotation relative to other firm-year observations. It presents 
the results of the regression of accruals and cash flow from operations. For space reasons, only the coefficients of 
interests are rep0l1ed. 
Regression model: 
ACCt =uo +u,DCFOt +u2CFOt +u3DCFOtxCFq ＫｾＬｒｏｉ［＠ ＫｾＲｒｏｉ［ｸｄｃｆｏｴ＠ +f33ROI;xCFO, 
+f34ROT,xDCFqxCFq + 8JFRSt + E 
Notes: 
DLEV = I if LEf' is above the regression sample median, 0 otherwise. DSIZE = 1 if SIZE is above the regression 
sample median, 0 otherwise. DMB = 1 if MB is above the regression sample median, 0 otherwise. See Table 5.6.2 
for variable definitions 
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Table 5.6.8 
Firm tenure in 1990-2008: Leverage Firm Su· e M k t t B k . 
, ,ar e - 0- 00 and TImely Loss 
Recognition 
Regression of accruals on cash from operations 
Table 5.6 8 
Panel A: Leverage 
Observations 
R-squared 
Panel B: Firm Size 
Observations 
R-squared 
Panel C: Market-to-Book 
Observations 
R-squared 
Expected 
sign 
+ 
? 
+ 
? 
+ 
? 
Low LEV 
0.004 
(0.985) 
0.066 
(0.131) 
1014 
0.506 
Small SIZE 
0.420** 
(0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.708) 
1014 
0.422 
LowMB 
0.29 
(0.147) 
-0.008 
(0.764) 
1014 
0.478 
High LEV 
0.549*** 
(0.002) 
-0.027 
(0.321) 
1015 
0.462 
Large SIZE 
-0.081 
(0.799) 
0.018 
(0.719) 
1015 
0.519 
HighMB 
0.113 
(0.531 ) 
0.05 
(0.270) 
1015 
0.446 
Difference 
0.545** 
(0.035) 
-0.093** 
(0.025) 
2029 
0.482 
-0.501 
(0.167) 
0.031 
(0.612) 
2029 
0.46 
-0.177 
(0.487) 
0.057 
(0.250) 
2029 
0.461 
This table presents the results for investigating the moderating role of leverage, firm size and market-to-book for 
timely loss recognition and firm tenure. It presents the results of the regression of accruals and cash flow from 
operations, For space reasons, only the coefficients of interests are reported. 
Regression model: 
ACC1 = a o + a 1DCFO/ + a]CFO, + a 3DCFO/xCFOt + ｾｬｔｅｎＯ＠ + ｾＲｔｅｎＬｸｄｃｆｏＬ＠ + ｾＳｔｅｎＬｸｃｆｏＬ＠
ＫｾＴｔｅｾｸｄｃｆｱｸｃｆｏＬ＠ + 8JFRSt + E 
Notes: 
DLEV = 1 if LEI' is above the regression sample median. 0 otherwise. DSIZE = 1 if SIZE is above the regression 
sample median, 0 otherwise. DAIB = 1 if ME is above the regression sample median, Oothen\ise. See Table 5.6.2 
for variable definitions 
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Table 5.6.9 
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotations, firm tenure, adoption of IFRS and Timely Loss 
Recognition 
Table 5.6 9 
Panel A: Firm rotations. Regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings 
(A) (B) (C) (A-C) (B-C) 
Expected ITALIAN ITALIAN IFRS 
sign GAAP GAAP 2005-2008 Difference Difference 
1990-2004 2001-2004 
DiJNlt_/x iJNlt_1 (1l3) -0.221 
-0.253 
-0.164 0.058 0.09 
(0.102) (0.140) (0.431 ) (0.812) (0.744) 
ROTt_1 X DiJNlt_1 X JNlt_1 W4) -0.252 
-0.788* -1.630*** -1.378** -0.842 
(0.627) (0.089) 0.000 (0.010) (0.102) 
Observations 1160 616 565 1725 1181 
R-squared 0.028 0.028 0.058 0.043 0.043 
Panel B: Firm rotations. Regression of accruals on cash from operations 
DCFOtx CFO t (1l3) 0.421*** 0.557*** -0.044 -0.465** -0.602*** + (0.003) 0.000 (0.731) (0.010) (0.002) 
ROTt x DC FOt X CFOt (P4) 0.125 0.128 -0.158 -0.282 -0.285 + (0.668) (0.694) (0.711) (0.561) (0.575) 
Observations 1160 616 565 1725 1181 
R-squared 0.481 0.404 0.453 0.473 0.43 
Panel C: Firm tenure. Regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings 
DiJNlt_1 X iJNlt_1 (1l3) 0.2 0.219 -0.176 -0.376 -0.395 
(0.505) (0.509) (0.637) (0.468) (0.468) 
TENt_I X DiJNlt-/ X iJNlt_1 (P4) -0.105* -0.132** -0.04 0.065 0.065 
? 
(0.079) (0.043) (0.561 ) (0.520) (0.520) 
Observations 1335 712 694 2029 1406 
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.067 0.051 0.051 
Panel D: Firm tenure. Regression of accruals on cash from operations 
DCFOtx CFOt (1l3) 0.345* 0.659*** 0.015 -0.33 -0.644** 
+ (0.004) (0.935) (0.206) (0.019) (0.084) 
TEN, x DCFOt xCFOt (P4) 0.015 -0.032 -0.012 -0.027 0.02 
? 
(0.691) (0.400) (0.656) (0.562) (0.662) 
Observations 1335 712 694 2029 1406 
R-squared 0.455 0.395 0.471 0.461 0.433 
This table presents the results for investigating whether the association between rotations, ｴ･ｮｾｲ･＠ and.timel) loss 
recognition is different under Italian GAAP than under IFRS. For space reasons, only the coefficients of mterests are 
reported. 
Regression models: 
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Panel A: Firm rotations. Regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings 
Mil, = U o + u1DMI'_1 + u 2MI'_1 + u 3DMI'_IxL1NI'_1 + 131 R0T,_1 + 132R0T,_lxDMI,_1 + 
+133ROT,-1 xf..Nlt_1 + 134 R0T,_I xDMI'_1 xMI'_1 + 01 IFRS'_1 + E 
Panel B: Firm rotations. Regression of accruals on cash from operations 
ACC, =Uo +u1DCFO, +u2CFO, +u3DCFO,xCFO, + 131 ROT, +132ROT,xDCFO, +133ROT,xCFO, 
+134ROT,xDCFO,xCFO, +oJFRS, +E 
Panel C: Firm tenure. Regression of changes in earnings on lagged changes in earnings 
MYI, = U o + u1DMI'_1 + u 2M1t-l + u 3DMI'_IxL1NI'_1 + 131TEN'_1 + 132TENt_IxDMI,_1 + 
+133TEN'_Ixf..NI'_1 + 134TENt_jxDMI,_lxMI,_1 + oJFRS'_1 + E 
Panel D: Firm tenure. Regression of accruals on cash from operations 
ACC, =Uo +ujDCFO, +u2CFq +u3DCFO,xCFO, + 131 TEN, +132TEN,xDCFOt +133TEN,xCFO, 
+134TEN,xDCFO,xCFO, + oIIFRS, + E 
See Table 5.6.2 for variable definitions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL AUDITOR FEES 
FOLLOWING SEC COMMENT LETTERS 
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6. PAPER III: An Analysis of External Auditor Fees 
Following Sec Comment Letters 
6. 1 Introduction 
The SEC's Division of Corporation Finance is responsible for reviewing company filings 
of all publicly listed companies. Section 408(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 requires that alI 
issuers be reviewed no less than once every three years. In Press Release 2005-72 the SEC 
announced it would begin the process of publicly releasing SEC comment and company response 
letters relating to disclosure filings made after Aug. 1, 2004. Comment letters have frequently 
requested additional information about the accounting treatment underlying items in the financial 
statements and the related disclosures made. In response to this Press Release one independent 
research agenc/5 commented that: "SEC comment letters, and their responses, are analytically 
rich. We consistently find them to be an important and helpful supplement to some of the more 
formal disclosure and communication mechanisms available to, and employed by, registrants. 
Like us, public companies know that SEC comment letters reveal areas of Staff concern about 
their accounting and/or disclosure practices. To the average securities analyst or investor, the 
SEC Staff is in the enviable position of being able to ask, and often secure the answers to, 
questions that are frequently dodged, dismissed, or ignored by a registrant when asked by a non-
regulator" . 
55 Response by SEC Insight Inc. Sept 30th 2004 to the press release, filed and recorded on the SEC Edgar site 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/s72804/secinsight093004.pdf. 
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Although there have been many studies of the determinants of audit fees, to date no 
research has investigated the effect on audit fees of SEC concerns raised in comment letters56 . 
Earlier research has taken account of the effect of SEC enforcement actions (Feroz et al. 1991; 
Beneish 1999) but enforcement actions are relatively rare events whereas comment letters are 
more frequent. Since the SEC correspondence letters often57 refer specifically to the application 
of certain accounting standards, this research tests the hypothesis that receiving a correspondence 
letter results in a significant increase in the audit fees set by external auditors responsible for 
attesting whether financial statements conform to federal securities laws. In addition since the 
receipt of a comment letter may affect the reputation of a company to produce high quality 
financial statements this research tests the hypothesis that audit fee increases associated with 
responding to SEC concerns with financial statements at a specific point in time, persist into 
future periods. 
As a significant proportion of comment letters does not explicitly reference accounting 
standards this also facilitates test comparing audit fees for companies that receive comment 
letters that do, or alternatively do not, refer to the application of specific accounting standards. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first provide a brief overview of the audit fee 
literature and of the relatively few research papers that have investigated SEC comment letters. 
We then set out the principal hypotheses and present a discussion of the data sources. We provide 
the principal empirical results, distinguishing between the fee levels analysis and the fee changes 
analysis. Persistence analysis and sensitivity checks follow. In the final section we present our 
main conclusions. 
56 An example comment letter is included in Appendix C. 
57 We provide more details later in the text. 
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6.2 Literature Review 
6.2.1 The audit fee literature 
Starting with Simunic (1980) different studies have analyzed vanous determinants of 
external auditor fees. Initially, studies focused on the existence of Big auditor premium prices 
(Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986; Francis and Simon 1987: Beattie 1989). Subsequently links 
between fee premiums and institutional variables were investigated (Choi et al. 2008). The effect 
of audit specialization has also been considered (Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986; Craswell et al. 
1995; Freguson and Stokes 2002) as well as the low balling effect of initial engagements 
(Palmrose 1986; Lee and Gu 1998; Simon and Francis 1988). More recently, studies have 
focused on risk as an important determinant of audit fees, drawing upon the so called "audit risk 
model" (SAS n.47) in which audit risk (AR) is the result of the interaction among inherent risk 
(IR), control risk (CR) and detection risk (DR): 
AR=IR x CR x DR 
As IR and CR58 increase, the auditor will exert extensive testing in order to lower DR59 and 
maintain an acceptable level of AR. This model has been empirically supported by looking at the 
response change of auditor planning activity to different level of risks6o. As auditors react to 
increase in risk by augmenting the level of tests, the costs of the audit is also affected. To the 
extent these higher costs are transferred to the client, increased risk leads to increased audit fees. 
S8 IR is defined as the risk that a specific account or a section of accounts is materially misstated without considering 
internal controls. CR represents the risk that material misstatements will not be prevented or detected by the internal 
control system. 
S9 The risk that an auditor's substantive procedures will not detect a material misstatement that exists in an account 
balance or class of transactions. 
60 Findings are however not always consistent. Mock and Wright (1999) found limited sensibility of audit programs 
to client risk, consistently with other previous studies (Bedard, 1989; Mock and Wright, 1993). O'Keefe et al. ( 1994) 
find that audit hours are sensitive to the level of inherent risk. but surprisingly not to control risk. Hackenbrack and 
Knechel ( 1997) and Felix et al. (2001) found similar result. 
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Consistent with this conjecture, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) find that higher earnings 
management risk and corporate governance risk are both associated with an increase in planned 
audit effort and increased billing rates. Private data on actual audit engagements is however 
limited and not easily available. For this reason, recent studies have analysed the way auditors 
price risk by looking at the association between audit fees and different proxies of risk. such as 
earnings management and restatements. Gul et al. (2003) find that discretionary accruals are 
associated with higher auditor fees, especially when they reflect management opportunism. 
Feldmann et al. (2009) provide evidence of increased audit fees following restatements. The 
ability of accruals to capture management opportunism (and therefore reporting risk) has 
however been subject to question (Bamber et al. 2009, McNichols 2000; Jones et al. 2008). On 
the other hand, financial reporting restatements are usually the consequence of "extreme" cases 
and therefore results are not necessarily generalizable. Other studies therefore have used different 
proxies for client's risk. Hogan and Wilkins (2008) found that audit fees increase with internal 
control weakness disclosure. Charles et al. (2010) use a commercially developed measure of 
reporting risk61 , which is found to be positively associated with audit fees. Moreover, they 
demonstrate that this positive association is stronger after 2002, possibly as a consequence of 
accounting scandals and of SOX introduction. 
As the earlier quote from SEC Insight illustrates we contribute to the literature on audit risk 
pricing by observing that the SEC comment letters are one of the few publicly available sources 
of detailed analysis of the quality of accounting statements and hence could add to our 
understanding of reporting risk. We develop a research design to test whether an analysis of the 
issuance of SEC comment letters and resultant fee increases through time, if any, can help 
61 In particular. their measure of financial reporting risk is based on Audit Integrity's risk score determined by 
modeling accounting and governance variables associated with known financial frauds. 
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improve our understanding of auditor assessed client specific reporting risk implied by the way 
auditors set risk adjusted fees. 
6.2.2 Prior research on SEC comment letters 
Given the SEC is the primary overseer and regulator of U.S. securities markets it is not 
surprising that academic research has developed an interest in the SEC monitoring role and its 
effects on financial reporting and capital markets. Some prior studies have focused on cases of 
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Actions for alleged violations of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). Feroz et al. (1991) and Beneish (1999) investigate consequences 
of enforcement actions for managers, auditors and market participants. Dechow et. at (1996) uses 
firms subject to SEC enforcement actions to detect earnings manipulation. Srinivasan (2005) 
studies whether earnings restatements lead to SEC actions. Farber (2005) investigates the role of 
governance in restoring reputation for fraudulent firms involved in SEC enforcement actions. 
Little research has been devoted to investigate the enforcement role of the SEC through 
other (non-disciplinary) mechanisms, particularly via the comment letters issuance process. We 
are only aware of three research papers that look at this topic. Ertimur and Nondorf (2006) 
investigate the association between SEC comment letters and IPQ performance. For a sample of 
95 firms listing an IPQ they find no significant association between SEC comment letters and 
IPQ underpricing, bid-ask spread, or market depths. These findings support the hypothesis that 
comment letters do not affect investors' perceptions concerning the information environment 
which determines the market response to initial pricing. However, it is important to note that IPQ 
firms start off as being characterized by high asymmetries of information relative to existing 
publicly listed stocks so one must exercise extreme caution before drawing conclusions for a 
wider sample of publicly traded stocks. Indeed Chen and Johnston (2010) find the converse result 
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when they redirect attention to 150 publicly listed firms that received comment letters during 
2005 and 2006. They find evidence of reduced return volatility and trading volume around 
earnings announcements that were preceded by a SEC comment letter. They argue that this 
suggests that SEC (enforcement) investigation has a material effect on investors' perceptions of 
the information environments of firms. Gietzmann and Isidro (2010) study the comment letters 
received by foreign companies listing in the US. Using a Tobit analysis they investigate the 
probability that the SEC will issue a comment letter questionning the application of an (FRS 
accounting standard rather than for a matched sample of US firms receiving a comment letter 
questioning the application of an equivalent US, SF AS standard. They find the SEC acts as if it 
assigns a higher probability to investigation of (foreign) IFRS reporting companies. In addition 
they show that this effect is further confirmed by the investment reactions of long term (low 
turnover) institutional investors who react more negatively to the receipt of comment letters that 
question the application ofIFRS. 
6.3 Principal Hypotheses 
When deciding how to price audit attestation servIces, external auditors conduct risk 
assessment procedures on clients. Each major audit partnership applies its own detailed 
proprietary methodology. However some common general features inc1ude62 an assessment of the 
adequacy of operating management oversight, the complexity of the operating environment, the 
experience and turnover of management, the nature of transactions in terms of numbers and 
dollar volumes. Also, increasingly as regulators are becoming more proactive and prepared to 
make public their findings, another critical risk factor is the likelihood of regulatory investigation 
and action. In addition the subsequent ability of management to respond to such issues as and 
62 This list is meant to be indicative not exhaustive. See Louwers et al. (2008) for a more extensive list. 
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when they occur is a related risk. Whereas public regulatory intervention was previously seen as 
quite an extreme event, happening only infrequently, the ongoing regulatory requirements of 
Section 408( c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and other statutory requirements results in the 
SEC conducting regulatory reviews of companies at least once every three years and as this 
research shows a significant number of US registered companies are receiving comment letters 
from the SEC that question the application of accounting standards and or the quality of existing 
disclosures in financial statements. From the point of view of the external auditor, the issuance 
of such comment letters has both in part a negative and positive effect. The fact that a client 
receives a comment letter means that even though the client has responsibility to resolve the issue 
it is most likely that the client will ask for and pay the external auditor to do additional work to 
address the public concerns the SEC has voiced in the comment letter. The SEC has a large 
experienced staff reviewing financial accounts on an ongoing basis, thus, although the comment 
letter is an additional fee "opportunity" for the external auditor the reception of a letter also 
indicates that a knowledgeable regulator is prepared to voice concerns63 about the quality of the 
clients financial accounts and thus the issuance of a comment letter should alert the external 
auditor to consider revising upward the reporting risk assigned to the client, with obvious effect 
on subsequent risk adjusted fees. 
This research therefore explores three hypotheses. First an investigation of audit fees 
following receipt of an SEC comment letter by a client is carried out. The first hypothesis is that 
clients receiving comment letters will ask their external auditor to perform additional work to 
help produce a response to the comment letter and that year on year any observed fee increases 
are significantly larger than any fee increases experienced by other audit clients. 
63 See Chen and Johnson (2010) for an extended discussion of this point. 
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HI: Fee increases for firms receiving an SEC comment letter are Sl·gnl;!;lC tl I } fi 
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increases experienced by other audit clients, ceteris paribus. 
Given the full text of comment letters is available we are able to search through them and 
investigate whether comment letters questioned the particular application of any accounting 
standards or whether the comment letter referred alternatively to risk issues64 or other disclosure 
issues. Since auditors now apply an holistic approach to risk assessment (see for instance Eilifsen 
et al. 200 I) we hypothesize that there is no reason to believe that comment letters that refer 
specifically to the application of accounting standards will lead to a more significant increase in 
audit fees than those that refer to client risk factors. 
H2: Any audit fee increases experienced by companies receiving a SEC comment letter IS 
independent from the letter content, ceteris paribus. 
If the sole basis for an audit fee increase was simply the additional work (billable hours) 
that external auditors had to perform to help a client reply to an SEC comment letter, then once 
the comment letter was resolved, one would expect audit fee levels to return to their normal level 
in subsequent years in which no comment letter was subsequently received by the client. 
However, we hypothesize that the fact that the SEC issues a comment letter results in auditors 
materially revising the overall reporting risk measure they assign to a client when setting risk 
adjusted audit prices in subsequent years. Consistent with this hypothesis we therefore 
hypothesize that any increase in audit fees following receipt of a comment letter persist into 
subsequent years as the external auditor revises the risk measure they assign to the client given 
the concerns voiced by the SEC in a particular year. That is, even though the client does not 
subsequently receive another correspondence letter from the SEC, audit fees are risk adjusted 
upwards consistent with a positive oversight role played by the SEC in identifying a re\ised 
64 We will make precise these three categories produced by Audit Anal) tics when \\ e discuss our data sources. 
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measure of disclosure risk factors that external auditors had not previously or ｩｮ｣ｯｭｰｬ･ｴ･ｬｾ＠
incorporated into prior risk adjusted audit pricing. 
H3: Any audit fee increases experienced by companies receiving a SEC comment letter will 
persist into subsequent years, ceteris paribus. 
6.4 Data sources and model specification 
The sample consists of US listed companies during the period 2004-2008. Data on SEC 
comment letters was downloaded from SEC comment letter section of Audit Analytics. We 
obtain audit fees data from Audit Analytics and accounting data from the Compustat database. 
The Audit Analytics data initially identified 77, 819 firm-year observations. Of this aggregate 
database of firms for which Audit Analytics holds audit fee data, we next identified firms that had 
received SEC correspondence letters during the period and for which it was possible to download 
accounting and other (control) data. This final sample consisted of 16,474 firm-year observations, 
corresponding to 4,756 firms. Of these 16,474 firm-year observations, 6,303 received a SEC 
comment letter in our span period. In particular, 4,302 firm-year observations received a letter 
which referred to an accounting issue, 4,338 firm-year observations received a letter including 
"other disclosure issues" and for 841 firm-year observations the SEC comment letter referred to 
"risk issues,,65 
When testing for the significance, if any, of fee increases following issuance of a 
correspondence letter we controlled for other determinants of audit fees that have been 
established in the literature. That is we control for the size of the firm using the log of total asset 
value and for complexity using the sum of receivable and inventory scaled by total assets, the 
number of business segments in which the client operates, an indicator for foreign transactions, 
65 That is a sample of comment letters referred to accounting issues and at least one of"other" or "risk" issues. 
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and whether the client closes its financial statement in December, which is also a proxy for audit 
busyness. We control for audit quality using the Big/non-Big dichotomy and for profitabilit: 
using the level of ROA and a dummy variable indicating whether the client reported a loss in the 
previous three years period. We finally control for the level of debt, restatements, going concern 
opinions, M&A transactions and the amount of discretionary accruals. 
In particular, the model used in this study is the following66. 
LNAF;,1 = a + fl,LET _ACCi,1 + /32 LET _DISCi,! + /33 LET _RISK,,1 + /34GCi,1 + ＯＳｳｒｅｓｾＬＱ＠ + /36 FOR,,1 + 
fJ7 BIGi,l + ｦｬｧｾＬＱ＠ + fl9 ROAi,1 + /3IO DECi,l + ＯＳｬＱａｒｉｎｾＢ＠ + ＯＳＧＲｄｅｂｾＬＱ＠ + /313LNASS,,1 + /3'4LOSS,,1 + 
fJ,sABSD4" + fl'6 SEG,,1 + Gi,l 
In order to test the existence of any persistence effect, we run the following regression. 
+ /3g MAi,1 + fl9 ROAi,1 + flIODECi,1 + ｦｬｬｬａｒｉｎｾＬＱ＠ + ｦｬＱＲｄｅｂｾＬＱ＠ + /313LNASSi" + /3'4 LOSSu + /3lsABSDAu + 
+ /316 SEG,,1 + Gi,1 
A full list of the variables and their definitions is provided in the Appendix-A. 
6.5 Empirical Results 
Table 6.7.1 Panel A, reports the number of total firm-observations and the relative 
percentages receiving comment letters per year. 
As the SEC started to publish SEC comment letters only starting from August 2004, the 
number of firm-observations receiving a letter in 2004 in our sample is much lower compared to 
other years. Panel B of Table 6.7.1 reports the distribution of SEC-comment letters by industry. 
66 The dependent variable consists in the natural logarithm of audit fees for the level analysis and ｣ｾ｡ｮｧ･＠ in natural. 
logarithm of audit fees for the change analysis. I n our robustness test, we also use the natural logarIthm of non-audIt 
fees and the natural logarithm of total fees as the dependent variable. 
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Table 6.7.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms which had an audit fee 
recorded in Audit Analytics and matching independent (control) variables in Compustat. 
For the sample the mean of the natural logarithm of audit fees is 13.257 (median 13.334) 
and of the natural logarithm of total assets is 50437 (median 50427). On average, 9% of our finn-
year observations received a going-concern opinion and around 12% restated their accounts. The 
majority of our sample is audited by a Big audit firm (65%), closes its financial statement in 
December (67%) and reports on average two business segments. Next 47% of the companies 
analyzed, reported a loss in one of the previous three years and the mean return on assets67 is _ 
10.9% (median 0.026) The mean of DEBT is 0.178 (median 0.089) and of receivables and 
inventory scaled by assets ARINV is 0.236 (median 0.196). Finally, companies on average report 
an absolute amount of discretionary accruals of 00405 (median 0.14). Focusing on our variables 
of interest, 38% of firm-year observations received a comment letter in our sample period. 
Focusing on letters' content, 68% of SEC comment letters referred to accounting issues, 69% of 
the letters included "other disclosure issues" while 13% to "risk issues,,68. 
Table 6.7.3 reports pair-wise correlation coefficients for observations included in the 
analysis. Audit fees are significantly positively correlated with SEC comment letters, regardless 
of its three possible content types (accounting, other disclosure or risk issue the correlation 
coefficients of LET ACC LET DISC and LET RISK are all positive and significant). 
- '- -
Consistently with the literature, audit fees are significantly positively correlated with size 
(LNASS), Big audit firms, the number of business segments (SEG), M&A activities, profitability 
(ROA), audit busyness (DEC), the level of debt and foreign transactions (FOR). Audit fees 
67 Charles et al. (2010) report similar negative return on assets for the 2000 - 2003 pe.riod. ., d 
68 That is the three groups are not mutually exclusive. A SEC comment letter may mclude an ｡ｾ｣ｯｵｮｴｭｧ＠ Issue Ｌｾ＠
. I 'h," . th t t es "LET RISK or risk or other disclosure issue at the same time. We repeat analYSIS c asst.] mg mto e wo ca egon _ 
"LET_DISC" only letters not including accounting issues and results remain mostly consistent. 
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appear to be negatively correlated with going concern opinions (GC), scaled receivables and 
inventories ARINV, the level of discretionary accruals (ABSDA) and LOSS. 
6.5.1 Levels Analysis 
Table 6.7.4, column A, presents results for regressing the natural logarithm of audit fees on 
SEC comment letters69, distinguishing among three letter categories classified as letters referring 
to accounting issues (LET _ ACC), letters referring to risk issues (LET_RISK) and letters referring 
to other disclosure issues (LET_DISC). 
In pat1icular, we follow Audit Analytics classification and we define LET _ACC as "SEC 
comments associated with general areas of accounting and disclosures". In these letters the 
application of specific accounting GAAP is questioned. The Audit Analytics classification 
taxonomy for accounting issues and relative frequencies that the specific issues appear in a 
comment letter referring to any accounting issue are presented in Appendix B, Panel A. 
LET_RISK captures "SEC comments about risk factor discussion in an issuer's Exchange 
Act reports" as outlined in Appendix B Panel B and LET_DISC refers to "SEC comments about 
material areas of disclosures that do not fit neatly into the other main groups, including things 
like lock up provisions, non-GAAP measures, EBITDA, Laws, etc.,,70 as outlined in Appendix B 
Panel C. 
The coefficient of LETfiCC is positive and significant (Bl=O.047; p-value=O.014). The 
coefficient of RISK is also positive and significant (B3=O.057; p-value=O.030) while the 
coefficients of LET_DISC is not significantly related to audit fees. 
69 We use OLS regression with White-adjusted and firm-clustered standard errors in all our models. This. in order to 
control for non-independence of firm-level observations over time. 
70 See Audit Analytics data-manual. 
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These findings suggest that the increase in audit fees following a comment letter is not onl) 
the result of external auditors' additional work to satisfY the SEC about the application of 
accounting standards but also that sufficient risk controls are in place. As one may expect, the 
auditor response in terms of adjusting audit pricing is not statistically significant for other 
disclosure issues. Most of the control variables relate to audit fees in a way consistent with the 
literature. In particular, auditor fees are highly positively associated with client size, as expected 
(LNASSETS is positive and economically significant, showing a coefficient pl30f 0.471). Big 
audit firms charge higher fees, consistent with the literature on premium prices. Complexity also 
leads to higher audit fees, as shown by variables FOR, MA, ARINV, DEC and SEG, which all 
show significant and positive coefficients. Variables GC, REST and ABSDA are positively 
associated with fees while profitability is negatively related to audit price, as expected (ROA is 
negative and significant), and the same is true for the level of debt. 
6.5.2 Persistence Effects 
In this section we finally test whether the response of audit fees to SEC comment letters 
persists to future periods. We attempt to capture the persistence effect by adding a dummy 
variable for each year following the receipt of the SEC comment letter. LET1 therefore captures 
firm-observations falling one year after the one in which the company was issued a comment 
letter (on any of the three categories); similarly LET2 and LET3 capture firm-observations two or 
three years following the letter year, respectively. 
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.7.4 and 6.7.5 (for level and change 
analysis, respectively), column B. Focusing on level analysis, it appears that auditors continue to 
charge higher fees up to three years after the company received the letter (LETl, LET2 and 
LET3 are positive and significant). 
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This confirms our hypothesis that auditors react to SEC comment letters by revising their 
client risk assessment. This revision persists to future periods even though the client does not 
subsequently receive a comment letter in the following year. This therefore suggests that fee 
increases are not simply associated with additional billable hours of work to respond to SEC 
concerns voiced in a comment letter, since if it were simply this, the fee increase would not 
persist to subsequent periods where no new comment letter (with associated required additional 
work) was issued. The persistence result is consistent with the identification of something more 
systemically associated with risks inherent with the clients reporting environment. 
Another interesting issue is whether the strength of these persistence effects falls off 
through time. The Wald test suggests that the economic impact decreases up to year two (the 
difference among LET, LETI and LET2 is significant while difference between LET2 and LET3 
is not). Since Section 408(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 sets out SEC review of the accounts 
at least once every three years it is as if the external auditors permanently increase their risk 
assessment of the client until the state of the clients reporting environment is re-exam ined by the 
normal three year investigation cycle of the SEC. 
6.5.3 Changes Analysis 
We repeat the same analyses by looking at the impact of SEC comment letters on the 
change in audit fees. Results are presented in Table 6.7.5, Column A. 
In this case, only "risk issues" appear to have a significant impact on the change in audit 
fees ＨｾＳ］ｏＮｬＰＸ［＠ p-value=O.OOO), reflecting once more the fact that auditors react to SEC comment 
letters highlighting a perceived increased risk in financial reporting and the auditors thus revise 
their risk assessment of the client. REST and FOR are negatively related to the change in audit 
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fees, while MA and CHLNASS report positive and significant coefficients. All other variables 
are not significant. 
6.5.4 Sensitivity Checks 
In this research we are assuming that any increase in work by external auditors in response 
to an SEC correspondence letter is detected by looking at the audit fee in the year following the 
reporting year that the SEC raises issues71 . However we need to check that any increase in fees is 
not instead charged to non-audit fees, or if it does, this does not change the qualitative fonn of the 
results. Thus we repeat the analysis using the amount of non-audit fees (Table 6.7.6) and total 
gross fees (Table 6.7.7). Non-audit fees show a lower response to SEC comment letters compared 
to audit fees. We are able to detect a significant increasing effect only following letters referring 
to "other disclosure issues" (Table 6.7.6, column A) suggesting any non-audit work is not 
associated with SEC questioning the application of accounting standards in financial reports. 
That is, non-audit fees do not respond to the SEC issuance of a comment letter referring to 
an accounting issue (LET_ACC is not significant) as one would expect, nor to a risk issue 
(LET_RISK is again not significant). Finally, the increasing effect on non-audit fees appears to 
persist only till the year after the receipt of the comment letter (Table 6.7.6, column B). The Wald 
test does not however confirm any trend in the economic impact of SEC letters through time. 
As another robustness check, we also use total audit fees as the dependent variable (Table 
6.7.7). 
Results are consistent with those presented in Table 6.7.4 for audit fees. SEC comment 
letters have a significant impact on total audit fees, especially for those letters referring to 
71 So, for example, if the company receives a SEC Comment letter in July 2008 ｲ･ｦ･ｲｲｩｮｾ＠ to the finan.cial statement 
closed on the 31 51 December 2007. we expect to detect increased audit fees in the reportmg ) ear closmg December 
2008. 
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accounting or risk issues. The impact lasts three years after receI'vI'ng th I tt 'th d . 
e e er, WI a ecreasmg 
economic impact up to year two. 
We control for industry effects in our analyses by adding industry dummies to the models. 
Results remain consistent in all our specifications suggesting that the way auditors react to SEC 
comment letters does not vary across industries. 
Instead of running regressions with firm etTor clusterting and industry dummies, \\ e 
perform a "2-way clustered regressions". In this way, etTors are clustered on two dimensions: 
firms and years. Even with this specification, results remain qualitatively the same72. However, 
as suggested by Cameron et al. (2006), 2-way clustering method requires a large number of 
clusters. As we analyse a five years period, we think that only including firm clustering and then 
adding year dummies could be the best specification. 
As extensively explained in Chapter 3, session 3.3, SEC is obliged to review each listed 
company at least every three years. For this reason, we do not think endogeneity issues may 
critically bias our results. To be on the safe side, we run an ML model for regressions with 
continuous outcome (audit fees) with a potential endogenous dummy variable (SEC comment 
letters) for correcting any potential endogenous switching problem. Choosing measures of size 
and risk in the specification models?3 , SEC comment letters still lead to significantly higher audit 
fees. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Research on how audit firms risk-adjust audit fees is still at a relatively early stage, given in 
part, paucity of data on client reporting risk. One relatively new quality source of client reporting 
72 The only significat difference concerns the change analysis of the persistence effect in ｷｨｩｾｨ＠ case also the variable 
LET2 presents a negative sign whereas the variable LET3 shows a positive significant ｣ｯ･ｦｦｩ｣ｉｾｮｴＮ＠ ,. 
73 This is the model used to predict the probability of receiving an SEC ｣ｯｲｲＺｭ･ｮｾ＠ letter. In particular. \\ e used sIZe 
(natural logarithm of total assets), loss, restatement and absolute value of discretIOnary accruals. 
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risk that has become publicly available since 2005 is Comment Letter issuance by the SEC to 
registered firms. This research considers whether external auditors, when setting annual audit 
fees, act as if the issuance of comment letters materially changes their assessment of individual 
client risk. 
When a firm receives a comment letter from the SEC it is likely that the firm \\ ill ask the 
external auditor to assist with preparation of a timely response to this important regulator. Thus, 
it is not surprising to see audit fees increasing in the year following the issuance of a comment 
letter. We confirm that the increase is statistically significant. When one classifies the principle 
topic covered by a SEC comment letters into one of three categories: accounting, risk or other 
disclosures it is not self evident how audit fees will respond to comment letters from each 
category. We confirm our initial hypothesis that audit fees increase in response to comment 
letters that refer specifically to the application of accounting standards. In addition, consistent 
with auditors taking a holistic response to audit risk we also find evidence that audit fees increase 
in response to comment letters that refer to specific and general risk issues. For our remaining set 
of comment letters that refer to other disclosures issues not covering accounting or risk we show 
there is no significant increase in audit fees. 
Of primary research interest here is whether the source of any significant increase in audit 
fees is simply the result of the external auditor being able to bill additional hours to the client (to 
help produce a response to an SEC comment letter) or alternatively the result of the external 
auditor revising their assessment of client reporting risk given the SEC has raised an issue about 
this via a comment letter. Thus under the first interpretation fee increases may be transitory and 
simply work flow driven. Under the second interpretation external auditors may fundamentally 
change the risk based pricing model they have for a client and this effect could persist for some 
periods until the auditor had some specific reason to revise their model of client reporting risk. 
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In this research we show that audit fee increases following the issuance of a comment letter 
by the SEC, persist to subsequent periods in which no further SEC letters have been received. In 
addition this persistence effect slightly decreases through time until the period in which the firm 
is by law due to be reviewed again by the SEC on the regular three year cycle. Thus the data is 
consistent with our persistence hypothesis that upon reception of a SEC comment letter. the 
external auditor revises their fees upwards in order to reflect the greater perceived client reporting 
risk signaled by the SEC choosing to issue a comment letter. This suggests that external auditors 
may positively value the SEC's parallel investigation work of the clients reporting system as the 
auditors make significant changes to the client fees conditional on the issuance of an SEC 
comment letter. 
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6.7 Tables 
Table 6.7.1 
Yearly and industry relative distribution of comment letters 
Panel A: Yearly relative distribution of comment letters 
Table 6.7 1 A 
Number of observations receiving a 
Year comment letter Percentage of letters Firm - year Observations 
2004 21 4% 502 
2005 1411 35% 3986 
2006 1632 40% 4102 
2007 1676 41% 4106 
2008 1563 41% 3778 
Total 6303 38% 16474 
Panel B: Industry relative distribution of comment letters 
Table 6.7.1 B 
Percentage of 
Firm-year firm-year Number of firm-
observations observations observation Percentage of 
Industry per industry per industry receiving a letter letters 
Agriculture. Foresting and Fishing 43 0.26% 19 44.19% 
Mining 988 6.00% 477 48.28% 
Constructions 128 0.78% 56 43.75% 
Manufacturing 8,119 49.28% 3017 37.16% 
Transport, Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary Services 1.918 11.64% 713 37.17% 
Wholesale Trade 592 3.59% 210 35.47% 
Retail Trade 1,088 6.60% 393 36.12% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 380 2.31% 130 34.21% 
Services 3.212 19.50% 1288 40.10% 
Others 6 0.04% 0 0.00% 
Total 16,474 100.00% 6303 
38.26° 0 
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Table 6.7.2 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.72 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Ql Q3 
LNAF 13.257 13.334 1.409 12.294 14.227 
LET_ACC 0.261 0 0.439 0 1 
LET_DISC 0.263 0 0.440 0 1 
LET RISK 0.051 0 0.220 0 0 
GC 0.089 0 0.285 0 
REST 0.120 0 0.325 0 
FOR 0.383 1 0.486 0 
BIG 0.649 1 0.477 0 
MA 0.156 0 0.363 0 1 
ROA -0.109 0.026 0.459 -0.123 0.085 
DEC 0.668 1 0.471 0 
ARINV 0.236 0.196 0.196 0.073 0.354 
DEBT 0.178 0.089 0.235 0 0.276 
LNASS 5.437 5.427 2.257 3.710 7.029 
LOSS 0.470 0 0.499 0 
ABSDA 0.405 0.14 0.707 0.047 0.402 
SEG 2.214 1 1.722 1.000 3.000 
N= 16,474 
Variable definition 
See Appendix A. 
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LNAF 
LET 
LET_ACC 
LET_NNACC 
LET_DISC 
LET_RISK 
LET1 
LET2 
LET3 
GC 
REST 
FOR 
BIG 
MA 
ROA 
DEC 
ARINV 
DEBT 
LNASS 
LOSS 
ABSDA 
SEG 
Variahle definition 
See Appendix A 
LNAF LET 
0.0823* 
0.0844* 1 
0.1388* 0.7552* 
-0.0611* 0.4723* 
0.1215* 0.7595* 
0.0378* 0.2946* 
0.0159* -0.3780* 
-0.0209* -0.2622* 
-0.0226* -0.1787* 
-0.2670* 0.0217* 
0.0003 0.0213* 
0.4813* 0.0195* 
0.6207* -0.0148 
0.1437* 0.0246* 
0.3007* -0.0567* 
0.0833* 0.0569* 
-0.0262* -0.0474* 
0.1575* 0.0258* 
0.8560* 0.0544* 
-0.2866* 0.0310* 
-0.1365* 0.0365* 
0.3851* 0.0189* 
LET_ACC 
0.1382* 
0.7552* 
1 
-0.2211* 
0.7917* 
0.2884* 
-0.2855* 
-0.1980* 
-0.1349* 
-0.0401 * 
0.0261* 
0.0594* 
0.0505* 
0.0131 
0.0340* 
0.0388* 
-0.0092 
0.0264" 
0.1304* 
-0.0424* 
-0.0071 
0.0445* 
Table 6.7.3 
Correlation matrix 
Table 6.73 
LET_NNACC LET_DISC LET_RISK LET1 LET2 LET3 GC REST FOR BIG MA 
-0.0634* 0.1200* 0.0374* 0.0148 -0.0252* -0.0268* -0.2674* 0.0001 0.4911* 0.6298* 0.1486* 
0.4723* 0.7595* 0.2946* -0.3780* -0.2622* -0.1787* 0.0217* 0.0213* 0.0195* -0.0148 0.0246* 
-0.2211* 0.7917* 0.2884* -0.2855* -0.1980* -0.1349* -0.0401* 0.0261* 0.0594* 0.0505* 0.0131 
1 0.0654* 0.0505* -0.1786* -0.1238* -0.0844* 0.0862* -0.0034 -0.0509* -0.0899* 0.0190* 
0.0654* 0.2997* -0.2871* -0.1991* -0.1357* -0.0367* 0.0140 0.0639* 0.0370* 0.0177* 
0.0505* 0.2997* -0.1114* -0.0773* -0.0526* -0.0008 -0.0049 0.0034 0.0064 0.0140 
-0.1786* -0.2871* -0.1114* 1 0.1405* 0.1570* 0.0106 -0.0154* -0.0092 -0.0296* 0.0023 
-0.1238* -0.1991* -0.0773* 0.1405* 1 0.1692* 0.0347* -0.0201* -0.0137 -0.0610* -0.0157* 
-0.0844 * -0.1357* -0.0526* 0.1570* 0.1692* 1 0.0546* -0.0206* -0.0214* -0.0477* -0.0141 
0.0862* 
-0.0034 
-0.0509* 
-0.0899* 
0.0190* 
-0.1301* 
0.0324* 
-0.0582* 
0.0029 
-0.0943* 
0.1031* 
0.0638* 
-0.0317* 
-0.0367* 
0.0140 
0.0639* 
0.0370* 
0.0177* 
0.0280* 
0.0325* 
0.0009 
0.0125 
0.1096* 
-0.0339* 
0.0030 
0.0437* 
-0.0008 0.0106 
-0.0049 -0.0154* 
0.0034 -0.0092 
0.0064 -0.0296* 
0.0140 0.0023 
-0.0386* -0.0048 
0.0261* 0.0084 
-0.0232* -0.0007 
0.0119 -0.0009 
0.0238* -0.0008 
0.0127 0.0386* 
0.0392* -0.0533* 
-0.0072 -0.0089 
0.0347* 0.0546* -0.0247* -0.1798* -0.2659* -0.0640* 
-0.0201* -0.0206* -0.0247* 1 0.0119 -0.0137 -0.0071 
-0.0137 -0.0214* -0.1798* 0.0119 1 0.2868* 0.1258* 
-0.0610* -0.0477* -0.2659* -0.0137 0.2868* 0.0714* 
-0.0157* -0.0141 -0.0640* -0.0071 0.1258* 0.0714* 
-0.0262* -0.0281* -0.4505* 0.0026 0.2270* 0.2487* 0.0358* 
-0.0005 0.0032 0.0353* 0.0038 -0.0557* 0.0687* 0.0175* 
0.0022 -0.0038 -0.0423* 0.0023 0.1471* -0.1061* -0.0062 
-0.0007 0.0080 0.0347* -0.0099 -0.0423* 0.1111* 0.0344* 
-0.0416* -0.0438* -0.3581* -0.0050 0.3761* 0.6193* 0.1337* 
0.0755* 0.0518* 0.2922* -0.0018 -0.1779* -0.2527* -0.1025* 
-0.0330* -0.0187* 0.1163* -0.0138 -0.0467* -0.1102* 0.0169* 
-0.0142 -0.0224* -0.1063* 0.0226* 0.2133* 0.1803* 0.0847* 
Pair-wise Pearson correlations are repolied below the diagonal; Spearman correlations are reported above the diagonal. 
ROA 
0.2737* 
-0.0458* 
0.0333* 
-0.1129" 
0.0254* 
-0.0306* 
-0.0228* 
-0.0525* 
-0.0626* 
-0.3605* 
-0.0079 
0.2282" 
0.2226* 
0.0743* 
1 
-0.0514* 
0.1652* 
-0.0444* 
0.4083* 
-0.4171* 
-0.2327" 
0.1684* 
Table 6.7.4 
Effect of SEC Comment Letters on Audit Fees 
Table 6.7 .J 
Expected Column A Column B 
sign Letter contents Persistence Effect 
Intercept (0.) ? 9.877*** 9.812*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
LET (yl) + 0.111*** 
(0.000) 
LET_ACC ({31) ? 0.047** 
(0.014) 
LET_DISC ({32) ? 0.002 
(0.915) 
LET_RISK ({33) ? 0.057** 
(0.030) 
LETl (y2) + 0.071 *** (0.000) 
LET2 (y3) + 0.042** (0.020) 
LET3 (y4) + 0.065*** (0.003) 
GC ({34) + 0.157*** 0.153*** (0.000) (0.000) 
REST ({35) + 0.031 * 0.028* (0.066) (0.089) 
FOR ({36) + 0.464*** 0.465*** (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG ({37) + 0.445*** 0.453*** (0.000) (0.000) 
MA ({38) + 0.080*** 0.078*** (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA ({39) -0.144*** -0.139*** (0.000) (0.000) 
DEC ({310) + 0.041** 0.042** (0.024 ) (0.022) 
ARfNl' ({311) + 0.482*** 0.486*** (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT ({312) + -0.134*** 
-0.134** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
LNASS ({313) + 0.471 *** 
0.470*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS ({31-1) + 0.272*** 
0.267*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ABSDA ({315) + 0.009 
0.009 
(0.315) (0.314) 
SEG ({316) + 0.050*** 
0.050*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 
16474 16474 
R-squared 
0.802 0.802 
Time control 
YES YES 
Clustered standard 
YES YES 
errors 
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Regression Models: 
(1) Letter contents 
LNAF;,I = a + fllLET _ACCi,l + fl2LET _DISCi,l + fl3LET _RISK,,/ + fl4GCi,l + fl5REST,,1 + fl6 FOR'f + 
fl7 BIGi,l + flgMAi,l + fJ9 ROAff + fllODECi,l + flllARINV;,1 + fl12 DEBT,,/ + fl13LNASSi,f + fl14 LOSSf,f + 
ｦｬＱＵａｂｓｄｾＬＱ＠ + P16SEGf,l + Gil 
(2) Persistence effect 
LNAFiJ = a + y1LETiJ + Y2 LETl i,l + Y3 LET2i,l + Y4 LET3i,/ + fl4GCf,l + flsREST,,1 + fl6FOR" + fl7B1Gu + 
+ flgMAi,/ + P9 ROAi,1 + PlO DECi,l + PllARINVi,1 + Pl'2 DEBT,,I + P13LNASSU + fl14 LOSSf,l + fll5'iBSDAU + 
+ P16SEGi,l + G;,I 
Variable definition: 
See Appendix A 
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Table 6.7.5 
Effect of SEC Comment Letters on Change in Audit Fees 
Table 6.75 
Intercept (a) 
LET (yi) 
LET_ACC (fJi) 
LET_DiSC (fJ2) 
LET_RiSK (fJ3) 
LETi (y2) 
LET2 (y3) 
LETJ (y-l) 
GC (fJ4) 
REST (fJ5) 
FOR (fJ6) 
BIG (fJ7) 
MA (fJ8) 
CHROA (fJ9) 
DEC (fJIO) 
CHARlNf' (fJil) 
CHDEBT (fJi2) 
CHLNASS (fJI3) 
LOSS (fJU) 
C HABSDA (fJ 15) 
CHSEG (fJI6) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Time control 
Clustered standard 
errors 
Expected 
sign 
? 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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Column A 
Letter contents 
0.010 
(0.380) 
0.009 
(0.569) 
0.007 
(0.662) 
0.108*** 
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.221) 
-0.030** 
(0.015) 
-0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.296) 
0.051 *** 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.755) 
-0.009 
(0.240) 
0.102 
(0.235) 
-0.003 
(0.945) 
0.355*** 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.446) 
-0.006 
(0.353) 
0.012 
(0.122) 
11733 
0.122 
YES 
YES 
Column B 
Persistence Effect 
0.022 
(0.110) 
0.019* 
(0.068) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.605) 
0.017 
(0.210) 
0.018 
(0.266) 
-0.030** 
(0.013) 
-0.019** 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.253) 
0.51*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.820) 
-0.009 
(0.244) 
0.098 
(0.253) 
-0.006 
(0.905) 
0.357*** 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.430) 
-0.007 
(0.302) 
0.011 
(0.135) 
11733 
0.121 
YES 
YES 
Regression Models: 
(1) Letter contents 
CHLNAF;" =a+fJI LET _ACC;,I +fJ2LET _DISC;" +fJ3LET _RISK;,f +fJ4GCi,/ +fJ,REST", +fJ"FOR,.1 + 
fJ7 BIG;" + fJ8 MA,,I + fJ9CHROA;,1 + fJIO DEC ,,1 + fJIICHARINVi,/ + fJI2CHDEBT,,f + fJ!3CHLNASS,,I + 
fJI4LOSSj" + PI <, CHABSDA, ,/ + fJI6CHSEGi,l +c;,/ 
(2) Persistence effect 
CHLNAF;,1 = a + Y1 LE1',,/ + Y2LETlj,/ + Y3LET2;,I + Y4LET3,,I + P4GCI./ + fJsRES1',,I + fJ6FOR" + fJ7B1GI./ + 
+ P8MAi,/ + P9CHROAi,l + PlODECj,/ + fJIICHARINV;,I + PI2CHDEBT" + P!3CHLNASS,.1 + fJI4 LOSS ,,1 + 
fJ1sCHABSDAi,l + P16CHSEGu + c,,/ 
Variable definition: 
See Appendix A 
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Table 6.7.6 
Effect of SEC Comment Letters on Non-audit Fees 
Table 6.76 
Expected Column A Column B 
sign Letter contents Persistence Effect 
Intercept (a) ? 4.037*** 3.832*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
LET (yl) + 0.325*** 
(0.000) 
LET_ACC (PI) ? -0.083 
(0.431 ) 
LET_DISC (f32) ? 0.217** 
(0.041 ) 
LET_RISK (f33) ? -0.157 
(0.283) 
LETl (y2) + 0.262*** (0.004) 
LET2 (y3) + 0.130 (0.271) 
LET3 (y-/) + 0.197 (0.226) 
GC (f34) + -0.254 -0.265 (0.142) (0.124) 
REST (f35) + 0.060 0.050 (0.526) (0.595) 
FOR (f36) + 0.712*** 0.717*** (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG (f37) + 0.863*** 0.889*** (0.000) (0.000) 
MA (f38) + 0.469*** 0.461*** (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (f39) -0.173 -0.150 (0.119) (0.177) 
DEC (f310) + -0.257*** -0.257*** (0.008) (0.008) 
ARINV (f31 I) + 1.369*** 1.383*** (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT (f3I2) + 0.146 0.146 (0.438) (0.440) 
LNASS (f313) + 0.686*** 
0.680*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS (f3 I -/) + 0.382*** 
0.366*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ABSDA (f315) + 0.132*** 
0.130*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
SEG (f316) + 0.163*** 
0.163*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 
16474 16474 
R-squared 
0.230 0.231 
Time control 
YES YES 
Clustered standard 
YES YES 
errors 
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Regression Models: 
(1) Letter contents 
LN _NAFi,l =a+fJ, LET _ACCi,l +fJ2LET _DISC,,1 +fJ3LET _RISKi,1 +fJ4GC,,1 +fJ,REST,,1 +f36FOR,.1 + 
f37 BIGi,1 + PS MAi,1 + P9 ROAi,1 + fJIO DECi,1 + fJIl ARINVi,1 + fJ12DEBT,,1 + f313LNASS,,1 + fJl4LOSSI,1 + 
fJIsABSDAi,1 + fJI6 SEGi,1 +&'i,1 
(2) Persistence effect 
LN _NAFiJ = a + y,LETi) + Y2 LET1 i,l + Y3LET2i,1 + Y4LET3i,1 + fJ4GCi,1 + fJsREST,.1 + f36FOR" + fJ7B1G,.I + 
+ PSMAi,l + P9 ROA i./ + PIO DECi,1 + ｐｬｬａｒｬｎｾＬＱ＠ + PI2 DEBT,,1 + fJI3LNASS,.1 + fJI4 LOSSI,1 + fJlsABSDA" + 
+ PI6 SEGi,l + Gi,l 
Variable definition: 
LN _ NAF= natural logarithm of non-audit fees in year t. 
For all other variables see Appendix A 
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Table 6.7.7 
Effect of SEC Comment Letters on Total Audit Fees 
Table 6.77 
Expected Column A Column B 
sign Letter contents Persistence Effect 
Intercept (a) ? 9.984*** 9.919*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
LET (yl) + 0.115*** 
(0.000) 
LET_ACC (131) ? 0.037* 
(0.060) 
LET_DISC (132) ? 0.010 
(0.627) 
LET_RISK (133) ? 0.074*** 
(0.004) 
LETl (y2) + 0.072*** 
(0.000) 
LET2 (y3) + 0.040* (0.024) 
LETJ (y4) + 0.067*** (0.003) 
GC (134) + 0.143*** 0.139*** (0.000) (0.000) 
REST (135) + 0.029* 0.026 (0.080) (0.113) 
FOR (136) + 0.459*** 0.459*** (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG (137) + 0.434*** 0.442*** (0.000) (0.000) 
MA (138) + 0.112*** 0.110*** (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (139) -0.149*** -0.143*** (0.000) (0.000) 
DEC (1310) + 0.024 0.024 (0.178) (0.168) 
ARINV (1311) + 0.492*** 0.496*** (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT (1312) + -0.116*** 
-0.115*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
LNASS (1313) + 0.481*** 
0.480*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS (13]./) + 0.268*** 
0.263*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ABSDA (1315) + 0.023*** 
0.023*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
SEG (1316) + 0.055*** 
0.055*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 
16474 16474 
R-squared 
0.810 0.811 
Time control 
YES YES 
Clustered standard 
YES YES 
errors 
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Regression Models: 
(1) Letter contents 
LN _TAFi,l =a+/3I LET _ACC,,1 +/32LET _DISCi,l +/33LET _RISKi,l +/34GCi,l +/3sRESTI,/ +/36 FOR ,.I + 
/37 BIGi" +/3SMAi,l +/39 ROAi,l +/3IO DEC,,1 +/311ARINVi,l +/312 DEBTi,/ +/313LNASSi,l +/31. LOSSi,/ + 
/31S ABSDAi,l + /316 SEGi,l + £,,1 
(2) Persistence effect 
LN _TAFi,1 = a + Y1 LE1';,I + Y'2LETli,l + Y3LET2i,l + Y4LET3',I + /34GC,,1 + /3sREST,,1 + /36 FOR, , + 
P7 BIGi,l + PSMAi,l + P9 ROA,,f + PIODECi,l + ｐｉｉａｒｉｎｾＬｉ＠ + P12 DEBTiJ + P13LNASSI/ + /314 LOSS ',I + 
fJlsABSDAi,l + PI6 SEGi,l + £i,l 
Variable definition: 
LN_NAF= natural logarithm of non-audit fees in year t. 
For all other variables see Appendix A 
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Appendix A 
Variables Definition 
LNAF= natural logarithm of audit fees in year t. 
CHLNAF= change in ｮｾｴｵｲ｡ｬ＠ logarithm of audit fees from year t-l to year t. 
ARINV= sum of receIVables and inventory scaled by total assets. 
CHARINV= change in ARINV from year t-l to year t. 
LNASS= natural logarithm of total assets. 
C HLNASS= change in LNASS from year t-l to year t. 
BIG= ､ｵｾｭｹ＠ ｶｾｲｩ｡｢ｬ･＠ .that takes the value of 1 if the company is audited by 
a BIg audIt firm In year t, 0 otherwise. 
ABSDA= absolute amount of discretionary accruals from a cross-sectional 
Modified-Jones model regression estimated for each two-digit SIC and 
year combination with at least 10 observation. 
CHABSDA= change in ABSDA from year t-l to year t. 
DEBT= Long term debt scaled by total assets. 
CHDEBT= change in debt from year t-l to year t. 
DEC= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company closes its 
accounts in December. 
FOR= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company paid taxes 
abroad in year t, 0 otherwise. 
GC= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company received a 
going-concern opinion in year t, 0 otherwise. 
LET= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company received a 
letter in year t, 0 otherwise. 
LET_ACC= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the SEC comment letter 
referred to any accounting issues, 0 otherwise. 
LET_DISC= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the SEC comment letter 
referred to "other disclosure issues", as reported in Audit Analytics. 
LET_NNACC= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the SEC comment letter 
did not referred to any accounting issues, 0 otherwise. 
LET_RISK= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the SEC comment letter 
referred to "risk issues", as reported in Audit Analytics. 
LET 1 = dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation falls in the 
year after which the company received the SEC comment letter. 
LET2= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation falls in the 
second year after which the company received the SEC comment 
letter. 
LET3= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation falls in the 
third year after which the company received the SEC comment letter. 
LOSS= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company reported a 
loss in the previous three years, 0 otherwise. 
MA= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company undertook a 
M&A transaction in year t, 0 otherwise. 
REST= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company restated the 
accounts in year t, 0 otherwise. 
ROA= earnings before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets. 
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CHROA= change in ROA, from year t-1 to year t. 
SEG= number in business segments in year t. 
Appendix B 
SEC comment letters content taxonomy 
Panel A - "Accounting Issues" 
Audit Number of Percentage 
Analytics Description of the accounting issue firm-year (over 4302 
coding observations LET ACC) 
176 Accounts receivable & cash reporting issues 706 16.41% 
177 Acquisitions, mergers, and business combinations 1083 25.17% 
178 Asset sales, disposals, divestitures, reorganization issues 626 1-\..55% 
179 Balance sheet classification of assets issues 82 1.91% 
180 Capitalization of expenditures issues 212 4.93% 
181 Cash flow statement (F AS- 95 or lAS 7) classification errors 830 19.29% 
182 Comprehensive income (Equity Section) issues l38 3.21% 
183 Consolidation (Fin 46, variable interest, SlY, SPE & off-B/S) 361 8.39% 
184 Consolidation, foreign currency/int1ation issue 153 3.56% 
185 Debt and/or equity classification issues 57 1.32% 
186 Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity ( BCF) security issues 1318 30.64% 
187 Deferred, stock-based and/or executive comp issues 1400 32.54% 
188 Deferred, stock-based options backdating only 46 1.07% 
189 Deferred, stock-based SF AS 123 only (subcategory) 712 16.55% 
190 Depreciation, depletion or amortization reporting issues 657 15.27% 
191 EPS, ratio and classification of income statement issues 475 11.04% 
192 Expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording issues 485 11.27% 
194 Financial derivatives/hedging (FAS 133) acct issues 322 7.48% 
195 Foreign (affiliate or subsidiary) issues 120 2.79% 
196 Subsidiary issues-- US or foreign (subcategory) 140 3.25% 
200 Investment in subs.laffiliate issues 343 7.97% 
201 Intercompany accounting issues 104 
2.42% 
202 Inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales issues 994 
23.11 % 
203 Contingencies & Commit, legal, (F AS 5 or lAS 37) accounting issues 860 19.99% 
204 Lease, leasehold (F AS 13 (98) and lAS 17) 429 9.97% 
205 Liabilities, payables, and accrual estimate issues 
999 23.22% 
206 Pension and related Employee Plan issues 
347 8.07% 
207 PPE fixed asset (value/diminution) issues 665 
15.46% 
208 PPE issues - Intangible assets and goodwill 
1091 25.36% 
212 Revenue recognition (incl deferred revenue) issues 1645 
38.24% 
214 Tax expense/benefitldeferrallother (F AS 109) issues 709 
16.48% 
283 Loans receivable, valuation and allowances issues 
67 1.56% 
284 Loss reserves (LAEs, Reinsurance) disclosure issues 
55 1.28% 
254 Asset retirement obligation (F AS 143) issues 
144 3.35% 
278 Fin statement segment reporting «F AS 131) subcategory) issues 
1073 2-\..9-\.% 
1011 Non-monetary exchange (APB 29, EITF 01-2) issues 
30 0.70°;0 
816 Percentage of completion 
212 4.93% 
897 Tax rate disclosure issues 
93 2.16% 
931 Investments (SF AS liS) and cash and cash equivalents issues 
399 9.27% 
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934 Changes in accounting principles and interpretation issues 
935 Fai.r value measurement, estimates, use (inel. YSOE) 126 2.930. 0 
1012 Gam or loss recognition issues 
1006 n.38% 
1016 Research and Development issues 
396 9.21% 
1027 Dividend and/or distribution issues 
294 6.830. 0. 
134 3.11% 
Panel B - "Risk Issues" 
Audit Number of Percentage 
Analytics Description of the risk issue firm-year (over 841 
coding observations LET RISK) 
933 Risk Factors - Accounting Policy Change 6 0.71% 
1312 Risk Factors - Anti-takeover issues 47 5.59% 
912 Risk Factors - Barriers to entry 4 0.48% 
1289 Risk Factors - Capital adequacy and liquidity restrictions 26 3.09% 
1069 Risk Factors - Change in shareholder rights 18 2.14% 
990 Risk Factors - Clarify/quantify price volatility risks 38 4.52% 
1803 Risk Factors - Climate change matters 0 0.00% 
1304 Risk Factors - Compensation levels and expense 0.12% 
910 Risk Factors - Competition and competitors 64 7.61% 
1303 Risk Factors - Conflicts ofinterestlrelated party issues 42 4.99% 
1163 Risk Factors - Credit restrictions 45 5.35% 
1108 Risk Factors - Credit risk for accounts receivable 37 4.40% 
1395 Risk Factors - Data protection and security breaches 2 0.24% 
1318 Risk Factors - Descriptive subheading issues 45 5.35% 
1112 Risk Factors - Dissent over merger or offer 0.12% 
1313 Risk Factors - Dividend payments 14 1.66% 
1321 Risk Factors - Exchange listing issues 14 1.66% 
1267 Risk Factors - Fluctuations in currency or exchange rates 17 2.02% 
1735 Risk Factors - Going concern 24 2.85% 
1234 Risk Factors - Government regulatory effects/changes 47 5.59% 
228 Risk Factors - Inadequate disclosure issues 522 62.07% 
1266 Risk Factors - Ineffective internal or disclosure controls 53 6.30% 
918 Risk Factors - Information about industry 11 1.31% 
1190 Risk Factors - Information technology 6 0.71% 
915 Risk Factors - Intellectual property rights 47 5.59% 
1290 Risk Factors - International operations 18 2.14% 
251 Risk Factors - Investments at risk 11 1.31% 
914 Risk Factors - Legal exposures, reliance, claims etc. 98 11.65% 
1396 Risk Factors - Licensing or regulatory agency approvals 12 1.43% 
1393 Risk Factors - Limited operating history 12 1.43% 
1302 Risk Factors - Loss reserves may prove inadequate 0 0.00% 
1301 Risk Factors - Market for offered securities 8 0.95% 
1270 Risk Factors - Market for products or services 61 7.25% 
1397 Risk Factors - Merging and acquiring risks 14 1.66% 
1394 Risk Factors - Operating losses 20 2.38% 
917 Risk Factors - Reliance on certain personnel 66 7.85% 
913 Risk Factors - Reliance on suppliers, customers, governments 122 14.51% 
991 Risk Factors - Remove language downplaying or mitigating risk 46 5.47% 
1105 Risk Factors - Remove or specify generic risks 77 9.16% 
916 Risk Factors - Revenue sources 33 3.92% 
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1291 Risk Factors - Seasonal fluctuations 6 0.71°0 
1253 Risk Factors - Share dilution issues 48 5.71% 
1273 Risk Factors - Substantial debt 45 5.35% 
921 Risk Factors - Tax positions and assumptions 20 2.3 8° 0 
911 Risk Factors - Technology reliance, feasibility, etc. 16 1.90% 
1317 Risk Factors - Unbundle discrete risks 31 3.69% 
Panel C - "Other Disclosure Issues" 
Audit Number of Percentage 
Analytics Description of the disclsoure issue firm-year (over 4338 
coding observations LET_DISC) 
819 Confidentiality in filing content sought 559 12.89% 
906 Director compensation and options incentive issues 334 7.70% 
927 Director compensation and options incentives--Benchmark issues 313 7.22% 
268 Disclosure Control reporting issues 1236 28.49% 
1342 Ethics code issues 29 0.67% 
924 Family/related pruty transaction disclosure issues 670 ＱＵａｾＥ＠
930 Foreign subsidiary--non-accounting disclosure issues 11 0.25°'0 
1403 Future Comment 2774 63.95% 
1028 Inadequate proxy disclosures 13 0.30% 
902 Internal Control (404) Over Financial Reporting Issues 136 3.14% 
232 Materiality - questions about disclosure decisions 940 21.67% 
222 Missing information - disclosure issues 48 1.11% 
1792 Non-compliance with prior SEC Staff directive 0 0.00% 
813 Non-GAAP measures (inc I. EBIT, EBITDA issues) 861 19.85% 
238 Outsourcing of accounting and disclosure issues 4 0.09% 
223 Plain English principles - reporting issues 58 1.34% 
209 Proforma financial information reporting issues 559 12.89% 
1014 Regulatory asset or liabilities accounting & reporting issues 74 1.71% 
932 Reorganization and restructuring issues (internal) 151 3.48% 
224 Repetitious statements - reporting issues 71 
1.64% 
210 Restatements made while in bankruptcy/receivership 3 
0.07% 
396 Tax agreements 9 
0.21% 
248 Terrorist Nation Sponsor Reporting Issues 137 
3.16% 
818 Third party expert input/consulting/advice issues 
815 18.79% 
270 Trade Restrictions - TSRA and OF AC financial disclosure issues 
65 1.50% 
929 Website issues of registrant/website revie\v ｢ｾ＠ SEC 97 2.24% 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
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7. Conclusions and future research 
7.1 Empirical findings 
In this dissertation I analyze two different examples of how altemative mechanisms 
of regulation may work to enhance the quality of the information provided on the market. 
In particular, in my first two empirical works (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), I focus on a 
particular example of enforced self-regulation which is the mandatory auditor rotation 
rule. Even if in the last decades there have been different debates at the intemational level 
about the effectiveness of this rule, there still is a call for empirical evidence. The rule is 
in fact enforced in very few countries in the world74 and data is not always publicly 
available, hampering empirical research on the topic. In this perspective, Italy represents 
an optimal research environment as it is the country with the longest audit firm rotation 
tradition (this rule is enforced since 1975) and data sets are available for the signing audit 
partner. In the first study, I evaluate the effects of mandatory and voluntary audit firm 
and audit partner changes on reporting quality for approximately 200 firms over a three 
year period from 2006-2008. Results indicate that only partner mandatory rotations are 
associated with improved reporting quality; there is no significant effect on reporting 
quality associated with audit firm rotation. As the latter is considered to be a highly costly 
regulatory framework (Arrunada, 1997), this evidence should help professional 
associations and legislators considering whether to introduce the rule in their own 
country. The second empirical work (Chapter 5), demonstrates that audit firm rotations 
are followed by a more conservative approach in Italy, and this evidence is even stronger 
after 2005 than before 2001. Evidence is provided suggesting a positive association 
74 See Chapter 3. section 3.1. 
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between conservatism and audit tenure, but only before the adoption of IFRS. Finally. 
new auditors seem to respond to external demand for conservatism, but not incumbent 
auditors. 
The last empirical work (Chapter 6) analyzes an example of direct governmental 
monitoring activity on corporate information disclosure. In patticular. the paper analyses 
how external auditors in the U.S. react to the SEC review activity on listed company and 
provides evidence of an increase in the audit fees paid by the company after a receipt of a 
SEC comment letter, which represents the output of this monitoring activity. In 
particular, this increase is evident not only for those letters specifically referring to 
accounting issues, but also for letters referring to specific or general risk issues. This 
suggests that this increase in audit fees represents an audit adjustment to the perceived 
level of risk. Evidence also suggests that this adjustment persists in future years, even if 
no additional letters are received by the reporting companies. 
7.2 Comments to empirical findings 
There are two most important messages which arIse from the analysis of the 
findings outlined above. 
First of all, the mandatory rotation rule as an example of enforced self-regulation 
may be beneficial when enforced at the partner level, while results suggest that extending 
mandatory rotation requirements to include audit firm rotations in addition to partner 
rotations may not yield better reporting. The findings are thus consistent with the view 
that incremental costs associated to mandatory audit firm rotations are not outweighed by 
their relative benefits in the presence of mandatory partner rotations. 
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This evidence might be of high importance for those regulators who are considering 
introducing firm mandatory rotations in their own countries, especially in the light of the 
recent EU Green paper (2010) which is considering extending auditor rotation rule to the 
firm level within the European Union. On the other hand, firm mandatory rotations seem 
to increase earnings conservatism, especially after the introduction ofIFRS in Italy. 
The second important message of this dissertation is that direct oversight activity 
and in pa11icular the SEC periodical reviews seem to affect auditing processes in the u.S. 
and auditors value the outcome of this activity recognizing increased risk in those clients 
receiving a comment letter by this governmental body. However, this comes with a 
certain cost to the client, as auditors significantly increase the fees charged to clients in 
the year in which the comment letter is received and, most importantly, this increase in 
audit fees continues in the following years, even if no letter is received. 
Of course, the direct comparison of the two regulatory mechanisms is difficult to 
pursue, especially as empirical findings are based on two different institutional settings 
(i.e. Italy and the U.S) and therefore results found in one country are not necessarily 
generalizable to the other one. 
However, future steps of research may be envisioned in order to better understand 
the costs and benefits of enforced self-regulation and direct oversight activity. These are 
outlined below in the following paragraph. 
7.3 Future research 
Future lines of research may be envisioned with reference to the two regulation 
mechanisms analyzed in this disse11ation. 
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First one cannot rule out the 'b'l't h h . . . . 
, POSSI I I Y t at t e posItive aSSOCIatIOn between 
partner mandatory rotations and audit quality in Italy during the period 2005-2008 is the 
result of a temporary effect. The public pressure which has been weighing on the audit 
profession since the financial scandals in 2003 (e.g. Pallnalat) and the new regulatory 
changes introduced by Law 26212005 (among others, partner mandatory rotation rule) 
may have influenced the results. In this sense, a future extension of the sample in the 
future years could help understating whether the apparent effectiveness of the rule may 
fade away in time. 
One of the major criticisms against the mandatory rotation rule refers to the high 
costs it induces both on clients and auditors. A future research path could therefore be to 
focus directly on the cost side of the rule and to check whether audit costs are 
significantly higher in a mandatory rotation regime. Ideally, this could be tested at the 
engagement level, for example looking at the amount of audit-hours the incoming auditor 
dedicates to the new client. As this data is seldom available, audit fees could also be used 
as a proxy for audit costs. 
This dissertation focuses on a particular aspect of the monitoring activity perfonned 
by the SEC, i.e. the auditor response to SEC comment letters in tenns of risk assessment 
and relative adjustment to audit fees. One different approach could be to directly analyze 
the effectiveness of the SEC review process in enhancing financial reporting quality. 
Does the level of reporting quality increase after the receipt of a SEC comment letter? Is 
this effect permanent? It is important to find an answer to these questions in order to 
directly compare the effectiveness of direct governmental monitoring activity in 
increasing corporate information quality with other regulatory mechanisms. 
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Finally, empirical evidence could be gathered on the determinants of SEC comment 
letters. Given that higher audit quality should lead to higher reporting quality. it could be 
interesting to analyze whether audit quality influences the probability of receiving a SEC 
comment letter. As Chen and Johnston (20 I 0) demonstrated that SEC comment letters 
seem to have an impact on investors' perceptions of firms' information environmenes, 
this evidence could help companies to understand how to avoid the negative effects 
induced by SEC comment letters. 
d' I around earnings announcements that 
75 In particular they find reduced return volatility and tra mg.\'o ume 
were preceded by a SEC comment letter. See Chapter 6, sectIOn 6.2.2. 
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